Over two months after the Supreme Court (SC) of India order of Aug 13, 2013[1], the MEF has now constituted an expert committee, see MEF order no: L-11011/14/2011-IA.I (Vol-II) dated Oct 15, 2013[2].
The constitution of the committee under the chairpersonship of Ravi Chopra is welcome, with the inclusion of some independent and expert members. At the same time, the committee is unwieldy with excessive inclusion of government members and members with conflict of interest. This raises doubts if the committee will be allowed to function in an independent way. The committee has not been given the full mandate as required by the Supreme Court order.
1. The MoEF order says in the very first para of the order, “Ministry of Environment & Forests hereby constitutes an Expert Committee to make a detailed study as to whether Hydroelectric power projects existing and under construction in the river basins of Alkananda, Bhagirathi and their tributaries”. It also says that the expert committee has been set up following Supreme Court orders dated Aug 13, 2013. But why limit to Alaknanda Bhagirathi (AB) basin and its tributaries? That leaves out a huge area of Uttarakhand that also suffered damages, including Ganga, Yamuna and Kali-Gori basins and where too hydropower projects are present and under construction. The SC order was not limited to AB basins, but was applicable to the entire UttarakhandState“Hydroelectric Power Projects existing and under construction have contributed to the environmental degradation, if so, to what extent and also whether it has contributed to the present tragedy occurred at Uttarakhand”. This committee’s mandate to look at only Alaknanda and BhagirathiBasins is limited does not comply with the SC order.
2. Mr BP Das, a member of this expert body, is former vice chair of Ministry of Environment and Forests’ (MoEF) EAC (Expert Appraisal Committee on River Valley Projects). He has been a member of EAC for many years and many of the projects cleared by the EAC that he was member of will now be reviewed by the committee this is clearly wrong. He has also presided over decisions to clear projects that WII had recommended be dropped. By making him member of this committee he will be now sitting on judgement over those same projects. Mr. B.P. Das has also been the head of committee constituted by MoEF which looked at environmental compliance of 330 MW Srinagar HEP of GVK company. To make Mr. Das a member of the committee is clearly inappropriate.
3. Similarly Mr G L Bansal has been a member of the EAC and hence his selection in this committee involves conflict of interest and should not have been done.
4. The second TOR of the committee says: “Examine, as observed by Wildlife Institute of India (WII) in its report, as to whether the proposed 24 projects in Uttarakhand are causing significant impact on the Biodiversity of Alaknanda & Bhagirathi river basins.” The Supreme Court order of Aug 13, 2013 had asked MoEF to take a view on these projects, which the ministry so far has refused to do. it has passed the hat to this committee.
This TOR too is very limited. It asks if the 24 projects are causing “significant impact” on biodiversity of AB basins. Do we need another expert committee to opine if big hydropower projects are causing significant impacts on biodiversity, when an expert body like WII has already concluded the impacts are so serious that the projects need to be dropped? This seems to be making fun of the WII report and attempt to not to respond to the SC order.
5. It seems some of the government members have been added just to make the committee loaded with government persons. Some such member includes Chief Engineer of Uttarakhand Water Resources Department, Expert representatives of NIRM, ICFRI, NDMA and CPWD. They were not part of the SC order. These bodies also do not have any expertise or direct involvement in hydropower projects. If the committee needed their expertise, they can in any case be asked to depose before the committee. Their presence is unnecessary and makes the committee unwieldy and difficult to manage.
6. Several respected women have been working on issues related to sustainable development, hydropower, its impacts on communities and ecosystems. However, the present committee does not have any representation from women. This is a serious concern.
This committee has a serious task ahead of it and for completing it effectively and in an unbiased manner, its mandate needs to be expanded to include whole of Uttarakhand as per the SC order. The constitution needs to be streamlined and members with conflict of interest as well as unnecessary government representation, as mentioned above need to be dropped.
Gangtok, 9 October 2013: Deemed as the greenest state in India, the government of Sikkim has drawn flak of the national board of wildlife (NBWL) for blatant violation of the environmental norms and the standing order of the Supreme Court in implementation of several hydro power projects under different stages of construction.
The background: In its 28th meeting held on 20th March 2013, the proposal for 520 MW Teesta Stage-IV Hydroelectric Power Project, on River Teesta in North Sikkim to be developed by NHPC Ltd, was placed before the SC-NBWL (Standing Committee-National Board of Wild Life) for consideration. The Member Secretary had informed the SC-NBWL that the project location falls 4 km away from the Fambonglho Wildlife Sanctuary and was recommended by the State Board for Wildlife.
Photo from SC-NBWL committee report has this caption: Construction of the Teesta III project at Chungthang on the edge of Khangchendzonga National Park proceeding without SC-NBWL clearances. Note the extensive forest cover and large landslides at the site
Following discussions, the SC-NBWL decided that a team comprising Dr M.K.Ranjitsinh, Kishor Rithe, Dr A.J.T Johnsingh and Dr M.D. Madhusudan would carry out site inspection and submit a report to the committee for its consideration. Following this decision, the above committee visited the project site and nearby areas from 15th to 21st May 2013. The committee met the representatives from the Sikkim Government’s Forest, Environment and Wildlife Management Department (FEWMD), the user agency, NHPC Ltd, and people from local citizens’ groups. The report of the committee dated Aug 2013 is now available online (http://envfor.nic.in/division/wl-orders).
The report raises serious concerns about a number of hydropower projects in Sikkim under construction without wildlife clearance in contravention to the Supreme Court order[1] (in the Goa foundation case). The Chamling government in Sikkim has allowed blatant violation of the Supreme Court order, a situation compared by the report with what had happened in Goa with respect to mines which were operating without wildlife clearance in violation of SC orders (the subject of the Shah Commission report). The Union Ministry of Environment and Forests is equally responsible for allowing continuing construction of these projects without legally mandatory clearances. The decision based on this report in the NBWL Standing Committee is still pending.
Map with locations of projects and protected areas from the SC-NBWL committee report
Both before and during site inspection, multiple stakeholders brought to the notice of the NBWL team that there were other proposed and ongoing hydel projects in the Teesta Basin located within the eco-sensitive zone (as defined by the Supreme Court in the Goa Foundation case), of the Khangchendzonga NP and Fambonglho WLS, which had not obtained the Supreme Court mandated clearance from the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife.
Besides this, the team in their journeys saw two projects under active construction—the Dik Chu[2] and the Teesta III[3]—that were clearly within the Supreme Court mandated eco-sensitive area. For Dik Chu HEP, the report says, “However, the accompanying FEWMD officials informed us that these mandatory wildlife clearances from the SC-NBWL had, apparently, not been obtained.” For Teesta III HEP, FEWMD officials were not aware of the SC-NBWL clearance, and the committee noted, we “must therefore conclude, on the basis of information available with us, that such a clearance was not obtained… we are deeply concerned about the advisability of this project.”
Deeply concerned about the likelihood of various hydel projects coming up in violation of the Supreme Court’s order in the Goa Foundation case, the team has requested the MoEF to write to the government of Sikkim, seeking a comprehensive list of completed, ongoing and proposed hydroelectric projects within the Supreme Court mandated 10-kilometre zone of the Khangchendzonga National Park (KNP) and Fambonglho Wildlife Sanctuary (FWLS). For each project, details sought included: (a) location (latitude-longitude) and distance from KNP and FWLS; (b) current status of the project; and (c) if and when they had obtained the required Environment, Forest and Wildlife Clearances. Even after waiting for 10 weeks, the NBWL team did not receive either an acknowledgment, or a response from the Pawan Chamling government to their query.
The committee, left with no option was compelled to use publicly available information on Environmental Clearances (EC) (http://environmentclearance.nic.in), submissions and information provided by other stakeholders, and to examine minutes from the SC-NBWL’s meetings, to ascertain if there was merit to the allegations made about the violations of the Supreme Court’s order of 12/2006.
Key recommendations Based on examination of available information on legal compliances required for the projects in the Teesta basin, the committee concluded that, with the notable exception of the Teesta IV project (which has currently approached the SC-NBWL for clearance), none of the other projects appear to have sought/obtained this compulsory SC-NBWL clearance, as mandated by the Supreme Court. While the SC-NBWL is fully aware that there are many more proposed/ongoing hydroelectric projects situated within the Supreme Court mandated 10-km eco-sensitive zone of wildlife sanctuaries and national parks in Sikkim, it has not been able to ascertain whether Supreme Court stipulations in their regard are being followed, or being violated, and if latter be the case, the MoEF should take due cognizance of the same urgently.
“We are of the unanimous considered opinion that it is absolutely essential to assess the overall impact of these projects, both from the recent past and those in the pipeline, rather than deal with them in a piecemeal fashion. Hence, we urge the Standing Committee not to consider the Teesta IV project’s request for clearance separately, but treat it as part of a larger set of hydroelectric projects in the Teesta Basin, with vast ecological, social and legal portents”, the committee has recommended.
It further recommend that the Standing Committee direct the MoEF to write to the Government of Sikkim asking them to immediately investigate and submit a detailed report listing hydroelectric projects in Sikkim that are being constructed prima facie in violation of Supreme Court’s order. Based on the list provided by the government of Sikkim, if it is indeed ascertained that the projects are proceeding in violation of the said Supreme Court ruling, it further adds that the MoEF initiate action by asking the State Government to suspend ongoing work on those projects immediately and to direct user agencies to formally seek clearance for these projects from the SC-NBWL. It adds that the MoEF and the Government of Sikkim thoroughly investigate the circumstances under which the seemingly widespread bypassing of Supreme Court orders in the construction of dams within the 10-km ecosensitive zone of Sikkim has taken place, fix responsibility for the transgressions and violations, and punish the guilty.
About Teesta IV proposal from NHPC, for which the committee visited Sikkim, the report recommends, “Finally, in the light of the devastating June 2013 Uttarakhand floods, we are deeply concerned about the wisdom of such large-scale manipulations of mountain river systems that are being implemented, against all reasonable scientific advice (and thedisregard of the CISHME’s recommendation against the construction of Teesta III, is a case in point)… Hence, we urge the Standing Committee not to consider the Teesta IV project’s request for clearance separately, but treat it as part of a larger set of hydroelectric projects in the TeestaBasin, with vast ecological, social and legal portents.”
The report also recommends that projects already in the pipeline and that may be proposed in future in Sikkim, be placed before the Standing Committee, “chaired by a very senior official of the MoEF, Besides senior officials of the MoEF and the Sikkim Government, this committee must include legal experts as well as experts in hydrology/ geology/ seismology/ social science/ botany/ riverine ecology/wildlife ecology, from reputed research institutions and some representatives of local communities” whenever they fall within the purview of the Supreme Court-mandated 10 km eco-sensitive area around PAs. The committee report adds that much of the summary and recommendations section of Justice Shah’s report (pp. 189-200) is extremely relevant to the case of the hydroelectric dams in Sikkim, and that any committee constituted to examine hydroelectric dams in the eco-sensitive areas of Sikkim, pay close attention to this report.
No ecological flows from NHPC’s Teesta V What the report says about this subject makes disturbing reading: ”On 16th May 2013, driving upstream of the Teesta V powerhouse, we noted extremely low flow in the river, which was particularly so in the stretch of the river directly downstream of the Teesta V dam (Figure 1), where the river was diverted through a tunnel. Such low flows, where River Teesta has been diverted through tunnels, are a cause for serious concern in the context of maintaining the ecological function of a river. We enquired from NHPC officials about how details of ecological flows were determined, and learnt that ecological flow was not a parameter that was optimised in the planning process. We were told that downstream flows were effectively a consequence of maximising hydropower potential of various river basins as determined jointly by the Central Electricity Authority and the Central Water Commission. These values, in turn, were used as the basis for soliciting proposals for hydroelectric power projects. In other words, we learnt to our great dismay that absolutely no ecological consideration whatsoever was used in the process of determining the hydropower potential of river basins.”
Violations galore, government unresponsive In a submission made by Tseten Lepcha in his capacity as the then Honorary Wildlife Warden of North Sikkim to Jayanthi Natarajan in 8th October 2011, Lepcha had contended that how the 1750 MW Demwe Lower by the Athena group is being considered by the SC-NBWL for wildlife clearance, when a project by the same promoters (1200 MW Teesta III) is under construction in violation of Supreme Court orders (without wildlife clearance). The current NBWL report confirms that the 1200 MW Teesta III is under construction illegally, violating SC orders. In an earlier submission he had made to the SC-NBWL on April 19, 2011 he mentioned violation of the WLPA (killing of a Serow – Schedule I species) in the 1200 MW Teesta III project being developed by the Athena group. The developer of the project, Teesta Urja Ltd (a special purpose vehicle of M/S Athena Pvt. Ltd.), through its sub-contractor, SEW Infrastructure Ltd, was involved in the death of a Serow (Capricornis sumanntraensis), a Schedule I animal, at the project site on June 4, 2008.
Photo from SC-NBWL com report with this caption: The Teesta V dam showing the virtual absence of flow in the river downstream of the dam, which can have devastating consequences for river-dwelling and river-dependent species
Several attempts by this correspondent, to contact the PCCF –cum-Secretary of the FEWM department of Sikkim Mr. Arvind Kumar on his cell phone, and his official e-mail address to get the Sikkim government’s official version on the controversy, remained unanswered.
How IPPs are cheating by flouting norms Sikkim Bhutia Lepcha Apex Committee (SIBLAC) convenor Tseten Tashi Bhutia, while speaking to this correspondent expressed immense joy at the NBWL report. “We have been protesting cultural and religious genocide being committed by the Sikkim government in the name of developing hydro power, apart from severely degrading the environment, this is a moral boost. I hope GOI takes strong action”, he said. Bhutia added that there are violations of the Places of Worship (special provisions) Act 1991, extended to Sikkim, and the gazette notifications of the Chamling government, in allowing the Tashiding project on holy river Rathong Chu.
SIBLAC along with another apolitical group Save Sikkim on September 28th, 2013 filed FIRs against an IPP, Shiga Energy Pvt ltd, developer of the 97 MW Tashiding hydro power project for alleged cheating, distortion of facts and violation of environmental norms and the SC order. This is in addition to an ongoing PIL at the Sikkim High Court.
The facts revealed by Tseten Tashi Bhutia in his FIR are startling and shocking. As per the requirement of the Environment Ministry (MoEF, Government of India), the executing agency i.e. Shiga Energy Private Limited, is required to submit a Six-monthly compliance report[4] on the status of the 97 MW Tashiding HEP to the stipulated environmental conditions in a prescribed format .However, while going through the latest Six monthly report dated 22.11.2012[5] submitted by the executing agency to the concerned authority i.e. North Eastern Region Office, Ministry of Environment & Forest, Government of India , it is found that as against the IX necessary conditions required in the prescribed format, the executing agency have intentionally deleted Stipulation No. VIII, jumping to the next condition.
The Monitoring report of MEF regional office (signed by DR S C KATIYAR, SCIENTIST ‘D’) dated Oct 2012[6] says about Stipulation VIII: “the proposed site is about 5 Km away from the buffer zone of the Khangchendzonga Biosphere Reserve as per Supreme Court order clearance from NBWL may be obtained (if required).” Status of Compliance: “Not complied with” and further writes; “the project also falls within 10 Kms from the Fambomgla Wildlife Sanctuary, as such; NBWL clearance needs to be obtained.”
Thus the agency has not complied to nor has obtained NBWL clearance yet as evident from the Monitoring Report on the Implementation Status of Conditions of Environmental Clearance dated Oct 4th, 2012. In other words, the executing agency has simply and swiftly been misleading and cheating the authorities till date by submitting wrong report to Ministry of Environment and Forest, Govt. of India. More surprising is to witness the lack of action by the MoEF on these manipulations and lack of action even after the Monitoring Report clearly reports non compliance.
Rathongchu is a sacred river according to the Denjong Neyig and Nesol texts having its source at various secret and sacred lakes at Khangchendzonga, Sikkim’s supreme guardian deity and runs independently till it meets River Rangit at the lower reaches; This sacred Rathongchu is the source to the annual Tashiding Bumchu ceremony which is held in the first lunar month, corresponding to the months of February and March. In fact, this Bumchu (Sacred Water) ceremony has been continuing for centuries and attracts thousands of devotees and pilgrimages from far across including Bhutan, Nepal, and entire Himalayas.
Ironically, a one-man Professor P S Ramakrishnan committee, of the JNU School of Environmental Sciences, submitted a report titled Ecology and Traditional Wisdom, on October 9th 1995, to the government of Sikkim where he categorically stated, “on social, cultural, and religious considerations, apart from the rich bio-diversity and fragile ecology of the Yuksom valley region, I strongly recommend that no hydro power or other projects should be allowed on River Rathongchu, deemed extremely sacred by Buddhists”. Under the circumstances, how was the Tashiding HEP allotted to the Shiga Energy Ltd by the Sikkim Government and cleared by the MoEF is moot question.
Some of the other proposed projects that are mentioned in the SC-NBWL committee that are also coming up requiring the SC-NBWL clearance include the 300 MW Panan HEP, the Ting Ting HEP, besides the ones mentioned above, see the accompanying map from the SC-NBWL report. Other hydropower projects of Sikkim that are being considered by the MoEF for clearances and that are also close to the protected areas include: 63 MW Rolep HEP on Rangpo river in E Sikkim (5-6 km from Pangolakha and Kyongnosla WLS), 126 MW Ralong HEP (4.05 km from Kangchendzonga Biosphere Reserve and 1.8 km from Maenam Wildlife Sanctuary), 96 MW Chakung Chu HEP inn North Sikkim district (1.8 km from Kangchendzonga Biosphere Reserve). Other such possible projects include: 71 MW Sada Mangder, 60 MW Rangit III, among others.
Let us hope now following the SC-NBWL report, the MoEF will promptly order stoppage of illegally ongoing construction of the guilty HEPs, not waiting for the SC-NBWL committee to meet, since the new Standing Committee of the NBWL remains to be constituted after the term of the earlier committee ended. The evidence provided by the SC-NBWL committee is sufficient to take prompt action. The fact that the MoEF has not take action yet, weeks after submission of the SC-NBWL report speaks volumes about the possible collusion of the MoEF in this murky affair.
[1] WP 406/2004, Goa Foundation vs. Union of India, Order dated 04/12/2006: “The MoEF would also refer to the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife, under Sections 5 (b) and 5 (c) (ii) of the Wild
Life (Protection) Act, the cases where environment clearance has already been granted where activities are within 10 km. zone”
[3] The Six monthly compliance report for Teesta III dated June 2013 also is quite on the issue of compliance with SC-NBWL clearance, see: http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Compliance/57_Teesta%20HEP-III%20_june2013.pdf, the condition for this was mentioned in the MoEF letter dated 30-04-2010 with additional condition: “Considering the proximity of Khangchendzonga National Park from the project site, clearance from the Standing Committee of theNational Board for Wildlife (NBWL) should be obtained”.
Days after walking down the Gori, we go to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Dharchula sub-division, Pramod Kumar, who is busy coordinating rescue and relief on a war-footing, but still has the courtesy to meet. On being asked by me regarding the sudden release of water by the 280 MW National Hydro-Power Corporation (NHPC) Dhauliganga Hydro-Electric Project (HEP, see below the layout of the project given on NHPC website) at Chirkila and the ensuing damage downstream, he confirms that he received an emergency call on the night of 16th June, 2013 from the NHPC, asking that they be permitted to release the impounded water in their reservoir, because it was in danger of breaching. Under normal circumstances they do not need his permission. He also confirms that he had refused, because the water level in the Mahakali main-stem was already flowing at danger-mark. NHPC went right ahead and opened their gates at full on the night of 16th June, without authorization or any prior warning to anybody[1] but their own office-residence complex 20 km downstream, at Dobat.
Map of Dhauliganga Dam Source: NHPC
Was this really an emergency, or was this purely opportunistic on the part of NHPC to take this opportunity early in the season to flush their reservoir that had been filled almost to half with bed-load and silt? We went looking for clues and information. I went to the NHPC office complex at Dobat, and met Bhuvan Chand Joshi, their Public Relations Officer. After giving me the spiel on how safe, and how green this so called run-of-the-river (ROR) project was, constructed by no less than the Japanese, the Germans and the Koreans put together[2], he admitted that their underground power-station was entirely flooded. Housed in a gigantic underground cavern about 100 meters long, four-storeys high at 40 meters and about 16 meters wide, river water had filled it right upto the control-room on the fourth floor. I had already been told by Kesar Singh Dhami, taxi owner of Dharchula, that on the 16th June itself, when he was ferrying the first batch of Kailash yatris to the road-head on their way up to Tibet, he had noticed the reservoir was filled high already with flood-waters, with large uprooted trees and other woody debris floating at the damsite. He confirms that water was being released, but only a small release, despite the dam being fuller than he had ever seen it.
I was also told by another employee of NHPC (who did not wish to be named) that what had gone wrong was that despite the high flows on the 15th and 16th June, the power-station continued with production of electricity as usual. In what seems to be an unbelievably short-sighted and poor design, the Tail-race Tunnel, from where water is released back into the river after having turned the turbines, is flushed into a tributary stream, the Ellagad. It was when Ellagad also pulsed, that it sent a train of bed-load debris down its lower reaches, effectively blocking the exit of the Tail-race Tunnel coming out of the powerhouse. The power house continued to take in water from the Head-race Tunnel intake to work their turbines, unaware that the exit for water had been blocked. It is only when the water blocked in the Tail-race Tunnel surged back up, burst through the turbine units and began flooding the powerhouse, that NHPC even know that something was wrong. It was then that the massive curved steel gates of the intake were slid shut, and the powerhouse evacuated. This was further confirmed by Joshi, PRO, who also said that the ‘matter was under investigation’ by their own team for organizational detail. The General Manager and the Chief Engineer of the Dhauliganga HEP had meanwhile been transferred out. It is not clear yet how soon after the powerhouse was flooded, that they opened the sluice gates at the bottom of the reservoir. Draining it was clearly beneficial for NHPC, but catastrophic for roads, bridges and habitations downstream, both in India and Nepal.
Dhauliganga before the disaster, with zero water flow downstream from the dam, killing a perennial river. Source: Author
If you look closely enough, there are two separate events here. The flooding of the powerhouse, and the ’emergency’ release of reservoir water. The powerhouse was not flooded because of too much water in the reservoir, but because it was in operation when its tail-race exit seven km downstream, is blocked-off because of poor short-sighted design[3]. They are then forced to close the gates of the intake, and abandon the powerhouse where water has reached the control-room on the fourth floor. The intake gates are now shut, but the flood waters continue to fill the reservoir further. They have already allowed the dam fill to a very high level, and here is the other curious factor.
The design of the Dhauliganga dam, is such that the dam has no provision for water to ‘overflow’ the dam safely, should undesired (even if foreseeable) levels be reached as they did this year. Or say if giant boulders block the narrow sluice gates at the bottom of the reservoir. Or in the real-time situation of what actually happened this year, the blocking of the tail-race tunnel leading to flooding of the powerhouse, hence requiring the shutting off of the intake, and losing the option of reducing reservoir levels more gradually and safely through two simultaneous releases. They then open the flood-gates. Clearly, one of two things have led to this decision:
One, letting the reservoir fill to a very high level is not out of the ordinary for NHPC; they do it every monsoon, as they had done on 16th June as well. It is not for many months in the year that they have enough water to run all four turbines. Despite the run-of-the-river label, Joshi confirmed that they were unable to let anywater to continue to flow un-diverted in the river-channel during the winter-spring months (we have photographic evidence of this as well), or they would not have water to turn even one turbine! The mandatory requirement that every hydro-power dam in Uttarakhand be required to release at least 10% of the river’s minimum flows at all times (as greatly insufficient as such a small flow is for downstream life), it seems neither a consideration while justifying the economics of such projects, and neither is it complied to here. The use of the term run-of-the-river here, is plain deception.
The Dhauliganga Hydro-power dam, after being flushed of bed-load sediment Source: Author
Their regular annual schedule for flushing the reservoir of bed-load and sediment is normally the 15th of July and the 31st of July every year. Here again, when the reservoir is full, and there is enough water to provide the pressure for increased and accelerated flow to flush the reservoir on a twice-annual basis. Both flushing schedules follow each other closely at peak-flow season, so that the flushing is as complete as possible, and there is enough of a monsoon season ahead to fill the reservoir up again before the winter-lean. The probable reason for preponing the flushing could be the chance of flushing some of the unusually high accumulation of bed-load debris that had come down in this years flood. What this meant to the efficiency of the power-station is one thing, but what it means to all life in and along the river, is quite another.
Two, that the faulty design of the dam, both in location of its tail-race exit as well as no provision for over-topping, in combination with the carelessness of allowing the reservoir to fill to such levels at the start of the monsoon, was responsible for the ’emergency’ catastrophic release.
Stitched photo of the bed of the drained Dhauliganga reservoir Source: Author
The Dhauliganga HEP is located on the Darma–yangti river, re-christened the Dhauliganga river, just a couple of kilometers upstream of the confluence with the Mahakali at Tawaghat. In these two kilometers, the rivers flows (twice a year when it is allowed to, for a few hours) down steeply to the confluence which it meets at right-angles. With the Mahakali already in spate, coupled with the sudden release of more than 6 million cubic meters of stored water (Gross Storage Capacity), plus the flow of the river in flood (steadily increasing from 398 cubic meters a second on 15th June), as well as millions of tonnes of bed-load boulders and sediment, the damage downstream is clear to see. If you look at the fresh scour-level on the banks downstream of the dam, it is in places more than 15 meters higher than the flood-level flow of the DhauliRiver. The river added thousands of tonnes of even more debris when, because of the flood level it reached, it tore through, plucking high at the talus-cones on either bank, and at every turn. At the confluence at Tawaghat, there must have been something of a back-flood for some time (a common flood phenomenon where the high-flowing main-stem creates a temporary water-dam), because the water-level seems to have risen very high, taking away the bridge that connects the entire Kuti valley and the trade route to Tibet, tearing away almost the entire village-market complex at Tawaghat, and destroying the road as well. The flood waters had clearly reached the top of the road because of the deposition of river-sand on it. When I walked this section days later, the river was only less than a meter below danger mark. Even so, it was flowing about 12 meters below the road! Further downstream, the destruction was more serious.
In order to understand the magnitude of this flood event, I ask Joshi of NHPC for flow-data of the Dhauli river between the 12th and the 18th of June. He goes off for some time and returns with a sheet of paper that has hand-scrawled 6 hourly flow volumes from 12th June, but stops short at 15th June. All the flow volumes between the 12th and the 15th were below 150 cubic meters a second (cumecs), and at 12 am, on the night of the 15th June it jumps up to 389.92 cumecs. This is just the start of the flood. Joshi seems to balk right here, and says that they have not received data for the 16th June yet (the day I speak to him was the 8th of July), and that he may get it after a week or so. And anyway, he says, the powerhouse was abandoned from the night of the 16thJune, so getting data beyond that would be out of question. It is clear that Joshi was unwilling to give me flow-data for the duration of the flood-pulse. He had only minutes before informed me of how automated the whole operation was, and that it was possible for them to even operate the power-house sitting in their Dobat office-complex itself. The real scenario will be clear when we get flow data for the 16th and 17th of June.
According to NHPC, the Peak Flood Design for the Dhauliganga HEP is 3,210 cumecs, at a return interval of 100 years. That is the flow volumes that the dam is designed to be able to take without damage, at flood levels expected at least every hundred years. It is unlikely that flow volumes had reached almost 10 times the flow volumes of the flood on the 15th June at the damsite (389.92 cumecs). NHPC gets its flow data from an automated level-gauge at the reservoir, so it did not require anyone to take readings manually, even prior to abandoning the station. If unprecedented levels had indeed been reached, then why had they held on to water in the reservoir right till the night of the 16th June? Please see the accompanying photographs, of the dam reservoir, empty of water. You can see at least two levels of cut-away terraces. The lower ones are alluvial terraces, consisting clearly of coarser gravels and cobbles deposited by the flowing river. The higher terraces, more visible high on the upper true-left bank in the photo, are remnant lacustrine (lake-bed) terraces, consisting of finer silts and sand, deposited by the stilled waters in the reservoir when it was full. This was the highest point of sediment accumulation in the reservoir prior to being flushed out. Clearly, at least 45% the reservoir was full of debris and sediment before NHPC flushed it. And if you look at the brown line on the concrete face of the dam, you see the level that the reservoir was allowed to fill upto, marked by the ‘bath-tub ring’ of floating bark and woody debris stuck there after draining.
Joshi tells me that when a delegation of people from Nepal came to NHPC to talk about the possible role that NHPC’s sudden release of water might have had on the flood that devastated Khalanga bazar at Darchula, he had told them that to the contrary, the dam had saved Nepal from great damage. “See how much debris is still behind our reservoir!” This was bare-faced misinformation. There are two aspects being denied here. One, that great masses of debris were actually flushed out from the lower-end of the reservoir on the night of 16th June, leading to greatly increased flood levels as well as erosive potential downstream, especially on the Nepal bank at Darchula, which bore the brunt of flushed debris centrifuged on the curve. As is evident from the photo of the dam-site above, most of the debris that has been flushed, is from the front-end of the reservoir only. And two, that all dams and reservoirs, despite some being able to flush out debris from a section of the reservoir, do actually hold back a great deal of bed-load as well as suspended sediment in the upper end of the reservoir. They impede the very essential flow of sediment down to the oceans. Look now at the geometry of bed-load debris in the stitched photo. Distortions from the wide-angle lens apart, it clearly shows a gradual slope, and a filling up of the bed-rock channel to form a wide, sloping flood-plain. Had it not been for the dam, the bed-load would have continued to fill up the bed-rock channel downstream at about the same angle, slowing the entire flow of water and entrained debris. It would not have been washed down catastrophically all the way down to Darchula, without the force of an additional 6 million m³ of stored water released suddenly.
[1] NHPC never gives warning of sudden releases. There is a notice painted on a board at Tawaghat, the first river-side habitation downstream, that warns people not to go anywhere near the river, because water may be released anytime.
[2] Kajima Construction Corporation Ltd of Japan, Daewoo Engineering and Construction Company of Korea, and Bauer Maschinen of Germany.
[3] How a tail-race exit could be planned on the Ellagad stream which is very steep and unstable, full of debris from a service tunnel, and highly ‘flashy’, is indicative of poor design and of lax design approval mechanisms.
The Study The study has been done by IRG Systems South Asia Private Limited (http://www.irgssa.com/, a subsidiary of US based IRG Systems) and http://www.eqmsindia.com/[i]. It is supposed to be a Cumulative Impact Assessment of 19 HEPs planned in the basin, out of which PFRs of 7 are available, DPR of two, and one of which, the 2000 MW Subansiri Lower HEP is under construction.
Subversion of Environment Governance in the Subansiri basin While looking at this basin study, the subversion of environment governance in Subansiri basin this very millennia should be kept in mind. A glimpse of it is provided in Annexure 1. In fact, one of the key conditions of environmental clearance to the 2000 MW Lower Subansiri HEP was that no more projects will be taken up in the basin upstream of the Lower Subansiri HEP, which essentially would mean no more projects in the basin, since LSHEP is close to the confluence of the Subansiri River with Brahmaputra River. That condition was also part of the Supreme Court order in 2004. The need for a carrying capacity study was also stressed in the National Board of Wild Life discussions. We still do not have one. In a sense, the Subansiri basin is seeing the consequences of that subversion.
Information in public domain not known to consultants The report does not even state that Middle Subansiri dam have also been recommended TOR in 41st EAC meeting in Sept 2010. This project will require 3180 ha of land, including 1333 Ha forest land, and 2867 ha area under submergence. Even about Upper Subansiri, the consultants do not know the area of forest land required (2170 ha). So the consultants have not used even the information available in public domain in EAC meetings.
Study based on flawed and incomplete Lohit Basin Study The Study claims that it is based on Lohit Basin Study done by WAPCOS. Lohit Basin Study is an extremely flawed attempt and does not assess cumulative impacts of the cascade projects. Civil society has written about this to the EAC and the EAC itself has considered the study twice (53rd and 65th EAC Meetings), and has not accepted the study, but has raised several doubts. Any study based on a flawed model like Lohit Basin Study should not be acceptable.
No mention of Social impacts Major limitation of the study has been absolutely no discussion on the severe social impacts due to cumulative forest felling, flux of population, submergence, livelihoods like riparian farming and fishing, etc. Though this has been pointed out by the TAC in its meeting and field visit, the report does not reflect this.
Some key Impacts Some of the impacts highlighted by the study based on incomplete information about HEPs are:
Þ The length of the river Subansiri is 375 km up to its outfall in the Brahamaputra River. Approximately 212.51 km total length of Subansiri will be affected due to only 8 of the proposed 19 HEPs in Subansiri River basin.
Þ Total area brought under submergence for dam and other project requirements is approx. 10, 032 ha of eight proposed HEPs. The extent of loss of forest in rest of the 9 projects is not available.
Þ 62 species belonging to Mammals (out of 105 reported species), 50 Aves (out of 175 reported species) and 2 amphibians (out of 6 reported species) in Subansiri Basin are listed in Schedules of Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 (as amended till date).
Þ 99 species belonging to Mammals (out of 105 reported species), 57 species belonging to Aves (out of 175 reported species), 1 Reptilian (out of 19 reported species), 2 Amphibians (out of 6 reported species), 28 fishes (out of 32 reported species), 25 species belonging to Odonata of Insecta fauna group (out of 28 reported species) are reported to be assessed as per IUCN’s threatened categories.
Even this incomplete and partial list of impacts should give an idea of the massive impacts that are in store for the basin.
Cumulative impacts NOT ASSESSED Specifically, some of the cumulative impacts that the report has not assessed at all or not adequately include:
1. Cumulative impact of blasting of so many tunnels on various aspects as also blasting for other project components.
2. Cumulative impact of mining of various materials required for the projects (sand, boulders, coarse and fine granules, etc.)
3. Cumulative impact of muck dumping into rivers (the normal practice of project developers) and also of also muck dumping done properly, if at all.
Subansiri River in the Upper Reaches Source: Lovely Arunachal
4. Changes in sedimentation at various points within project, at various points within a day, season, year, over the years and cumulatively across the basin and impacts thereof.
5. Cumulative impact on aquatic and terrestrial flora and fauna across the basin due to all the proposed projects.
6. Cumulative impact of the projects on disaster potential in the river basin, due to construction and also operation at various stages, say on landslides, flash floods, etc.
7. Cumulative dam safety issue due to cascade of projects.
8. Cumulative change in flood characteristics of the river due to so many projects.
9. Cumulative impacts due to peaking power generation due to so many projects.
10. Cumulative sociological impact of so many projects on local communities and society.
11. Cumulative impact on hydrological flows, at various points within project, at various points within a day, season, year, over the years and cumulatively across the basin and impacts thereof. This will include impacts on various hydrological elements including springs, tributaries, groundwater aquifers, etc. This will include accessing documents to see what the situation BEFORE project and would be after. The report has failed to do ALL THIS.
12. Impact of silt laden water into the river channel downstream from the dam, and how this gets accumulated across the non-monsoon months and what happens to it. This again needs to be assessed singly and cumulatively for all projects.
13. Impact of release of silt free water into the river downstream from the power house and impact thereof on the geo morphology, erosion, stability of structures etc, singly and cumulatively.
14. Impact on Green House Gas emissions, project wise and cumulatively. No attempt is made for this.
15. Impact of differential water flow downstream from power house in non-monsoon months, with sudden release of heavy flows during peaking/ power generation hours and no releases during other times.
16. Cumulative impact of all the project components (dam, tunnels, blasting, power house, muck dumping, mining, road building, township building, deforestation, transmission lines, etc.,) for a project and then adding for various projects. Same should also be done for the periods during construction, operation and decommissioning phases of the projects.
17. Cumulative impact of deforestation due to various projects.
18. Cumulative impact of non compliance of the environment norms, laws, Environment clearance and forest clearance conditions and environment management plans. Such an assessment should also have analysed the quality of EIA report done for the Subansiri Lower hydropower project.
Wrong, misleading statements in Report There are a very large number of wrong and misleading statements in the report. Below we have given some, along with comment on each of them, this list is only for illustrative purposes.
Sr No
Statement in CIA
Comment
1
“During the monsoon period there will be significant discharge in Brahmaputra River. The peaking discharge of these hydroelectric projects which are quite less in comparison to Brahmaputra discharge will hardly have any impact on Brahmaputra.”
This is a misleading statement. It also needs to be assessed what will be the impact on specific stretches of Subansiri river. Secondly, the projects are not likely to operate in peaking mode in monsoon.
2
“However, some impact in form of flow regulation can be expected during the non-monsoon peaking from these projects.”
This is not correct statement as the impact of non-monsoon peaking is likely to be of many different kinds, besides “flow regulation” as the document describes.
3
“Further, during the non-monsoon period the peaking discharge release of the projects in upper reaches of Subansiri basin will be utilized by the project at lower reaches of the basin and net peaking discharge from the lower most project of the basin in general will be the governing one for any impact study.”
This is again wrong. What about the impact of such peaking on rivers between the projects?
4
“The construction of the proposed cascade development of HEPs in Subansiri basin will reduce water flow, especially during dry months, in the intervening stretch between the Head Race Tunnel (HRT) site and the discharge point of Tail Race Tunnel (TRT).”
This statement seems to indicate that the consultants have poor knowledge or understanding of the functioning of the hydropower projects. HRT is not one location, it is a length. So it does not make sense to say “between HRT and the discharge point of TRT”.
5
“For mature fish, upstream migration would not be feasible. This is going to be the major adverse impact of the project. Therefore, provision of fish ladder can be made in the proposed dams.”
This is simplistic statement without considering the height of the various dams (124 m high Nalo HEP dam, 237 m high Upper Subansiri HEP dam, 222 m high Middle Subansiri HEP dam), feasibility of fish ladders what can be optimum design, for which fish species, etc.
6
“…water release in lean season for fishes may be kept between 10-15% for migration and sustaining ecological functions except Hiya and Nyepin HEP. Therefore, it is suggested that the minimum 20% water flow in lean season may be maintained at Hiya and Nyepin HEP for fish migration.”
This conclusion seems unfounded, the water release suggested is even lower than the minimum norms that EAC of MoEF follows.
Viability not assessed The report concludes: “The next steps include overall assessment of the impacts on account of hydropower development in the basin, which will be described in draft final report.”
One of the key objective of the Cumulative Impact assessment is to assess how many of the planned projects are viable considering the impacts, hydrology, geology, forests, biodiversity, carrying capacity and society. The consultants have not even applied their mind to key objective in this study. They seem to assume that all the proposed projects can and should come up and are all viable. It seems the consultant has not understood the basic objectives of CIA. The least the consultant could have said is that further projects should not be taken up for consideration till all the information is available and full and proper Cumulative impact assessment is done.
The consultants have also not looked at the need for free flowing stretches of rivers between the projects.
Section on Environmental Flows (Chapter 4 and 9): The section on Environmental flows is one of the weakest and most problematic sections of the report, despite the fact that the Executive summary talks about it as being one of the most crucial aspects.
The study does not use any globally accepted methodology for calculating eflows, but uses HEC RAS model, without any justification. The study has not been able to do even a literature review of methodologies of eflows used in India and concludes that “No information/criteria are available for India regarding requirement of minimum flow from various angles such as ecology, environment, human needs such as washing and bathing, fisheries etc.”
This is unacceptable as EAC itself has been recommending Building Block Methodology for calculating eflows which has been used (very faultily, but nonetheless) by basin studies even like Lohit, on which this study is supposedly based. EAC has also been following certain norms about E flow stipulations. CWC itself has said that minimum 20% flow is required in all seasons in all rivers. BK Chaturvedi committee has recently stipulated 50% e-flows in lean season and 30% in monsoon on daily changing basis.
The assumption of the study in its chapter on Environmental Flows that ‘most critical reach is till the time first tributary meets the river” is completely wrong. The study should concentrate at releasing optimum eflows from the barrage, without considering tributary contribution as an excuse.
First step of any robust eflows exercise is to set objectives. But the study does not even refer to this and generates huge tables for water depths, flow velocity, etc., for releases ranging from 10% lean season flow to 100% lean season flow.
After this extensive analysis without any objective setting, the study, without any justification (the justification for snow trout used is extremely flawed. Trouts migrate twice in a year and when they migrate in post monsoon months, the depth and velocity needed is much higher than the recommended 10% lean season flow) recommends “In view of the above-said modeling results, water release in lean season for fishes maybe kept between 10-15% for migration and sustaining ecological functions except Hiya and Nyepin HEP. Therefore, it is suggested that the minimum 20-25% water flow in lean season may be maintained at all HEP for fish migration and ecological balance.”
The study does not recommend any monsoon flows. Neither does it study impact of hydro peaking on downstream ecosystems.
Shockingly, the study does not even stick with this 20-25% lean season flow recommendation (20-25% of what? Average lean season flow? Three consecutive leanest months? The study does not explain this). In fact in Chapter 9 on Environmental Flows, the final recommendation is: “Therefore, it is suggested that the minimum 20-25% water flow in lean season may be maintained at Hiya and Nyepin HEP or all other locations for fish migration.” (emphasis added)
So it is unclear if the study recommends 20-25% lean season flows or 10-15% lean season flows. This is a very flawed approach to a critical topic like eflows.
The study keeps mentioning ‘minimum flows’ nomenclature, which shows the flawed understanding of the consultants about e-flows.
The entire eflows section has to be reworked, objectives have to be set, methodology like Building Block Methodology has to be used with wide participation, including from Assam. Such exercises have been performed in the past and members of the current EAC like Dr. K.D. Joshi from CIFRI have been a part of this. In this case, EAC cannot accept flawed eflows studies like this. (DR. K D. Joshi has been a part of a study done by WWF to arrive at eflows through BBM methodology for Ganga in Allahabad during Kumbh: Environmental Flows for Kumbh 2013 at Triveni Sangam, Allahabad and has been a co author of this report)
Mockery of rich Subansiri Fisheries Subansiri has some of the richest riverine fisheries in India. The river has over 171 fish species, including some species new to science, and forms an important component of livelihood and nutritional security in the downstream stretches in Assam.
But the study makes a mockery of this saying that the livelihoods dependence on fisheries is negligible. The entire Chapter on Fisheries needs to be reworked to include impacts on fisheries in the downstream upto Majuli Islands in Assam at least.
No mention of National Aquatic Animal! Subansiri is one of the only tributaries of Brahmaputra with a resident population of the endangered Gangetic Dolphin, which is also the National aquatic animal of India (Baruah et al, 2012, Grave Danger for the Ganges Dolphin (Platanista ganegtica) in the Subansiri River due to large Hydroelectric Project. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10669-011-9375-0#).
Shockingly, the Basin Study does not even mention Gangetic Dolphin once in the entire study, let alone making recommendations to protect this specie!
Gangetic Dolphin is important not only from the ecological perspective, but also socio cultural perspective. Many fisher folk in Assam co-fish with the Gangetic River Dolphin. These intricate socio ecological links do not find any mention in the Basin study, which is unacceptable.
Agitation Against Lower Subansiri Dam in Assam Source: SANDRP
Lessons from Lower Subansiri Project not learnt A massive agitation is ongoing in Assam against the under construction 2000 MW Subansiri Lower HEP. The people had to resort to this agitation since the Lower Subansiri HEP was going ahead without studying or resolving basic downstream, flood and safety issues. The work on the project has been stopped since December 2011, for 22 months now. In the meantime several committee have been set up, several changes in the project has been accepted. However, looking at this shoddy CIA, it seems no lessons have been learnt from this ongoing episode. This study does not even acknowledge the reality of this agitation and the issues that the agitation has thrown up. There is no reflection of the issues here in this study that is agitating the people who are stood up against the Lower Subansiri HEP. The same people will also face adverse impacts of the large number of additional projects planned in the Subansiri basin. If the issues raised by these agitating people are not resolved in credible way, the events now unfolding in Assam will continue to plague the other planned projects too.
Conclusion From the above it is clear that this is far from satisfactory report. The report has not done proper cumulative assessment on most aspects. It has not even used information available in public domain on a number of projects. It does not seem to the aware of the history of the environmental mis-governance in the SubansiriBasin as narrated in brief in Annexure 1. For most projects basic information is lacking. Considering the track record of Central Water Commission functioning as lobby FOR big dams, such a study should have never been given to CWC. One of the reasons the study was assigned by the EAC to the Central Water Commission was that the CWC is supposed to have expertise in hydrological issues, and also can take care of the interstate issues. However, the study has NOT been done by CWC, but by consultants hired by CWC, so CWC seems to have no role in this except hiring consultant. So the basic purpose of giving the study to CWC by EAC has not been served. Secondly the choice of consultants done by the CWC seems to be improper. Hence we have a shoddy piece of work. This study cannot be useful as CIA and it may be better for EAC to ask MoEF for a more appropriate body to do such a study. In any case, the current study is not of acceptable quality.
Set Conditions to be waived Later – The MoEF way of Environmental Governance
In 2002, the 2,000 MW Lower Subansiri hydroelectric project on the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border came for approval to the Standing Committee of the Indian Board for Wildlife (now called the National Board for Wildlife) as a part of the Tale Valley Sanctuary in AP was getting submerged in the project. The total area to be impacted was 3,739.9 ha which also included notified reserved forests in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. The Standing Committee observed that important wildlife habitats and species well beyond the Tale Valley Sanctuary, both in the upstream and downstream areas, would be affected (e.g. a crucial elephant corridor, Gangetic river dolphins) and that the Environmental Impact Assessment studies were of a very poor quality. However, despite serious objections raised by non-official members including Bittu Sahgal, Editor, Sanctuary, Valmik Thapar, M.K. Ranjitsinh and the BNHS, the Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF) bulldozed the clearance through in a May 2003 meeting of the IBWL Standing Committee. Thus a project, which did not deserve to receive clearance, was pushed through with certain stringent conditions imposed (Neeraj Vagholikar, Sanctuary Asia, April 2009).
Lower Subansiri Dam Source: The Hindu
The EC given to the project was challenged in Supreme Court (SC) by Dr L.M Nath, a former member of the Indian Board for Wildlife. Nath pleaded, these pristine rich and dense forests classified as tropical moist evergreen forest, are among the finest in the country. Further the surveys conducted by the Botanical Survey of India and the Zoological Survey of India were found to be extremely poor quality. The Application mentions that the Additional DG of Forests (Wildlife) was of the view that the survey reports of the BSI and ZSI reports were not acceptable to him because these organisations had merely spent five days in the field and produced a report of no significance.
The SC gave its final verdict on 19-4-2004, in which the Court upheld the EC given by MoEF to NHPC but with direction to fulfill some important conditions. Out these conditions there were two conditions which were very significant – “The Reserve Forest area that forms part of the catchment of the Lower Subansri including the reservoir should be declared as a National Park/ Sanctuary. NHPC will provide funds for the survey and demarcation of the same.”, and “There would be no construction of dam upstream of the Subansri River in future.” These conditions were also mentioned in the original EC given to the project in 2003.
In May 2005, two years after the EC was given the Arunachal Pradesh govt and NHPC approached the SC to waive or modify the above two conditions. The state government calimed that following these conditions would imply loss of opportunity to develop 16 mega dams in the upstream of Lower Subansiri (this including 1,600 MW Middle Subansiri and 2,000 MW Upper Subansiri to be developed by NHPC). The SC sent it back to National Board for Wildlife to review the conditions.
The petition was done strategically. “The strategy of the dam proponents is simple. They raised no objection to the terms until the construction of the Lower Subansiri project had proceeded beyond a point when it could have been cancelled. Armed with this fait accompli, they asked for a review of the clauses on the very basis on which the original clearance – laid down by members who were subsequently dropped from the wildlife board – was granted.”[ii]
Then nonofficial members of NBWL expressed their dissent to the proposal. In a May 2008 communication to the Chairman of the NBWL Standing Committee, member Dr. Bibhab Talukdar observed: “If the Standing Committee agrees to waive the conditions, we would be setting a dangerous precedent and sending a wrong signal regarding the credibility of decision-making by us. This would mean that projects impacting rich wildlife habitats can receive clearances based on stringent conditions, only to be up for review later. Such an approach is undesirable both from a perspective of good governance as well as the long-term interest of wildlife in the country.”
Dr. Asad Rahmani of the BNHS, who was part of a sub-committee of the NBWL Standing Committee conducting a site visit to the project area, stated in his report: “Under no circumstances should new projects be allowed in the Subansiri river basin until an advance cumulative assessment of proposed projects and a carrying capacity study of the Subansiri river basin are completed.”
In the December 12 2008 meeting of NBWL Standing Committee, even after these dissenting opinions from nonofficial members MoEF managed to do a dilution of the above two conditions. Assam that time was witnessing a major protest concerning the downstream impacts of Lower Subansiri HEP but it was not even consulted. Shockingly the “no dam upstream” condition was removed and it was decided that “any proposal in the upstream of the SubansiriRiver would be considered independently on its merit by the Standing Committee as and when submitted by the proponents”.
Now the Arunachal Pradesh government needs to declare a smaller area of 168 sq. km. as a sanctuary and “make serious efforts” to bring an additional 332 sq. km. reserved forest under the category of Conservation Reserve (CR) in consultation with the MoEF. The latter part of the condition (declaration of CR) is non-enforceable because of the choice of words. Even the demand to at least conduct an advanced cumulative impact assessment of proposed projects and a carrying capacity study of the Subansiri river basin has been ignored[iii].
As Bittu Sahgal, Editor, Sanctuary Asia says, “The Lower Subansiri is one such, where the PMO has placed a very dubious role in forcing clearances, agreeing to clearance conditions and then starting the project, only to loosen the environmental conditions. In this whole scam the Zoological Survey of India and the Botanical Survey of India have been co-conspirators that have suppressed the ecological value of the forests to facilitate the building of the dam, which will drown pristine elephant, tiger and clouded leopard forests and cause havoc downstream as well.”
The above sequence of events are very pertinent to remember as we see the Subansiri basin study.
END NOTES:
[i] Website says: “More than 200 successful environmental Impact Assessment Clearance from Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India for Industry, Infrastructure & Construction projects” Sounds strange from an EIA consultant.
[iii] For more details please see – “Forest Case Update”, Issue 1, June 2004 and “The Subansiri Subversion” by Neeraj Vagholikar published in Sanctuary Asia, April 2009 issue
The Lower Kopili Hydro Electric Project(HEP) will be considered for TOR clearance in the forthcoming Expert Appraisal Committee(EAC) meeting on September 23-24, 2013. This project was first discussed in the 63rd EAC meeting held on 12-13th October, 2012. It was again discussed in the 65th meeting of the EAC held on 26-27th December, 2012 for approval of Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). EAC had sent back the project proposal seeking additional information/clarification on several issues. There were several critical issues which were not raised by the EAC. We have made a submission to EAC pointing out issues which need urgent attention.
Background of Hydroelectricity Generation on Kopili River
The Kopili River: Kopili is a south bank tributary of Brahmaputra which originates in the Borail range mountains in Meghalaya at an altitude of about 1600 m and has a total length of 290 km up to its confluence with Brahmaputra. Its basin is bound by the Jaintia Hills in the west and the South Cachar and Mikir Hills in the east. Kharkor, Myntriang, Dinar, Longsom, Amring, Umrong, Longku and Langkri are its major tributaries in its upper reaches.
After entering Assam the Kopili separates the Karbi Anglong district from the Dima Hasao North Cachar Hills district up to its confluence with Diyung River on its right at 135 km. After the confluence with Diyung, Kopili flows into the Nagaon district in a north-westerly direction. The Jamuna River with a catchment of 3960 km2 flows to the Kopili at Jamunamukh. The river then flows in western direction, and further downstream, the Umkhen-Borapani River which rises in the Shillong plateau and drains an area of 2038 km2 joins Kopili at a distance of 254 km from the left. The Killing River, known as Umiam in its upper reaches draining an area of about 1445 km2, flows into Kopili from the left at about 280 km. The Kopili River finally flows to Kalang, a spill channel of Brahmaputra, near Hatimukh after traversing a distance of 290 km2. The total catchment of Kopili River is about 16,421km2.
Kopili HEP: The Kopili Hydro Electric Project (HEP) has two dams, one on the Kopili River and one on its tributary Umrang stream. This project was developed by NEEPCO (Northeast Electric Power Corporation Ltd.). The first dam with 66 m height on the Kopli River is known as Khndong dam and the second one with 30 m height is known as Kopili dam located at Umranso. Water from the Khandong reservoir is utilised in the Khandong power station through a 2852 m long tunnel to generate 50 MW (2 X 25 MW) of power. The tail water from this powerhouse is led to the Umrong reservoir. The water from Umrong reservoir is taken through a 5473 m long tunnel to the Kopili power station to generate 200 MW (4 X 50 MW) of power. An additional 25MW was added to the Khandong dam in the Stage two of the Kopili HEP, making the total power generation 275 MW. Both Khandong and Kopili dams are concrete gravity dams. The first unit of this Kopili HEP was commissioned in March 1984. Additional unit under stage two was commissioned in July, 2004.
Proposed Lower Kopili HEP: The proposed Lower Kopili HEP is coming up in Boro Longku village in Dima Hasao district. The project is developed by Assam Power Generation Corporation Limited (APGCL). The Lower Kopili dam will be a concrete gravity dam with 70.13 m high dam wall. This project will also have two power houses and the first power house, or the main power house will have an installed capacity of 110 MW (2X55MW). An auxiliary Power House with an installed capacity of 10 MW (2×2.5 MW+1×5 MW) has been planned at the toe of the dam for utilizing the mandatory releases for ecological purposes, making the total installed capacity 120 MW. The Head Race Tunnel(HRT) of the project will be 7.25 m in diameter and 3.6 km long. The total land required for this project will be 1577 ha out of which according to the revised PFR and Form-I 552 ha will fall under submergence. But the old PFR and Form-I had mentioned the size of the submergence area as 620ha. The free flowing river stretch between Full Reservoir Level (FRL) of Lower Kopili HEP and Tail Water Level (TWL) of upstream Kopili HEP is about 6 km.
The water available at Lower Kopili dam site will consists of the following components:
1. Tailrace releases from Kopili Power Station (4 x 50 MW)
2. Inflow from intermediate catchment between Khandong and Longku Dam site
3. Spill from Khandong and Umrong Reservoir.
Projects in Cascade on Kopili River
Some Key Issues Requiring Urgent Attention
After thoroughly going through Pre Feasibility Report (PFR) and Form-I of the proposed Lower Kopili HEP we have found that following issues have not been adequately dealt with by the project authorities. Infact some of them have not even been mentioned at all. EAC should not give TOR clearance to the project without satisfactory resolution of these issues.
Dam induced Flood: Experiences of the people living in downstream suggest that floods have become more recurrent after construction of the dam. The Kopili dam has changed the character of flood in the river downstream for the worse. Before the construction of Kopili dam, floods occurred mainly during monsoon season. Increase in water volume due to heavy rains used to be the reason for flood. These were normal floods which occurred not more than two or three times a year. But after the construction of the dam, number of artificial floods occurring in a year has gone upto 5- 6 times. These floods mainly occurred from the month of August to the first one or two weeks of November. Government of Assam never made an attempt to investigate the source of these floods (this information is from a field visit done to the area).
In the catastrophic floods of 2004, out of 140 revenue villages of Kampur circle of Nagaon district 132 were affected by floods with area of 135.12 sq. miles. Due to these floods 1,92,000 people were temporarily displaced. These floods also took the lives of 4 people. Even government had confirmed that the main reason for the devastation in these Nagaon and Morigaon districts was the release of the water from the NEEPCO’s Kopili project. The team that was deputed by the government found that water level of the Khandong reservoir went up to 727.70 meters against the FRL of 719.30 meters on 18th July 2004, which rolled down and led to catastrophic disaster. Flood release from the dam happened without prior warning and affected the whole valley. Kampur is one of the towns located in the downstream of Kopili dam where people were give only 2 hours to evacuate the area and move to nearby relief camps. July 18 is less than midway through the monsoon and questions arise why was the dam allowed to be filled up so soon which had led to such disaster. Had the dam operations were conducted properly the disaster could have possibly been avoided.
The issue of flash floods in Kopili River was raised in the Assam state assembly. On 8th November, 2010 former Chief Minister of Assam Mr. Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, an MLA from Nagaon district made a call attention motion in the Legislative assembly on the issue flash floods in Kopili. He stated the NEEPCO is responsible for the flash floods in the Kopili River.[1] Then Water Resource Minister Prithvi Majhi in his reply accepted this claim by saying that “the government would take up the matter of providing prior warning before release of excess water with the NEEPCO authorities.” From the above experiences of flood in Kopili River, it is clear that after the construction of the Kopili HEP (Hydroelectric Project) flood ferocity had increased in the downstream. In such situation construction of another dam in the immediate downstream of previous dam can worsen the flood scenario.
Besides, The Kopili reservoir of the Khandong dam is located at 82.5 km downstream from the origin of Kopili River. A major tributary Myntang with 512 sq kmcatchment joins Kopili at 86 km from origin[2]. This is one of the tributaries in the upstream of proposed Longku dam site. In rainy season excess of rains in the catchment of these streams can also lead to spillovers in the proposed dam itself. The PFR does not look into the cumulative impact of the operation of the two dams on the downstream riverine area.
Spillway Capacity Inadequate at Lower Kopili HEP: As per the PFR, the design spillway capacity of the proposed Lower Kopili project with catchment of 2106 sq km is 16110 cumecs. Compare this with the spillway capacity of the upstream Khandong dam on the same Kopili river with catchment area of 1256 sq km being 15471.3 cumecs. It is clear that the design spillway capacity of the proposed Lower Kopili Project is inadequate.
Acid Contamination due to Opencast Mining threatens Viability of Lower Kopili: In the item 9.9 of the Form-I it has been mentioned that the acidic mine discharge in the upper reaches of the Kopili catchment is posing serious threats to the existing Kopili HEP. The PFR states “The identified acid mine discharge has been reported to cause constant erosion/ corrosion of critical hydropower equipments leading to frequent outages of the power plants under Kopili HEP.” The minutes of 9th TCC (Technical Coordination Committee) & 9th North East Region Power Committee Meetings held on 11-12th August, 2010, stated “The Kopili HE Plant has faced an extraordinary and unprecedented situation owing to acidic nature of the reservoir water. Prima facie, the acidification of the reservoir water is caused due to unscientific coal mining in the catchment area as revealed by study through GSI, NER, Shillong. The increased wear and tear on the underwater metal parts of the Plant due to corrosive action of the acidic water has led to the increase in the number of breakdowns.” The minutes also mentioned “It is pertinent to mention here that, although massive repairing work has been carried out by NEEPCO as temporary measures; an integrated, interdisciplinary approach for preventing / tackling acidification at source must be opted for survival of the Plant.” The acidic contamination due to open cast mining is such that no living organisms could be found in the downstream of Kopili river up to Kheroni.[3] The situation is quite alarming as the PH value of the water has come down from 5.5 to 3.2 due to acidic contamination which is unfit for human consumption. State Power Minster was very much aware of the situation and expressing concerns over this he had asked the center to take up this issue with Meghalaya.[4] The PFR should have given detailed account of implication of this on the proposed Lower Kopili HEP and further downstream, but has not done that.
PFR overlooks Kopili Fault Line: The PFR of the proposed Lower Kopili HEP does not mention about the Kopili fault line[5]. In recent studies done in the Kopili river basin it has been found that the Kopili fault extends from western part of Manipur up to the tri-junction of Bhutan, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, covers a distance of about 400 km. During the last 140 years, the Kopili fault has experienced 2 earthquakes of magnitude greater than 7 in R.S., three of magnitude 6 to 7 in R.S. and several of magnitude 4.5 to 6 in R.S.[6] The study concludes that the North East region, more specially the Kopili Fault area is a geologically unstable region, surrounded by faults and lineaments and seduction zones in the east. But the PFR of Lower Kopili, overlooking this issue states that there are only two minor faults in this area and both of them are much beyond the project area. This clearly wrong and misleading on the part of Lower Kopili PFR.
Besides, some of the EAC statements are not complete and stand in contradiction to each other. The EAC said that as the site specific seismic study had been completed by IIT Roorkee and considered it appropriate for 120 MW project. But it also mentioned “The project specific geo-morphological and neo-tectonic mapping has not been done so far. As the project area falls under the active seismic zone where the Disang-Naga Thrust and Dhauki fault merge which triggers high seismic risk, the proponent is to monitor the MEQ studies by installing a 3-4 seismograph network for a period of one year.” When EAC is aware of these site specific details, allowing an additional big dam in the area will only to increase disaster potential in the area. EAC needs to keep this in mind while considering this new dam.
Issues Tribal Land Relations: In the item 2.1 of the Form 1 the project authorities have stated that the 620 ha that will be submerged due to this project consists of medium to high density vegetation, scrubs open and barren land etc. But Dima Hasao people have expressed their fears of not getting proper rehabilitation.[7] The project seems to ignore this fact in the form 1. There can another reason also for the stating the submerged land as government land because the land holdings may not same as the ‘patta’ lands.[8] Besides, the area which has been considered for the construction of the dam is inhabited by Dimasa people who mainly depended on the system of shifting cultivation.[9] It is to be noted that in shifting cultivation there a cultivator cannot exercise permanent ownership over the land.
Defining ‘Other Forests’: The project as stated in item 1.1 of form 1 will also submerge 65 ha cultivation land. In the same item it is mentioned that an area of 585 ha will be submerged and this area has been mentioned as ‘other forests’. But the Form 1 did not define what this ‘other forests’ are or what they consists.
Impact on the Local People: In a memorandum submitted jointly by the Karbi Students’ Association (KSA), Sominder Kabi Amei (SKA) and Karbi Nimso Chingthur Asong (KNCA), to the State Power Minster Mr. Praduyut Bordoloi, the association demanded first preference in terms of employment should be given to the locally affected people. But the track record of dam building companies is very poor in this regard. The local people did not get promised employment and other benefits the in the Kopili project which came up in 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. On 20th March 2012, the Dimasa Students’ Union, Dimasa Welfare Association, Karbi Students’ Association and Sengia Tularam Club called for a 48 hours Umrangso bandh seeking “60 per cent of technical and non-technical posts in the project should be reserved for the local tribal populace, 100 per cent reservation for local tribal youths for Grade III and Grade IV posts, free electricity for locals, free treatment facilities in NEEPCO-run hospitals and so on.”[10] This is very crucial issues but surprisingly it finds no place in the PFR document.
Why the size of forest area significantly reduced: In the revised Form I and PFR, submitted on 23 August 2013, Section 1.1 mentioned that out of 1577 ha which is the total land required for the project, 552 ha will fall under submergence and 340 ha forest land will be submerged in the reservoir. But the previous Form I and PFR, submitted on 14th November 2012, stated in the same section that the land falling under submergence and land converted into reservoir area is same i.e. 620 ha. The revised document does not give any rationale for reducing size of submergence area and reservoir area. It is also surprising to note that in the revised document, under the section “Impacts due to damming of river” in page 55, the old figures of submergence has been reiterated – “The damming of river Kopili due to the proposed hydroelectric project in creation of 620 ha of submergence area.” So the new documents submitted in Aug 2013 have serious contradictions.
Issues Need to be Included in EIA report
Since several critical issues were not included in the previously submitted document, we have listed out the following issue which should be included in the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) study of the proposed Lower Kopili HEP. Without detail analysis of all these issues EIA cannot be considered as complete.
Downstream Impact Assessment: Downstream impact assessment is a burning problem in Assam. The state has already witnessed huge protests against dams due to lack of proper downstream impact assessment. In case of proposed Lower Kopili HEP, the EIA document should do a proper downstream impact assessment. In order to do a thorough downstream impact assessment, the EIA will have to go beyond the 10 km radius and assess the full downstream area. In case of Lower Kopili, going beyond 10 km downstream becomes all the more significant because major part of the Kopili river basin is in the downstream of the dam. The downstream impact assessment should specifically focus on the impacts of the dam on fisheries and livelihood of the people who are dependent on fisheries, change in character of flood and impacts thereof, change in sedimentation and impacts thereof, change in geomorphological issues, change in groundwater recharge, among others. The EIA should find which section of people will be affected the most by the dam and how to compensate those people.
It has been reported that bank erosion by the Kopili River has increased after the construction of the Kopili dam. The EIA report of Lower Kopili HEP, should do an analysis to find what will be impacts of the new project on river bank erosion.
Impacts Peaking Power Operations: The EIA should do a detail assessment of impacts of peaking power operation during non-monsoon months. Due to peaking power generation in non-monsoon months the river stretch downstream from power house will have very little water for most hours of a day with sudden flows in the river only for a few hours. This flow fluctuation leads to many severe impacts including on aquatic bio-diversity, on safety, on river bed cultivation, on erosion, among others. This has severe socio economic impacts along with issues of safety of the people and their livestock in this stretch of the river. Therefore the EIA should do a detail assessment of impacts of peaking power generation.
Assessment of Optimum Reservoir Operation: The EIA should do an assessment to prepare an optimum reservoir operations plan for the project in order to minimize the downstream impacts if a disaster occurs. It is also highly recommended that the local people should be made a part of the reservoir operations process. Then only the dam authorities can be expected to be more responsible to in reservoir operations.
Impacts of Silt Management operations: The EIA should include detail analysis impact of changing silt flows downstream from desilting chamber, from silt flushing in monsoon, on the downstream areas. The EIA study should give detailed account of how the silt from the dam will be flushed out annually and what will be the impact of this in the downstream. The EIA should also include how the desilting chamber will be operated and what will be its impacts.
Detailed and Thorough Options Assessment: The EIA should do a thorough options assessment for the project. There can be several other cost effective options for power generation in that area and options assessment should look into al those.
Here we can take the case of solar power. A recent example of proposed 1000 MW solar power generation in Rajastan[11] has showed that for 1 MW installed capacity only 2 Ha of land is required and the cost per megawatt installed capacity will be 7.5 crores and electricity will be provided at Rs 6.5 per unit. Another proposed 25 MW solar power project in Assam[12] has similar figures.
At this rate, for a 120 MW (the target capacity of the proposed Lower Kopili HEP) solar power plant, the land required will be 240 ha. But for Lower Kopili HEP the land required is 1557 ha of land out of which nearly 900 ha will be used for the project even if we subtract 680 ha projected to be used for compensatory afforestation. This implies that for 1 MW installed capacity for the proposed dam the land requirement will be about 7.5 ha, about 3.75 times the land required for solar project of same capacity. Besides, the total cost for the Lower Kopili project is expected to be Rs. 1489.64 crores implying cost per MW installed capacity will be Rs. 12.41 crores, compared to Rs 7.5 cr for solar plant. Even if we were to put up 240 MW installed capacity of solar project, it would require 480 ha land, will not have impacts on the river, on people’s livelihoods, on forests, on climate change, and so on.
Increased Costs: It is important to note here that EAC in its 65th meeting in March 2013 discussing this projects had noted “In comparison to other HEPs being examined recently, the cost per unit of installed capacity of this project is almost double!” and this was said when the cost per megawatt installed capacity was Rs. 9.79 crores. Now in the revised document, the cost has gone up further to Rs 12.41 cr, the project proponent need to explain this further escalation from the earlier already high cost.
Groundwater Depletion in Downstream areas: People in the downstream of Kopili dam have reported that there has been depletion of groundwater in the downstream areas of Kopili dam. From a field visit done in the downstream areas of Kopili dam, it was reported that the ground water level at certain areas had reduced to 140 feet. River like Borapani, Kopili and Nisari dry up in the winters affecting the winter cultivations. Besides, wetlands which are known as Beel or Duba locally have disappeared. The reduction in groundwater can also be due to reduced groundwater recharge due to the dam. Impact of the dam on groundwater recharge should be a part of the EIA study.
Impacts of Tunneling and Blasting: The EIA should analyze the impacts of tunneling and blasting as these activities can increase in risk of landslide and disaster in a hilly area. Blasting in hilly area also will have impacts on water and people. These impacts should be thoroughly assessed by the EIA of the proposed project.
Impacts of Mining: The project will require large quantities of sand, coarse and fine granules and boulders. These are likely to be mined from the nearby areas. The EIA should include a study on the impacts of mining on the people as well on the local environment. Mining for the project will be done in the nearby areas and it will have severe impact on people as well as on the river, bio-diversity, hills, flora-fauna and aquatic bio-diversity etc. The study on the impacts of mining should include all these issues.
Impacts of Backwater Effects: The PFR of proposed Lower Kopili HEP states that Maximum Water Level (MWL) of the river is 229.60m where as the FRL of the reservoir is 226.0m. The MWL is thus 3.6m higher than FRL and this will have serious back water effects during the times of monsoon. The EIA must do an assessment of the submergence at MWL level and backwater effect measured at MWL and follow it up with an impacts analysis.
Detailed analysis about the existence of wetlands, watercourses and other water bodies: The revised PFR in page 17 under section ‘Environment Sensitivity’ states that there are no wetlands, watercourses and other waterbodies reported within the 15 km of the project. This statement seems incorrect. The EIA should do a detailed and thorough analysis regarding the existence wetlands, watercourses and other water bodies within 15 km of the project site.
Impacts of Climate Change: The EIA of the proposed Lower Kopili dam should do a study of possible impact of the climate change on the dam as well as on the Kopili river. Besides, it should also include the impacts of the dam on adaptation capacity of the local people.
Smaller Size Documents should be Uploaded for Public Dissemination: The EIA and other documents which would be uploaded on the internet should be about the size of 10 MB or less. The Revised Form I and PFR which uploaded on the MoEF website was 114 MB and it was difficult to download such a huge document even in a metropolis. These heavy documents will nearly be impossible to download from a small town or a village. The MoEF should insist from projects proponents that PP should be careful about this and should reduce the size (less than 10MB) documents for uploading from next time.
Parag Jyoti Saikia
with inputs from Himanshu Thakkar and Pooja Kotoky
[2] Patowary, A., “The Kopili Hydroelectric Project, Downstream People Rise in Struggle” published in “Water Conflicts in Northeast India – A Compendium of Case Studies” edited by Das, Partha J. et. all, 2013
[5] Mahanta, K. and et all (2012): “Structural Formation & Seismicity of Kopili Fault Region in North-East India and Estimation of Its Crustal Velocity” International Journal of Modern Engineering Research,Vol.2, Issue.6, Nov-Dec. 2012 pp-4699-4702
[8] It is to be noted that in many of the tribal areas of Assam and India’s north eastern states, the tribal law of land is community of ownership of land and there are no government ‘patta’ system.
IMPACT OF UTTARKHAND FLASH FLOODS IN MID JUNE 2013 ON LOCAL PEOPLE AT KHARADI VILLAGE (BARKOT BLOCK) IN UTTARKASHI DISTRICT RESULTING FROM A DIVERSION/ REDIRECTION OF THE YAMUNA RIVER TOWARDS POPULATED BANK OF THE RIVER DUE TO THE 8 MW GANGANI HEP. IMPACT IS ALSO THERE ON THE HEP INFRASTRUCTURE ITSELF PUTTING A QUESTION MARK ON ITS QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION AS ON ITS SUSTAINABILITY.
YAMUNA JIYE ABHIYAAN, JULY 2013 Text by Manoj Mishra
Kharadi is a small road side market place on river Yamuna, some 40 km short of the holy shrine of Yamunotri. It is also a popular night halt site on the Char Dham Yatra route. Resultantly over the period of time a number of hotels and residential properties have come up along the road and the river side.
Redirection of the river to the left due to the project head. All Photos taken on 20 July 2013, by Bhim Rawat, Yamuna Jiye Abhiyaan
Some time in 2008-09 works, started by a pvt firm called Regency Gangani Energy Private Limited, immediately upstream of the Kharadi village for the construction of a 8 MW run of the river HEP. The works involved a diversion head, laying of pipes to convey the diverted river water and a power house around 5 km down stream of Kharadi at a place called Gangani. It is notable that the planned HEP is on the proper river Yamuna
By the year 2012, construction works had progressed to a considerable extent, when on the night of 3 August 2012 a cloud burst at Hanuman Chatti area resulted in a flash flood in the river Yamuna. Flow of Yamuna was obstructed by the diversion head of the HEP and was diverted towards its more populated left bank. This diversion swept away of around 9 hotels and residential properties of the local people at Kharadi. It also resulted in damages to the pipes laid in and near the river bed by the HEP.
If the above was not enough then on 17 June 2013, another cloud burst and heavy rains over most of higher reaches of Uttarakhand led to yet another diversion of the river and sweeping away of around 28 properties (see list at the end of this report) in the market village of Kharadi.
Washing away of structures in Kharadi some 500 m downstream from the river diversion head of the Gangani HEP by the flash flood in the river Yamuna on 17 June 2013
The Project also applied for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) status under United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to get Carbon Emission Reduction Credits. Yamuna Jiye Abhiyaan and others have objected to this application at the Validation stage earlier and at registration stage now in August 2013 as the project is not only unsustainable, but its application was full of contradictions and misleading claims. The project is in any case not a sustainable Development Project, is business as usual project and hence non additional as per UNFCCC criteria. The project is also not sustainable development project, but India’s National CDM Authority, namely the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests, has never done credible assessment of this, and never rejected any application of CDM hydro projects!
Road and structures washed away by the flash flood in the Yamuna river downstream from diversion head of the Gangani HEP.Damaged pipes (meant to carry the river water to the Gangani HEP power plant some 3 km d/s from the diversion head) and the damaged approach bridge on the river
List of Hotels and residential properties destroyed in Kharadi village by the flash floods in river Yamuna made worse due to the diversion head of the HEP upstream of the Kharadi village on the night of 16 and morning of 17 June 2013 and on the night of 3 August 2012 around 11 PM made worse (as per local people) due to the Gangnani HEP structure (head) in the river upstream of the village
Property/Hotel Owner Name Father’s Name Village Name No. of Rooms
1 Neel Kanth Hukum Singh Rawat, Sri Lal Singh Khanera Three Storey, 20 rooms
2 Unnamed Jagdish, Chandar Mohan, Ajay Sri Attar Singh Khanera 2 rooms + Provision Shop
3 Yamuna Darshan Jaidev Singh Rana Sri Jandar Singh Khanera 25 rooms
4 Bhupendar Place Rajendar Singh Chouhan, Sri Narendar Singh Syalna 12 Rooms
5 Bhupendar Palace (Joint) Gajendar Singh , Sri Narendar Singh Syalna 04 Rooms
6 Bhupendar Palace (Joint) Arjun Singh, Kesar Singh Syalna 04 Rooms
7 Amit Restaurant Jogindar singh, Sri Chandan Singh Bhansadi 05 Rooms
8 Govind Palace Janak Singh Sri Ranjor Singh Khanera 12 rooms 9 Him Darshan (August 12) Atol Singh, Sri Jai Singh Chouhan Nagon Gaon 22 Rooms
10 Naveen Palace Jag Mohan Chouhan, Sri Jhoon Singh Khanera 06 Rooms
11 Naveen Palace Man Mohan Singh, Sri Jhoon Singh Khanera 04
12 Naveen Palace Dharmendar , Sri Jhoon Singh Khanera 04
13 Vijay Restaurant Vijay Chouhan, Sri Jhoon Singh Khanera 1 Hall, 1 Cottage
14 Naveen Palace Darmyan Singh, Sri Kamal Singh Syalna 07
15 Provision Singh Jagveer Singh chouhan Sri Surveer Chouhan Khanera Provision Shop
16 Ravindar Palace Ravindar Singh Sri Budhi Singh Khanera 04 Rooms 17 Kahniya Palace Shailendar Singh Sri Shiv Singh Khanera 04 Rooms + Restaurant 18 Rana Place Kitab Singh Rana Sri Surb Singh Rana Khanera 04 Rooms
19 Residence Gabar Singh Sri Sultan Singh Khanera 04 Rooms 20 Residence Bijendar Singh Sri Sabal Singh Khanera 07 Rooms
21 Residence Brij Mohan Sri Jogolia Khanera 06 Cottages
23 Residence Chojen Lal Sri Kuta Singh Syalna 04 Rooms 24 Residence Basant Lal Sri Khelan Singh Khanera 03 Rooms 25 Residence Trepan Lal Sri Sadhu Lal Syalna 02 Rooms 26 Residence Jogi Lal Sri Jhapuliyan Khanera 02 Rooms
27 Aneesh Place Aneesh Sri Janbeer Khanera 06 Rooms
28 Residence Jendar Singh Sri Keval Singh Khanera 02 Rooms
29 Residence Praveen Singh Sri Jandar Singh Khanera 02 Rooms
30 Residence Jagendar Singh Sri Keval Singh Khanera 02 Rooms 31 Narayan Place Kendar Singh Payal Sri Ram Singh Syalna 05 Rooms
32 Residence Chain Singh Sri Rompal Singh Syalna 04 Rooms
33 Residence Ispal Singh Sri Khajan Singh Syalna 04 Rooms 34 Narayan Palace (Joint) Ranbeer Singh Sri Ghayan Chand Syalna 04 Cottage
35 Narayan Palace (Joint) Chain Singh Sri Daya Ram Singh Khanera 02 Rooms + Canteen= 02 cottage (About to fall)
36 Giri Ashram Saint Giri Kharadi
37 Trishul Hotel Kandra Singh Payal Sri Ram Singh Syalna Verandah Damaged Bold entry relates to properties washed away in Aug 2012.
NOTE:
About 25 additional Households have now (after June 2013 floods) come with in the slip zone, which can now slip or get washed away any time in the event of high rainfall or another flood.
Entire Kharadi village has now been declared as disaster affected by the District Administration.
YAMUNA JIYE ABHIYAAN, JULY 2013 (Text by Manoj Mishra)
As Uttarakhand faced unprecedented flood disaster and as the issue of contribution of hydropower projects in this disaster was debated, questions for which there have been no clear answers were, how many hydropower projects are there in various river basins of Uttarakhand? How many of them are operating hydropower projects, how many are under construction and how many more are planned? How many projects are large (over 25 MW installed capacity), small (1-25 MW) and mini-micro (less than 1 MW installed capacity) in various basins at various stages?
This document tries to give a picture of the status of various hydropower projects in various sub basins in Uttarakhand, giving a break up of projects at various stages, As per available information in July 2013.
River Basins in Uttarakhand Entire Uttarakhand is part of the larger Ganga basin. The Ganga River is a trans-boundary river, shared between India and Bangladesh. The 2,525 kms long river rises in the western Himalayas in the Indian state of Uttarakhand, and flows south and east through the Gangetic Plain of North India into Bangladesh, where it empties into the Bay of Bengal. The Ganga begins at the confluence of the Bhagirathi and Alaknanda rivers and forms what we have called Ganga sub basin till it exits Uttarakhand. Besides Bhagirathi, Alaknanda and Ganga sub basin, other river basins of Uttarakhand include: Yamuna, Ramganga (Western Ramganga is taken as Ramganga basin in this document, eastern Ramganga is considered part of Sharda basin) and Sharda. Sharda sub basin includes eastern Ramganga, Goriganga, Dhauliganga, Kaliganga and part of Mahakali basin.
Destroyed 400 MW Vishnuprayag HEP on Alaknanda. Photo: Matu Jan Sangathan
Existing hydropower projects in Uttarakhand In the table below we have given the sub basin-wise list of existing hydropower projects in Uttarakhand along with their capacities. The list has been prepared based on various sources including Central Electricity Authority, Uttarakhand Jal Vidhyut Nigam (UJVNL), Uttarakhand Renewable Energy Development Authority (UREDA) and Report of Inter Ministerial Group on Ganga basin.
Existing Hydropower projects in Uttarakhand
Projects
Installed Capacity (MW)
Projects in Alaknanda River Basin
1. Vishnu Prayag (P)
400
2. Tilwara
0.2
3. Soneprayag
0.5
4. Urgam
3
5. Badrinath II
1.25
6. Rajwakti (P)
3.6
7. Tapowan
1
8. Jummagad
1.2
9. Birahi Ganga (P)
7.2
10. Deval (P Chamoli Hydro P Ltd on Pinder)
5
11. Rishiganga (P)
13.5
12. Vanala (P Hima Urja P Ltd Banala stream)
15
13. Kaliganga I (ADB)
4
Alaknanda Total
455.45
Projects in Bhagirathi River Basin
14. Maneri Bhali-1 (Tiloth)
90
15. Maneri Bahli-2
304
16. Tehri St-I
1000
17. Koteshwar
400
18. Harsil
0.2
19. Pilangad
2.25
20. Agunda Thati (P Gunsola hydro Balganga river)
3
21. Bhilangana (P – Swasti)
22.5
22. Bhilangana III (P – Polyplex)
24
23. Hanuman Ganga (P – Regency Aqua)
4.95
Bhagirathi Total
1850.9
Projects in Ganga River sub basin downstream of confluence of Bhagirathi and Alaknanda
24. Chilla
144
25. Pathri
20.4
26. Mohamadpur
9.3
Ganga sub basin Total
173.7
Projects in Ramganga basin
27. Ramganga
198
28. Surag
7
29. Loharkhet (P Parvatiya Power P Ltd Bageshwar)
4.8
30. Kotabagh
0.2
31. Sapteshwar
0.3
32. Gauri
0.2
Ramganga Total
210.5
Projects in Sharda River Basin
33. Dhauliganga
280
34. Tanakpur
94.2
35. Khatima
41.4
36. Chirkilla
1.5
37. Taleshwar
0.6
38. Suringad
0.8
39. Relagad
3
40. Garaon
0.3
41 Charandev
0.4
42. Barar
0.75
43. Kulagad
1.2
44. Kanchauti
2
Sharda Total
426.15
Projects in Yamuna River Basin
45. Chibro
240
46. Dhakrani
33.75
47. Dhalipur
51
48. Kulhal
30
49. Khodri
120
50. Galogi
3
51. Tharali
0.4
Yamuna Total
478.15
Grand Total
3594.85
Note: (P) in the bracket suggests the project is in private sector, throughout this document. The eastern Ramganga river, which is part of Sharda basin, is included in Sharda basin. Where-ever Ramganga river is mentioned in this document, it refers to Western Ramganga, which is a tributary of Ganga.
Alaknanda flowing beyond the destroyed 400 MW Vishnuprayag Project Photo: Matu Jan Sangathan
In the next table we have given available list of existing mini and micro hydropower projects in Uttarakhand, based on UREDA information.
List of projects up to 1 MW under operation:
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Basin
1
Milkhet
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda
2
Bamiyal
*
Chamoli
Alaknanda
3
Bursol
0.2
Chamoli
Alaknanda
4
Choting
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda
5
Ghagaria
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda
6
Ghagaria Extension
*
Chamoli
Alaknanda
7
Ghes
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda
8
Gulari
0.2
Chamoli
Alaknanda
9
Niti
0.025
Chamoli
Alaknanda
10
Sarma
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda Nandakini/ Maini Gad
11
Wan
0.05
Chamoli
Alaknanda
12
Bank
0.10
Chamoli
Alaknanda Pinder
13
Gamsali Bampa
0.05
Chamoli
Alaknanda Dhauliganga/Ganesh Ganga
14
Kedarnath II
0.2
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
15
Badiyakot
0.1
Bageshwar
Alaknanda
16
Kunwari
0.05
Bageshwar
Alaknanda
17
Borbalada
0.025
Bageshwar
Alaknanda Pindar/ Chhiyaldi Gad
18
Dokti
0.02
Bageshwar
Alaknanda
19
Dior IInd Phase
*
Pauri
Alaknanda/ Ganga
20
Chandrabhaga Gad
*
Tehri
Bhagirathi
21
Jakhana
0.1
Tehri
Bhagirathi Bhilangana/Balganga
22
Gangotri-I
0.1
UttarKashi
Bhagirathi Kedar Ganga
23
Kanwashram
0.1
Pauri
Ganga
24
Bilkot
0.05
Pauri
Ramganga
25
Dior Ist Phase
0.1
Pauri
Ramganga
26
Gogina II
0.05
Bageshwar
Ramganga
27
Sattshwar
0.05
Bageshwar
Ramganga
28
Toli
*
Bageshwar
Ramganga
29
Ramgarh
0.1
Nainital
Ramganga
30
Lathi
0.1
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
31
Liti
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
32
Liti-II
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
33
Ratmoli
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
34
Baghar
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
35
Baicham
0.1
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
36
Jugthana
0.1
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
37
Kanol gad
0.1
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
38
Karmi
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
39
Karmi -III
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
40
Karmi-II
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
41
Bhikuriya Gad
0.5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
42
Kanchauti
*
Pithoragarh
Sharda
43
Lamabager
0.20
Bageshwar
Sharda Saryu
44
Lamchula
0.05
Bageshwar
Sharda Saryu
45
Tarula
0.10
Almora
Sharda Saryu/Jataya Ganga
46
Taluka
0.025
Uttarkashi
Yamuna Tons/ Gattu Gad
47
Bhadri Gad
0.02
Tehri
Yamuna
From http://ahec.org.in/, capacity of some of the projects is as per the UJVNL website. The capacity comes to 3.815 MW for the 41 projects for which capacity is available, for six mini-micro HEPs in Uttarakhand listed above, this information is not available..
5 MW Motigad Project in Pithorgarh District destroyed by the floods. Photo: Emmanuel Theophilus, Himal Prakriti
Based on above two tables, in the following table we have provided an overview of operating hydropower projects and their capacity, with basin wise and size wise break up.
Uttarakhand has total of 98 existing hydropower projects, with total installed capacity of close to 3600 MW. At least eleven of these projects are in private sector with total capacity of over 503 MW. An additional about 1800 MW capacity is in central sector. It means that majority of the power generation capacity in the state is not owned by the state and there is no guarantee how much of that power would be available to the state.
Basin wise number of operating hydro projects in Uttarakhand
Basin
Large Hydro projects (above 25 MW)
Small Hydro projects (1-25 MW)
Mini-micro Hydro projects (below 1 MW)
Total Hydro projects
No of projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
Alaknanda
1
400
10
54.75
21
2.22
32
456.97
Bhagirathi
4
1794
5
56.7
4
0.4
13
1851.1
Ganga Sub basin
1
144
2
29.7
1
0.1
4
173.8
Ramganga
1
198
2
11.8
9
1.05
12
210.85
Sharda
3
415.6
4
7.7
21
4.45
28
427.75
Yamuna
5
474.75
1
3
3
0.445
9
478.195
TOTAL
15
3426.35
24
163.65
59
8.665
98
3598.665
Here we should note that as per the Union Ministry of New and Renewable Energy sources, in Uttarakhand, by March 2013, 98 small hydro schemes has been installed with total capacity of 170.82 MW. If we add the small and mini-micro projects in above table, we have 83 operating schemes with installed capacity of 172.315 MW. This mis-match is not possible to resolve since MNRE does not provide full list of operating SHPs in Uttarakhand.
Under Construction Hydropower projects in Uttarakhand In the table below we have given available list of under construction hydropower projects in Uttarakhand. Actual list of under construction projects is likely to be larger than this, since clear and uptodate information is not available on official website. Please note that this does not include the list of mini and micro hydropower projects that are under construction. Even in case of small hydro projects (1-25 MW capacity), the list is not complete. According to this list, 41 projects with 2378.115 MW capacity are under construction in Uttarakhand. 6 of them are large hydropower projects and rest 35 are small or mini-micro hydro projects. Of the 6 large hydropower projects, three are in private sector and three are in central sector, none in state sector.
Mountains of Muck generated by under construction 330 MW Shrinagar Hydel Project
List of under construction projects:
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
1
Srinagar
330
Pauri
Alaknanda
2
Phata- Byung
76
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
3
Singoli-Bhatwari
99
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
4
Lata Tapovan
171
Chamoli
Alaknanda
5
Tapovan Vishnugad
520
Chamoli
Alaknanda
6
Madhmaheshwar (ADB)
10
Rudrprayag
Alaknanda
7
Kaliganga-II (ADB)
6
Rudrprayag
Alaknanda
8
Bgyunderganga (P)
24.3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
9
Birahi Ganga-I (P)
24
Chamoli
Alaknanda
10
Devali (P)
13
Chamoli
Alaknanda
11
Kail ganga
5
Chamoli Pinder
Alaknanda
12
Khiraoganga (P)
4
Uttarkashi
Alaknanda
13
Sobla I
8
Pithoragarh
Alaknanda
14
Hafla
0.2
Chamoli
Alaknanda Hafla Gad
15
Nigol Gad
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda Nigal Gad
16
Wachham
0.50
Bageshwar
Alaknanda Pindar/SunderDhunga Gad
17
Tehri stage-II
1000
Tehri
Bhagirathi
18
Asiganga-I
4.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
19
Asiganga-II
4.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
20
Suwarigad
2
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
21
Limchagad
3.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
22
Kaldigad (ADB)
9
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
23
Balganga-II
7
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
24
Jalandhari Gad (P)
24
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
25
Kakora Gad (P)
12.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
26
Kot-Buda Kedar (P)
6
Tehri
Bhagirathi
27
Siyangad (P)
11.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
28
KotiJhala
0.2
Tehri
Bhagirathi Bal Ganga
29
Pinsward
0.05
Tehri
Bhagirathi Bal Ganga
30
Dunao
1.5
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
31
Gaudi Chida
0.25
Pauri
Ganga sub basin E Nayar
32
Rotan
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda E Ramganga/Rotan
33
Duktu
0.025
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Nati Yanki
34
Nagling
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Nagling Yanki
35
Sela
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Dhauli Ganga/ Seal Gad
36
Kutty
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali
37
Napalchu
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Piear Yanki
38
Bundi
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Pulung Gad
39
Rongkong
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Dangiang Yanki
40
Chiludgad
0.10
Uttarakashi
Yamuna Supin/Chilude Gad
41
Khapu Gad
0.04
Uttarakashi
Yamuna Supin/Khapu Gad
Total Under Construction 2378.115 MW
Note: Projects like Loharinag Pala, Pala Maneri, Bhairoghati and other projects along Bhagirathi upstream of Uttarkashi along the Eco Sensitive zone have been dropped from this list. Rest of the list is from the IMG report or from UJVNL website. P in the bracket indicates the project is in the private sector. ADB in the bracket indicates that the project is funded by the Asian Development Bank.
Proposed hydropower projects in Uttarakhand In following tables we have provided available list of proposed hydropower projects in the Alaknanda, Bhagirathi, Yamuna, Sharda and Ramganga basins in Uttarakhand. The list is likely to be longer than the list in these tables since full and upto-date information is not available. Also there are different agencies involved in proposing, sanctioning and executing these projects and there is no single agency which can provide comprehensive picture of what is happening in the basin. However, even this available list is frightening.
List of proposed projects in Alaknanda Basin
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Vishnugad Pipalkoti (WB)
444
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Construction to be started
2
Kotli Bhel (IB)
320
Pauri
Alaknanda
EAC ok/FAC u/consideration
3
Alaknanda (P Badrinath)
300
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EC & FC ok IA not signed
4
Devsari Dam
252
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EC & FC ok CEA concrnce?
5
Kotli Bhel II
530
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
EAC ok/FAC u/consideration
6
Bowla Nandprayag
300
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EAC TOR Approved
7
Tamak Lata
280
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EC ok, DPR under revision
8
Nand Prayag
100
Alaknanda
DPR returned
9
Jelam Tamak
108
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EAC ok in June 2013
10
Maleri Jelam
55
Chamoli
Alaknanda
PFR prepared
11
Rishiganga I
70
Chamoli
Alaknanda
PFR prepared
12
Rishiganga II
35
Chamoli
Alaknanda
PFR prepared
13
Gohana Tal
60
Chamoli
Alaknanda
PFR prepared
14
Rambara
24
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
IMG report
15
Birahi Ganga-II (P)
24
Chamoli
Alaknanda
DPR under revision
16
Melkhet (P)
56
Chamoli
Alaknanda Pinder
Proposed
17
Urgam-II
3.8
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Under S&I
18
Bhyunder Ganga
243
Chamoli
Alaknanda
FC under consideration
19
Nand Pyayag Langasu
141
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EAC TOR Approved
20
Rambara
76
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
EAC TOR u/consideration
21
Bagoli
90
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
22
Bangri
44
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Pinder
23
Madhya Maheshwar
350
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
24
Ming Nalgaon
114
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Pinder
25
Padli
66
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
26
Thapli
44
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
27
Utyasu-I
70
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
28
Utyasu-II
205
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
29
Utyasu-III
195
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
30
Utyasu-IV
125
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
31
Utyasu-V
80
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
32
Utyasu-VI
70
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
33
Rampur Tilwari
25
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
34
Chunni semi
24
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed Mandakini
35
Kosa
24
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
36
Vijay nagar- Rampur
20
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
37
Nandakini-III
19.5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
38
Nayar
17
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
Nayar
39
Alaknanda I
15
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
40
Buara
14
Bageshwar
Alaknanda
Pindar
41
Duna Giri
10
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
42
Alaknanda II
10
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
43
Balkhila-II
10
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
44
Mandani Ganga
10
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Mandakini Mandani ganga
45
Rishiganga
8.25
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
46
Subhain
8
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
47
Son
7
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Mandakini son gad
48
Kalp ganga
6.25
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed kalpganga
49
Lustar
6
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Mandakini Lustar
50
Madhya maheshwar -II
6
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Mandakini madmaheshwar
51
Hom 6
6
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
52
Amrit ganga
6
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Amrit ganga balsuti gadera
53
Gaddi
5.25
Chamoli
Alaknanda
dhauliganga Gaddi Gadera
54
Deval
5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
55
Ghrit Ganga
5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
56
Jumma
5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
57
Ringi
5.5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
58
Tamak
5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
59
Balkhila-I
5.5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed Balkhila
60
Basti -I
4
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
61
Basti -II
4
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
62
Laxmanganga
4
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
63
Nil ganga
3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
64
Santodhar – I
2
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
W Nayar
65
Santodhar – II
2
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
W Nayar
66
Birahiganga
4.8
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
67
Byaligaon
2.25
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
E Nayar
68
Ghirit Ganga
1.3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
69
Jummagad
1.2
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
70
Kailganga
3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
71
Kakra
1
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
72
Kali Ganga
3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
73
Garud Ganga
0.6
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
74
Gansali Bampa
0.05
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga/Ganesh Ganga
Alaknanda Total
5199.25
List of proposed projects in Bhagirathi Basin
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Kotli Bhel (IA)
195
Pauri
Bhagirathi
EC/FAC stage 1
2
Jhalakoti (P)
12.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed dharamganga
3
Bhilangana II A
24
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
4
Karmali
140
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
IMG, on Eco-sensitive zone?
5
Jadhganga
50
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
IMG: PFR prepared
6
Bhilangana IIB
24
Tehri
Bhagirathi
Under S&I
7
Bhilangana IIC
24
Tehri
Bhagirathi
Under S&I
8
Pilangad-II
4
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
9
Bhela Tipri
100
Uttarakashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
10
Nelong
190
Uttarakashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
11
Asiganga-III
9
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
12
Gangani (P)
8
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
13
Balganga-I
5
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed
14
Khirao ganga
4
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
15
Lagrasu (P)
3
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed
16
Songad
3
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
17
Jalandhari Gad
3
Uttarakashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
18
Jalkurgad I
2
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed jalkur gad
19
Rataldhara
0.4
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed Jalkur Gad
20
Lamb Gaon
0.4
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed Jalkur gad
21
Dhatirmouli
0.4
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed Jalkurgad
22
Gangi-Richa
0.2
Tehri Tehri
Bhagirathi
Bhilangana/ Re Gad
Bhagirathi Total
801.9
List of proposed projects in W Ramganga Basin
Golden Mahseer in Ramganga
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Babas Dam
88
Almora
Ramganga
Proposed
2
Khati
63
Bagehwar
Ramganga
Proposed
3
Lumi
54
Bagehwar
Ramganga
Proposed
4
Kuwargarh
45
Bagehwar
Ramganga
Proposed
5
Bawas Gaon
34
Nainital
Ramganga
Proposed
6
Jamrani Dam
30
Ramganga
Proposed
7
Khutani
18
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
8
Sarju Stage-II (P)
15
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
9
Sarju Stage-III (P)
10.5
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
10
Sheraghat
10
Almora
Ramganga
Kho
11
Baura
14
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
12
Sarju Stage-I (P)
7.5
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
13
Balighat
5.5
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
14
MehalChaura-I
4
Pithoragarh
Ramganga
Proposed
15
MehalChaura-II
3
Pithoragarh
Ramganga
Proposed
16
Agarchatti
2
Pithoragarh
Ramganga
Proposed
17
Kho I
2
Pauri
Ramganga
Kho
18
Kho II
2
Pauri
Ramganga
Proposed
19
Harsila
0.7
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed harsila gad
20
Kalsa
0.3
Nainital
Ramganga
Proposed
Ramganga Total
408.5
List of proposed projects in Sharda Basin
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Mapang Bogudhiyar (P)
200
Pithoragarh
Sharda
EAC TOR Approved
2
Bogudhiyar Sarkaribhyol (P)
170
Pithoragarh
Sharda
EAC TOR Approved
3
Sarkaribhyol Rupsiabagar
210
Pithoragarh
Sharda
EAC TOR Approved
4
Rupsiabagar Khasiabara
260
Pithoragarh
Sharda
EAC Ok / FAC Rejected
5
Bokang Baling
330
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed THDC
6
Chungar Chal
240
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed NHPC
7
East Ram Ganga Dam
30
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
8
Khartoli Lumti Talli
55
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
9
Budhi
192
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
10
Garba Tawaghat
610
Pithoragarh
Sharda-Mahakali
Proposed NHPC
11
Garbyang
131
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
12
Lakhanpur
160
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
13
Malipa
138
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
14
Pancheshwar
6000
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Indo Nepal Project
15
Purnagiri Dam
1000
Champawat
Sharda
Indo Nepal Project
16
Tawaghat – Tapovan
105
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
17
Taopvan Kalika
160
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
18
Tapovan Chunar
485
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
19
Sela Urthing
230
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
20
Urthing Sobla (P)
340
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
21
Sobla Jhimjingao
145
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
22
Kalika – Baluwakot
120
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
23
Kalika Dantu
230
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
24
Dhauliganga Intermediate
200
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed NHPC
25
Gauriganga III A & B
140
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed NHPC
26
Madkini (P)
39
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
27
Burthing – Purdam
5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed Jakula
28
Jimbagad
7.7
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
29
Suringad-II
5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
30
Tanga (P)
5
Pithoraharh
Sharda
Proposed
31
Tankul
12
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
32
Motighat (P)
5
Pithoraharh
Sharda
Proposed
33
Painagad
9
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
34
PhuliBagar- Kwiti
4
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed Jakula
35
Kumeria- Garjia (Bawas)
12.5
Nainital
Sharda
Kosi
36
Balgad
8
Pithoragarh
Sharda
E Ramganga
37
Kuti SHP
6
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Maha Kali/ Kuti yangti
38
Palang SHP
6.5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Maha Kali/ Plang gad
39
Najyang SHP
5.5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Maha Kali/ Najyang gad
40
Simkhola SHP
8.75
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Maha Kali/ Simkhola gad
41
Birthi
1
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Balchinn
42
Baram
1
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Dhauli Ganga/ Baram Gad
43
Unchiya
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Dhauli Ganga/ Khari Gad
44
Murtoli
0.02
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Goriganga/ Martoligad
45
Burphu
0.03
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Goriganga/ Martoligad
46
Ralam
0.03
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Goriganga/ Ralangad
47
Ram Gad-II
0.1
Nainital
Sharda
Kosi/ Ramgad
48
Watcm
0.1
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Ramgad E/ Watchraila
Total Sharda Basin
12022.28
List of proposed projects in Yamuna Basin
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Lakhwar
300
Dehradun
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
2
Vyasi
120
Dehradun
Yamuna
EAC Recommended
3
Arakot Tuni
81
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
4
Tuni Plasu
66
Dehradun
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
5
Mori-Hanol (P)
63
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
6
Naitwar Mori (Dewari Mori)
60
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC Recommended
7
Hanol Tuni (P)
60
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC Recommended
8
Jakhol Sankri
45
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
9
Kishau
600
Dehradun
Yamuna
Proposed
10
Chammi Naingaon
540
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
11
Chatra Dam
300
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
12
Taluka Sankri
140
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
13
Taluka Dam
112
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
14
Sankri Mori
78
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
15
Barkot Kuwa
42
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
16
Hanuman Chatti Sianachatti
33
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
17
Barnigad Naingaon
30
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
18
Rupin Stage V (P)
24
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
19
Damta – Naingaon
20
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
20
Tons
14.4
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
21
Supin
11.2
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
22
Rupin Stage IV (P)
10
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
23
Rupin Stage III (P)
8
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
24
Barnigad
6.5
Uttarakashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
25
Pabar
5.2
Dehradun
Yamuna
Proposed
26
Badyar (P)
3
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
27
Lagrasu
3
Tehri
Yamuna
Proposed
28
Rayat (P)
3
Tehri
Yamuna
Proposed
29
Ringali
1
Tehri Garhwal
Yamuna
Proposed Aglar Ringaligad
30
Purkul
1
Dehradun
Yamuna
Tons
31
Paligad
0.3
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed Paligad
32
Rikhani Gad
0.05
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Rikhanigad
33
Bijapur
0.2
Dehradun
Yamuna
Tons
Yamuna Total
2780.85 MW
Grand Total
21212.78 MW
Note: EAC: Expert Appraisal Committee of MoEF; FAC: Forest Advisory Committee of MoEF; EC: Environment Clearance: FC: Forest Clearance; TOR: Terms of Reference (of EIA); for Alaknanda, the first 17 projects are listed as given in IMG report and for Bhagirathi first 8 projects are as listed in IMG report. However, many of these projects have been recommended to be dropped by the WII (Wildlife Institute of India) report. Also, IMG and other have said that no further projects should be taken up in Bhagirathi and Alaknanda basins. The projects listed above in the Bhagirathi basin beyond serial number 8 and those in Alaknanda basin beyond 17 would, in any case, not be taken up.
In the table below we have provided and overview of proposed hydropower projects in Uttarakhand based on the information from above five tables.
Overview of Proposed Hydropower Projects in Uttarakhand
Basin
Large Hydro projects (above 25 MW)
Small Hydro projects (1-25 MW)
Mini-micro Hydro projects (below 1 MW)
Total Hydro projects
No of projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
Alaknanda
29
4823
43
375.6
2
0.65
74
5199.25
Bhagirathi
5
675
13
125.5
4
1.4
22
801.9
Ramganga
6
314
12
93.5
2
1
20
408.5
Sharda
26
11920
16
101.95
6
0.33
48
12022.28
Yamuna
17
2670
13
110.3
3
0.55
33
2780.85
TOTAL
83
20402
97
806.85
17
3.93
197
21212.78
Overview of hydropower projects in Uttarakhand In the table below we have put together the number and capacities of existing, under construction and proposed hydropower projects in various basins of Uttarakhand. Uttarakhand government has plans to have total of 337 hydropower projects with total capacity of 27191.89 MW. Largest number (124) of such projects are in Alaknanda basin, the largest capacity is proposed to be in Sharda basin at 12450.905 MW.
In the table below we have given basin wise figures of total large, small and mini-micro hydropower proejcts (including existing, under construction and proposed) projects in Uttarakhand. According to Union Ministry of New and Renewable energy, total potential of small hydro in Uttarakhand is 1707.87 MW from 448 small hydro projects. If we take that into account the figures in the following tabes would change (go up) accordingly.
Basin wise total capacities for large, small and mini HEPs in Uttarakhand
Basin
Large Hydro projects (above 25 MW)
Small Hydro projects (1-25 MW)
Mini-micro hydro projects (<1 MW)
Total Hydro projects
No of projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
Alaknanda
35
6419
61
524.65
26
3.67
122
6947.32
Bhagirathi
10
3469
28
266.7
10
2.05
48
3737.75
Ganga Sub basin
1
144
3
31.2
2
0.35
6
175.55
Ramganga
7
512
14
105.3
11
2.05
32
619.35
Sharda
29
12335.6
20
109.65
35
5.155
84
12450.405
Yamuna
22
3144.75
14
113.3
8
1.135
44
3259.185
TOTAL
104
26024.35
140
1150.8
92
14.41
336
27189.56
In the table below we have given basin wise figures of existing, under construction and proposed hydropower projects of all sizes in Uttarakhand.
Overview of all Hydropower projects in Uttarakhand
Basin
Existing Hydro projects
Under construction projects
Proposed hydropower projects
Total Hydro projects
No of projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
Alaknanda
32
456.97
16
1291.1
74
5199.25
122
6947.32
Bhagirathi
13
1851.5
13
1084.75
22
801.9
48
3737.75
Ganga Sub basin
4
173.8
2
1.75
–
–
6
175.55
Ramganga
12
210.8
–
–
20
408.5
32
619.35
Sharda
28
427.75
8
0.375
48
12022.28
84
12450.405
Yamuna
9
478.195
2
0.14
33
2780.85
44
3259.185
TOTAL
98
3598.665
41
2378.115
197
21212.78
336
27189.56
Basin Maps Maps of Hydroelectric Projects in various sub basins of Uttarakhand are available at the following links. Please note that the maps are based on information available when the maps were created in 2011:
How do the hydropower projects increase the scale of disaster?
This is a question that a lot of journalists and TV anchors have been asking me since the Uttarakhand disaster. Here is a quick response:
Þ Almost all hydropower projects of Uttarakhand involve deforestation. Deforestation directly increases the potential of erosion, landslides and floods since water now just runs off to the rivers. Moreover the compensatory afforestation and catchment area treatment, even when done, usually involves planting of commercially important variety of trees like pine and teak and not broad leaf tress like oaks which not only adds humus in the soil, but also allows rich under growth. Pine does not allow this to happen. This change in character of forests is something Gandhiji’s disciple Mira Behen has been warning since independence, but there is little impact of this on the forest department.
Þ In fact largest proportion of deforestation in Uttarakhand has happened basically for hydropower projects.
Þ All run of the river projects involve building of a dam, diversion structure, desilting mechanism, tunnels which could have length of 5 to 30 km and width sufficient to carry three trains side by side, as also roads, townships, mining, among other components. All of these components increase the disaster potential of the area in one or the other way. Cumulative impacts of all the components of any one project and all projects together in a given basin is likely to be larger than the addition of the impacts of individual projects in many cases.
Þ Massive blasting of massive proportions is involved in construction of all these components, which adds to landslide risks. In fact Uttarakhand’s Disaster Mitigation and Management Centre in their report of Oct 2012 after the Okhimath disaster of Sept 2012 recommended that no blasting should be allowed for any development activity anywhere in Uttarakhand, but Uttarakhand government did nothing about this recommendation.
Þ The massive tunneling by itself weakens the young and fragile Himalayan mountains, increasing the disaster potential.
Þ Each of the hydropower project generates immense amount of muck in tunneling, blasting and other activities. A large hydropower project could typically generate millions of cubic meters of muck. The large projects are supposed to have muck disposal plan, with land acquired for muck disposal, transportation of muck to the designated sites above the High Flood levels, creation of safety walls and stabilization process. But all this involves costs. The project developers and their contractors find it easier to dump this muck straight into the nearby rivers. In the current floods, this illegally dumped muck created massive disaster in downstream areas in case of 330 MW Srinagar HEP, the 76 MW Phata Byung HEP and the 99 MW Singoli Bhatwari HEP. When the flooded rivers carry this muck, boulders and other debris, has much greater erosion capacity and also leaves behind massive heaps of this muck in the flooded area. In Srinagar town about 100 houses are buried in 10-30 feet depth of muck. Such debris laden rivers also create massive landslides along the banks.
Muck Disposal directly into the Alaknanda river by Srinagar Project Photo: Matu janSangathan
Þ Wrong operation of hydropower projects can also create greater disasters in the downstream areas. For example the operators of 400 MW Vishnuprayag HEP on Alaknanda river did not open the gates when the river was flooded on June 16-17, possibly to maximize power generation. However, this lead to accumulation of massive quantities of boulders (for photos of dam filled with such boulders see: http://matuganga.blogspot.in/) behind the dam, so much so that that there was no space for water to flow. The river then bypassed the dam and started flowing by the side of the dam, creating a new path for its flow. This created a sudden flashflood in the downstream area, creating a new disaster there.
Boulders devouring the Vishnuprayag Project. 26th June 2013 Photo: Matu jan Sangathan
Þ The incomplete, broken and ill designed protection wall of the Maneri Bhali projects in Uttarkashi lead to erosion and landslides in the downstream areas.
DAMAGED HYDRO PROJECTSA large number of hydropower projects are likely to have suffered damage due to the flood disaster in Uttarakhand. Some of the projects that have suffered damage include:
According to the update from http://www.energylineindia.com/on June 27, 2013, the 520 MW under construction Tapovan Vishnugad HEP has suffered damaged by rains on June 16, 2013: “While construction of diversion tunnel was completed in April this year, the same was washed away due to heavy rains on June 16. Diversion dyke has washed away and damages have been observed in chormi adit approach road. In August last year, the flash floods had caused serious damages in the coffer dam of the project.”
76 MW Phata Byung HEP of Lanco in Mandakini Valley in Uttarakhand
99 MW Singoli Bhatwari HEP of L&T in Mandakini Valley in Uttarakhand NDTV India reported that the water level of the river has gone up due to the silt dumped by dams. This is likely to be due to the Phata Byung and Singholi Bhatwari HEPs.
Assiganga projects on Assiganga river in Bhagirathi basin in Uttarakhand
5 MW Motighat I HEP in Goriganga basin in Pithoragarh (Himalprakriti report)
280 Dhauliganga Project of NHPC in Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand (reports said the power house was submerged, but is now working, part of the township was submerged.)
The Himalaya Hydro (HH) Tanga Phase I for 5 MW, located along the Paina gad in Goriganga basin, is badly damaged. The dam has got smashed by a deluge of huge boulders. One sluice gate is torn through. The metal filter-gates are all choked with boulder debris, and the remnant concrete and gate pulleys of the dam are now stranded mid-river, with both banks eroded and the river now running along the true-left bank. (Himalprakriti report)
The UREDA 500 KW Motigad microhydel on Moti gadh (a tributary of Paina gadh) at Bindi (Dani Bagad) is also badly damaged. The water has broken through the wall, cut under the foundation, inundated the turbines with water and debris, and smashed the housing for the electrical distribution system. (Himalprakriti report)
The 5.5′ diameter head race waterpipes taking water to the HH Phase II, located on the Gori opposite Seraghat, has also been damaged. The generator and housing for the HH Ph II has collapsed into the river. All this damage is said to have happened on the evening of 17th June. People working as non-skilled labour have been sent home for a few months, but welding work on the new pipes feeding the powerhouse is still underway! (Himalprakriti report)
Down to Earth (http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/hydropower-projects-suffer-severe-damage) has given some details of damage to some of the hydropower projects, quoting UJVNL sources. It says: 19 small hydropower projects have been completely destroyed, while others have been damaged by the raging waters (see table below)
Project
Location
Capacity
Estimated Loss
Dhauli Ganga
Pithoragarh
280 MW
Rs 30 crore (project completely submerged)
Kaliganga I
Rudraprayag
4 MW
Rs 18-19 crore (power house and 4 houses washed away)
Kaliganga II
Rudraprayag
6 MW
Rs 16 crore (power house and 4 houses washed away)
In addition, a large number of projects had to stop generation temporarily due to high silt content, including Maneri Bhali I and II, Tanakpur, Dhauli Ganga, Kali Ganga I, some of the Yamuna basin projects among others.
Conclusion This article was intended to give an overview of hydropower projects in Uttarakhand. However, we should add that there are many glaring issues related to these hydropower projects, some of the key issues include:
Most of these projects are out of the environmental governance. Projects below 25 MW do not require EIA, Social Impact Assessment, public consultation, environmental clearance, environmental management plan or monitoring. This is clearly wrong as all projects have environmental impacts, and they are particularly serious in Himalayan region with multiple vulnerabilities. We have for years demanding that all projects above 1 MW should need environment clearance, EIA and so on.
Even for projects above 25 MW we do not have any credible environmental or social impact assessment. Former Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh is on record having accepted that most EIAs are dishonest cut and paste jobs. We do not have any credible process in place to ensure that EIAs are proper and those that are not are rejected and consultants are black listed. Jairam Ramesh did put in place a process of registration of EIA consultants under the Quality Council of India, but that is completely non transparent, unaccountable and ineffective process. It is amazing that reputed NGOs like the Centre for Science and Environment are on board of this process, but they have completely failed to achieve any change and have chosen to remain quiet.
The Environment clearances of the River Valley Projects (which includes hydro projects and dams) is considered by the Expert Appraisal Committee on River Valley Projects appointed by Union Ministry of Environment and Forests. However, the ministry chooses members of the EAC such that they rarely object to any project. As per SANDRP analysis in six years ending in Dec 2012, the EAC had not said NO to any project for environment clearance. Its appraisal of projects, EIAs, public consultation process and its own minutes were found to be inconsistent, unscientific and loaded in favour of the project developers.
Our environment compliance system is non-existing. The projects are supposed to implement the environment management plan pari passu with the project work, they are supposed to follow the conditions of environment clearance, follow the environmental norms, but who is there to ensure this actually happens? The Union Ministry of Environment and Forests which is supposed to ensure this compliance has no capacity the officials tell us. The officials do not have time to even check if six monthly compliance reports are being submitted or make any surprise visits. However they do not even seem to have will, since we have seen no change in this situation for decades. Nor do they seem to have willingness, since even when NGOs present photographic and video and other evidence of violations they refuse to take action.
One way to achieve compliance is to have a project monitoring committee for each project where over 50% of the members are from local communities and other independent persons and such committees ok must be required each stage for the project to go ahead. We have been suggesting this for long, but the MoEF has shown no willingness to follow this.
More pertinently, none of the assessment reports look at the impact on the disaster potential of the area. Each of these projects have significant impact on the disaster potential of the area, particularly in the context of a vulnerable state like Uttarakhand. This should be a must for all such projects.
Similarly the projects must also be assessed in the context of climate change, again in vulnerable area like the Himalayas. How the project will impact the local climate, how it will have impact on adoption capacity of the local communities and also how the project itself will be impacted in changing climate. This again we have been writing to the MoEF numerous times, but without any success so far.
Most significantly, the only impact assessments that we have is for specific projects of over 25 MW capacity. However, we have no credible cumulative impact assessment for any of the river basins of Uttarakhand, which also takes into account carrying capacity of the river basins and all the interventions that are happening in the basins. As our critique of so called cumulative impact assessment of Bhagirathi-Alaknanda basins done by AHEC of IIT Roorkee shows (see: http://www.sandrp.in/hydropower/Pathetic_Cumulative_Impact_Assessment_of_Ganga_Hydro_projects.pdf), it was not much of a cumulative impact assessment. WII (Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun) report was somewhat better within the mandate given to it (assessment of hydro projects on aquatic and terrestrial biodiversity), but the most important recommendation of the WII report that at least 24 projects should be dropped has not been accepted by the MoEF, so what is the use of the cumulative impact assessment in such a situation?
Unless we address all of the above issues in a credible way, there is little wisdom in going ahead with more hydropower projects in Uttarakhand.They will invite greater disasters. Uttarakhand has many other options for development.
Firstly people of Uttarakhand should get first right over all the power that is getting generated within Uttarakhand.
Secondly, this is not a plea for no projects, but to address the crucial issues without addressing which we are in no situation to even know the impacts or address the issues.
Thirdly, Uttarakhand needs to take up power generation options that do not accentuate the disaster potential of the area. Such options include micro hydro, hydro kinetics, and solar and biomass based power in addition to better utilization of existing infrastructure.
Going ahead with more hydropower projects in current situation would be invitation to greater disasters. In fact, the Uttarakhand government should not allow even the damaged and under construction hydropower projects until al the conditions mentioned above are satisfied.
Some of the hydropower projects that have surely seem to have added to the disaster proportions of current Uttarakhand flood disaster include the 400 MW Vishnuprayag HEP, the 280 MW Dhauliganga HEP, the 330 MW Shrinagar HEP, the 304 and 90 MW Maneribhali II and I HEPs, the 99 MW Singoli Bhatwari HEP and the 76 MW Phata Byung HEP, the last two on Mandakini river.
In response to my question on a programme on Headlinestoday channel anchored by Rahul Kanwal on July 8, 2013 (in presence of panel that also included Dr Vandana Shiva and Vimlendu Jha), the Uttarakhand Chief Minister Shri Vijay Bahuguna agreed that he will institute an enquiry into the damage due to these hydropower projects and hold them accountable for such damage.
Let us see how soon and how independent and credible enquiry he institutes.
– Himanshu Thakkar
South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (www.sandrp.in) July 2013
Indus river rises in the southwestern Tibet Autonomous Region of China. Originating in the Tibetan plateau of western China in the vicinity of Lake Mansarovar in Tibet Autonomous Region, the river runs a course through the Ladakh district of Jammu and Kashmir and then enters Pakistan via the Northern Areas (Gilgit-Baltistan), flowing through the North in a southerly direction along the entire length of Pakistan, to merge into the Arabian Sea near the port city of Karachi in Sindh.
The Sub-basin wise generation data of large hydro with installed capacity of the basin in the latest year 2012-13.
Projects
Inst Capacity (MW)
Generation (MU)
MU/MW
Sutlej
4534.3
18979
4.19
Beas
2267
9125
4.03
Ravi
2059
7383
3.59
Chenab
1530
8159
5.33
Jhelum
690
3828
5.55
Total
11080.3
47474
4.28
The above graph shows the trend line of power generation of Big Hydropower projects for last 28 years in the basin, the trend-line shows diminishing generation from existing hydro power projects of Indus River Basin.
It shows that the per MW generation in 2012-13 (4.28) has dropped by a huge 17.69% from the highest per MW generation (5.2) achieved in the year 1988-89.
All generation figures have been taken from official data of Central Electricity Authority (CEA).
List of other projects (up to 25 MW) under operation (for which latest generation figures not available):
On the 25th June 2013, when unprecedented floods were ravaging Uttarakhand, Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh laid the foundation stone of 850 MW Ratle Hydroelectric Project, being developed by a private company GVK, on the Chenab River in Jammu and Kashmir. The PM hailed this project as a harbinger of prosperity to J and K and did not forget to state that the project has acquired all the requisite clearances.(http://inbministry.blogspot.in/2013/06/pms-address-at-laying-of-foundation.html). While he mentioned the upcoming elections, he did not mention a single word about the Uttarakhand tragedy.
PM laying the foundation stone of Ratle Project Courtesy: Indian Express
He forgot to mention that while there are over 60 projects under planning, construction and commissioning in Chenab Basin of Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir, no Cumulative Impact Assessment that has been carried out to study the cumulative impacts of these bumper to bumper projects on the ecology, geology, disaster impacts, climate change impacts and communities of the Chenab. No carrying capacity study has been done in the basin to ascertain if the area can take all these projects in a sustainable and safe way. CHENAB BASIN LIKELY TO HAVE THE HIGHEST CONCENTRATION OF HYDROPOWER PROJECTS AMONG ALL BASINS IN INDIA.
In addition, the MoEF website till date (1st July 2013, after PM laid the foundation stone of Ratle Project) does not show the Form I, Form I A or the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of Ratle Project on its website, clearly violating Central Information Commission (CIC) orders. This issue has been pointed out by civil society including SANDRP multiple times and it is shocking that MoEF is not following CIC orders even for a project which is high profile enough for the PM to lay its foundation stone.
The PM, incidentally laid foundation stone for the 3000 MW Dibang project in Arunachal Pradesh on January 31, 2008, the project still has not got even statutory clearances over five years later. Let us see if Ratle makes better progress than that.
Considering these issues and also the devastation in the wake of Uttarakhand Floods, one would expect that the upcoming hydro projects in the fragile Himalayas will have a thorough assessment of their risks due to climate change, flash floods, landslides. However, the TOR of 850 MW Ratle Project given by MoEF does even mention the term Climate change! Going for the project without such an assessment may be invitation for a disaster.
These and other such issues have been raised by civil society organizations including SANDRP when MoEF was busy clearing hydropower projects on the Chenab Basin.
SANDRPs submissions to the EAC on Ratle: SANDRP had raised many issues after Ratle was granted Environmental Clearance by the Expert Appraisal Committee of the MoEF in its 59th meeting in July 2012.
Submission sent by SANDRP before the 60th EAC meeting in September 2012:
“RATLE HEP: the EAC has recommended EC to this 850 MW project, the largest such projects so far in J&K and in Chenab basin. However, Chenab basin is home to a very large number of large hydropower projects, including Salal, Baglihar-1, Dul Hasti (all operating) and also Baglihar 2 (under construction), Sawalkote, Bursar (plannned) among many others. However, there has been no cumulative impact assessment including basin wide and carrying capacity aspects. Taking up further projects without such a study is not prudent.
More importantly, in the context of this project, there seems to be some major discrepancies and EAC do not seem to have applied its mind. For example, the minutes say (page 14) that FRL of Ratle is 1029 m and TWL of upstream Dulhasti is at 1031.5, just 2.5 m above the FRL of Ratle. And yet the minutes claim that this project is 14 km downstream of Dul Hasti power house! How is this possible that the elevation of the TWL of the upstream project is just 2.5 m above and yet the distance is 14 km? This seems unlikely considering the topography of the region. The minutes do not say what is the length of the river where the tail race water of upsteram project enters the river and the tip of the FRL of downstream project.
VIOLATION OF CIC ORDERS The EIA and other related documents of the Ratle (or any other projects discussed in EAC) are not available on the MEF website, as required under the CIC orders, and till the implementation of the CIC order is achieved, consideration of projects will be violating the basic transparency norms.
We find that for Ratle, the minutes says that min env flow of 33.43 cumecs will be achieved through the operation of a 30 MW unit, it is not clear what norms will be followed for other seasons, including monsoon. The EAC do not seem to have applied its mind on this.
In view of all these reasons, we request the EAC to review its decision regarding the Ratle project.
Himanshu Thakkar
SANDRP”
We did not receive any response on this from the EAC members or other officers of MoEF. The EAC did not even acknowledge the letter, nor did they bother to explain the serious discrepancies pointed out in the letter.
Bumper to Bumper Dams in Chenab: As Chenab descends from Himachal and enters Jammu and Kashmir, it is dammed by several large hydro projects either operational, under construction or planned. Table below lists hydropower projects close to 9,000 MW in the Chenab basin in Jammu and Kashmir. This is not the full list. According to the Central Electricity Authority, projects totaling 4,200 MW are planned in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, while additional projects for 2,075 MW have been identified.
Partial list of large hydropower projects on the Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir:
Sr No
Project
Capacity (MW)
River
1
Kirthai I
250
Chenab
2
Kirthai II
990
Chenab
3
Bursar
1,200/1,500
Marusudar
4
Pakal Dul
1,000
Marusudar
5
Dul Hasti (operating)
390
Chenab
6
Ratle (GVK)
850
Chenab
7
Baglihar I (operating)
450
Chenab
8
Baglihar II
450
Chenab
9
Sawalkote
1,200
Chenab
10
Salal (operating)
690
Chenab
11
Chainani I, II, III
33
Tributary
12
Kiru
600
Chenab
13
Kwar
520
Chenab
Total
8,623/8,923 MW
Some projects are under consideration for forest and environmental clearance, like the 1,200 MW Bursar project in Kishtwar district which requires 1,665 hectares of land, including 1,077 hectares of forest. It will affect more than 500 families in over 14 villages (option 2 requires 4,593 hectares of land!). And the 1,200 MW Sawalkote dam which will require 1,099 hectares of land, including 600 hectares of forest. Some of these dams will submerge parts of the Kishtwar High Altitude National Park. Here again, like it is being done in Chenab Basin in Himachal Pradesh, projects are being planned bumper-to-bumper; no environmental mitigation measures like fish passes or ladders are included and the social impacts appear huge, adding to the overall cumulative impact.
Despite all of this, no cumulative impact assessment study is being recommended or undertaken for the Chenab basin in Jammu and Kashmir.
Overdeveloped Chenab Basin in Himachal Pradesh: As many as 49 Hydroelectricity projects are planned or under construction in Chenab in Himachal Pradesh (HP). According to CM of HP Premkumar Dhumal, more than 28 of these projects are at an advanced stage of obtaining clearances (http://thehimachalnews.com/himachal-asks-for-environment-waivers-on-chenab-river-projects/ ). HP government is actually suggesting that the condition of cumulative impact assessments for projects on the Chenab put forward by the MoEF should be lifted as “it is unilateral and contrary to the state’s interests”! It would appear as though the chief minister believed that the interests of the state lay only in the execution of hydropower projects, nothing else. Services obtained from a river such as water availability, groundwater recharge, fishing, irrigation through smaller streams, climate regulation, tourism and protection of lands, forests, mountains and biodiversity are not in the interests of the state and are worthless!
Partial list of large hydro projects planned/under implementation in the Chenab basin, Himachal Pradesh:
Sr No
HEP
Cap in MW
District
Tributary
Length of HRT
Distance from U/s project
Distance from D/s project
Developer
1
Gyspa
300
Lahaul and Spiti
Bhaga
14.96 km
Himachal Pradesh Power Corporation Limited
2
Chattru
120
Lahaul and Spiti
Chandra
10.48
Not applicable
DCM Sriram
3
Shangling
44
Lahaul and Spiti
Chandra
Reliance Power
4
Miyar
120
Lahaul and Spiti
Chandrabhaga
Moser Baer
5
Tandi
104
Lahaul and Spiti
7.4
ABG Shipyard
6
Rashil
130
ABG Shipyard
7
Seli
400
Lahaul and Spiti
Zero
Moser Baer
8
Reoli Dugli
420
Lahaul and Spiti
11 km
Zero
Moser Baer
9
Teling
94
Reliance Power
10
Bardang
126
Lahaul and Spiti
ABG Shipyard
11
Patam
60
Lahaul and Spiti
9.75 +
12
Tinget
81
13
Purthi
300
Lahaul and Spiti
Reliance Power
14
Sach Khas
260
Chamba
Chenab
3.5 km
9 km
15
Dugar
380
Chamba
Chenab
8.5 km
9 km
3 km
Tata Power S N Group, Norway
16
Gondhala
144
Lahaul and Spiti
Chenab
17
Khoksar
90
Lahaul and Spiti
Chenab
Total
3,173
Protests against Hydel Projects on Chenab in Himachal Courtesy: Himdhara
Cumulative impact Assessment of Chenab Basin Projects in Himachal: The MoEF sanctioned TORs for cumulative impact assessments of the Chenab in February 2012. Surprisingly, this critical task has been entrusted to the Directorate of Energy, Government of Himachal Pradesh. Can there be any agency with greater conflict of interest than the Directorate of Energy for this study? Can we expect this department to conduct the study in an unbiased manner? Even as the directorate put out a request for proposals for contractors to carry out the study, it did not mention that the consultant had to be an independent agency with a credible track record, as specifically instructed by the EAC.
The MoEF seems to have meekly accepted the Himachal Pradesh chief minister’s demand for delinking environmental clearances from cumulative impact assessment studies, without any questions asked. Delinking EC from Cumulative impact Assessment defeats the entire purpose of having a CIA done. J and K Government is not even considering a Cumulative Impact Assessment as the MoEF has not asked for it so far.
It is time India took the issue of the impacts of cascading mega projects seriously. These rivers are not merely power-producing channels, they have been providing and continue to provide services to millions of local communities and our ecology. Governments and their agencies cannot simply push ahead with their big dam agenda at the cost of the environment and communities, in the absence of unbiased scientific studies and democratic decision making process. Doing that would be invitation to disaster.
Moreover, we need a cumulative impact assessment for the whole Chenab basin, including Himachal Pradesh and J&K, which is not even being considered by anyone, including the Prime Minister, MoEF, or state governments.
Poor track record of GVK group Here it should be added that Ratle project is being developed by GVK group, who has poor track record in development of hydropower projects. The only hydropower project of the group that has gone to advanced stage is the 330 MW Srinagar hydropower project on Alaknanda river in Uttarakhand and that project has been mired in serious controversies. A case has been going on in the Supreme Court, Union Ministry of Environment and forests has given stay work order, the project has no environmental impact assessment, and now during the current flood, the project is found to be responsible for the destruction of the downstream Srinagar town, and project itself has suffered extensive damage. People of J&K need to be aware of this track record so that they know what to expect from them. It is indeed shocking that the Prime Minister chose to lay foundation stone for this GVK project in the face of the role that the project of this company has played in Uttarakhand.
Neglect by PM’s Advisory Council on Climate Change It may be added here that Prime Minister is the head of the India’s climate change related work along with his advisory council on climate change. One of the highlights of the Uttarakhand disaster is that the PM and his advisory council have neglected the issues related to climate change in Uttarakhand. Now they are again repeating that blunder in J&K.
It is indeed unfortunate to see that the Prime Minister laid the foundation stone of the huge Ratle Project even as all the above mentioned issues are unresolved and are being swept under the carpet. What makes it more poignant is that he should do it when floods are still ravaging Uttarakhand and when many experts and organisations are linking these floods with the cumulative impacts of damming, blasting, tunneling, mining, muck dumping, deforestation, no attention to climate change impacts, disaster impacts , environmental compliance and sheer playing with the rivers associated with hydel projects in Uttarakhand.
This act has the potential of sending a very wrong signal to communities of Himalayas: That Indian Government will go ahead with its hydel development plan at any cost: even without assessing impacts of these projects on communities and ecology, without fulfilling norms of transparent governance. At a time when the nation is trying to cope with the Uttarakhand disaster, this is indeed a very wrong signal to send.
We have recently sent a letter to the PM, Ms. Snia Gandahi, Planning COmmission Members, etc.
July 4, 2013
To,
1. The Prime Minister of India,
Government of India,
New Delhi
2. Union Minister of State of Environment and Forests (IC),
Paryavaran Bhawan,
New Delhi
3. Mihir Shah,
Member (Water),
Planning Commission, Government of India,
and member NAC,
New Delhi
4. Chairperson,
National Advisory Council,
New Delhi
Respected Sirs and Madams,
The Prime Minister of India and UPA Chair-person graced the occasion of laying the foundation stone for the 850 MW Ratle Hydropower project in Jammu and Kashmir on June 25, 2013. We were very happy to see that Mrs Sonia Gandhi raised the issues of environmental impacts and sustainability on this occasion.
In this context we would like to bring to your attention that a very large number of hydropower projects are at various stages of planning, clearance, construction and operation in the Chenab basin. These include at least 13 hydropower projects of J&K alone, with total capacity of over 8600 MW. A very large number of smaller hydropower projects (each of them also have adverse impacts on local environment and communities) are additional. In addition, in the upstream Chenab basin in Himachal Pradesh, at least 17 large hydropower projects of total capacity of 3200 MW are in advance stage, whereas the state has plans for 49 projects in Chenab basin. Here again there are other smaller projects. It means even now there are over 30 large hydropower projects (for a full list of such projects, see: https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2013/07/01/pm-kick-starts-850-mw-ratle-project-in-jk-without-full-impact-assessment-invitation-to-another-disaster-in-chenab-basin/) with total capacity 11 800 MW (this is not the full list or total capacity) and much larger number of smaller hydropower projects are planned to come up in this basin. It seems Chenab basin is going to be home to one of the largest number of hydropower projects in the country if all these projects are to come up.
However, there is no cumulative impact assessment of all these projects and other developmental interventions that are going on in the basin. Nor is there any carrying capacity study. As you know credibility of our environmental and social impact assessments is also very poor. Such indiscriminate planning and construction of so many projects without such basic assessments in place is clearly an invitation to disaster. This is particularly so in the context of Climate Change, which is having one of the greatest impacts in the Himalayan Region. Scientists have been warning us that Chenab basin has seen a very high rate of melting of glaciers and threat of Glacier Lake Outburst floods.
The absolute minimum we can do is to do the cumulative impact assessment and carrying capacity by a credible agency (not by Directorate of Energy, Govt of Himachal Pradesh, since this agency is more interested in pushing more and more hydro projects, or such other agencies involving conflict of Interest) and stopping clearance and work on all new projects (including Ratle) till such an assessment is available. It is not prudent to delink the new projects from such an assessment as the MoEF is currently doing. This is the most important lesson we can learn from the Uttarakhand disaster and the lessons from that disaster are relevant for all Himalayan areas including the entire Chenab basin. The MoEF should also not be considering cumulative impact assessment and carrying capacity study in Himachal Pradesh and J&K separately, but consider for Chenab basin as a whole.
Here we would also like to highlight that the GVK Hydro, which is the developer of Ratle project, has been held guilty of a lot of serious problems in implementation of the 330 MW Srinagar hydropower project in Uttarakhand (the only large hydro that this company has ever developed. Over a hundred houses have been damaged in Srinagar town, many of them submerged in over 10 ft of muck illegally dumped by the project in the river and sudden release of water in early hours of June 17 by the project. In fact your government should investigate such project induced damages in Uttarakhand disaster and fix responsibility on those guilty and make them pay for such damages. Your gracing the foundation stone laying ceremonies for projects of such companies do not send right signal.
We request you to kindly take the steps suggested above on urgent basis. We will look forward to your early response on this.
Forum for Policy Dialogue on Water Conflicts in India (Forum hereafter) has published its latest compendium titled ‘Water Conflicts in Northeast India – A Compendium of Case Studies.’ Forum since its inception has been working towards documenting water related conflict in the country. Forum has already earlier published a book titled ‘Water Conflicts in India: Million Revolts in the Making’ where they published 63 case studies of conflicts related to water from all over India.
In the NE compendium, Forum has put together water related conflict case studies from the northeastern region of India. This is the first document from northeast where issues related to water sectors has been put into the framework of conflict and analyzed. Northeast is already witnessing a lot of hue cry regarding water issues. These issues include annual flood havoc in the Assam valley, the unprecedented rise in hydropower construction in Arunachal Pradesh, the threat of water diversion by China in the upstream of Brahmaputra, shortage drinking water in towns and hill areas etc. The northeastern region is surrounded by international boundaries and linked to mainland India though a 27 km wide Siliguri corridor. The Brahmaputra and BarakRivers, two of the major rivers in the region along with many of their tributaries are international rivers. Therefore water related conflicts in the region carry a lot of geo-political importance. However, from the side of government of India the thrust today is for hydropower development and bargain for water sharing with China.
Cover of the Compendium
Different Cases with Inherent Conflicts:
This compendium has 18 case studies which covers several important issues related with water in the region. This compendium also has 3 chapters along with the note from the editors which brings to fore the rationale for this compendium. Out of the 18 case studies nine case studies deal with hydropower development. Rest of the nine case studies brings to light other burning issues related with water in the region.
The introductory chapter is an article titled ‘Damming of rivers and Anthropological Research: An Introductory Note’ written by Dr. A.C. Bhagbati, a renowned social anthropologist from northeast. Dr. Bhagbati wrote this article in 1983 but there are several issues which are still relevant. The time when he wrote this, the feasibility report for Ranganadi Hydroelectric project was prepared and lower Subansiri project was still in papers. During that time possibly he was the only one who expressed concerns for the social-ecological consequences of dam construction in the region. He said that no anthropological research was incorporated in development planning of the country at that time and impacts of dam on local inhabitants receives attention as a mere technical question in the survey report prepared for the dams. The situation has not changed much even though 30 years have passed.
Natural Resources and Impact on Water:
There are two case studies, which analyse the process of natural resource extraction in the region and how it is affecting the water resources in the area. The first case study “Seismic Survey for OIL in the Brahmaputra River Basin: Scientific Understanding and People’s Perceptions” deals with how lack of transparency of concerned authorities regarding the technologies used for seismic surveys as well as oil exploration and their likely negative impacts coupled with uneven sharing of costs and benefits have resulted in differing perceptions and contestations in Assam.
The other case study named “The Barak River: Conflict around the impending Oil Extraction in Manipur” talks about the impending oil extraction in Manipur and how it can worsen the conflicts in the region around the Barak river from its source in Manipur through Assam and up to Bangladesh. The case study also brought the issue of water contamination through oil extraction.
Drinking Water Safety and Security:
The next set of two case studies ‘Water Quality in Assam: Challenges, Discontent and Conflict’ and ‘Conflicts over Drinking Water in Tripura’ brings to fore the problems of drinking water safety and security in the region. Even though the first case study is not focused on a specific area, it discusses the overall situation of water quality and the problems of water contamination due to arsenic, fluoride & other heavy metals along with bacteriological contamination. The second case study discusses how drinking water shortage becoming acute in the state of Tripura and how it is impacting the people living in urban areas as well in the refugee camps.
Embankment and Erosion – Failure of structural measures:
The case study ‘Jiadhal River Catchment: Conflicts over Embankments’ by Partha J Das discusses issue of frequent changing of river course Jiadhal river and how it is failing all the structural measures taken in the state. This case study also presents the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the rivers in the region and how human interventions in the river, e.g. embankments can do no good to ‘protect’ the people from the fury of the river.
The case study by Sidharth Kumar Lahiri ‘Riverbank Erosion in Rohmoria: Impact, Conflict and Peoples’ Struggle’ is focused on the worst erosion affected area of Assam, Rohmoria (in Dibrugarh district in upper Assam) which has witnessed the loss of 30 revenue villages, 5 huge tea gardens and 1 state government run sericulture firm along with 7 schools, police station and post office buildings. The rapidity of erosion in the region was such that no structural measures did any good to stop this. This case study also shows the nature of resource orientated state as government started giving attention to this area only after the oil-blockade, started in 1999. In both these cases there were open confrontation of people and government forces as the people staged protests, dharnas and road-blocks demanding solutions.
Transboundary River issues:
The two case studies ‘The Kurichu Project in Bhutan: Transboundary Hydropower Projects and Downstream Impacts’ and ‘Uncharted Waters: Navigating the Downstream Debate on China’s Water Policy’ details about the transboundary nature of rivers in the northeast and how this is adding to the complexities of water conflicts in the region. The first case study talks about the catastrophic flash floods which occurred on 10 July 2004 due to the bursting of the Tsatichu landslide dammed lake in Bhutan. This had led too flash floods in the Manas and Beki rivers and submerged parts of the Barpeta and Nalbari districts in downstream Assam.
The latter case study by Nimmi Kurien, discusses the Chinese plans of hydropower development and water diversion and its role in the water dynamics of northeast. This case study analyses the China’s water resources choices in its overall water policy directions, the possible conditions under which the China is planning to exercise these choices, the ripple effects they are likely to have across the borders and some key concerns that have flown downstream. This case study indicates that hydro-power projects in China has given an impetus to Indian government to build mega dams in the sub-basins of the Siang, Lohit and Subansiri rivers to establish first-user rights over the water. In doing so, India has kind of sidelined all the environment and ecological concerns.
Case studies on Hydro Power Projects:
The next set of nine case studies is focused on issues related with hydropower dams in the northeast. These nine case studies are from Manipur, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. This region has been identified as the future powerhouse of the country and as a result the region is witnessing rapid increase in the proposals for construction of hydropower dams in the region. In fact MoUs for 157 dams in a single state of Arunachal Pradesh has been signed, damming almost all the free flowing rivers in the state. Due to the staggering number of MoU former Union Minister of Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh had once opined that the state was infected by ‘MoU Virus’.
It can be observed that though these case studies are located in different states, they bring together similar issues or instances which in a way lead to the larger critique of the hydropower development regime in the region.
Impacts of Tipaimukh Dam in Manipur:
The case study by R. K. Ranjan Singh titled “Tipaimukh High Dam on the BarakRiver” states that construction of the Tipaimukh dam will lead to permanent displacement and loss of livelihoods of indigenous communities, mostly belonging to the Zeliangrong and Hmar people. This dam was originally planned for flood control but later on a hydropower element was added to it. The constriction of the dam has been questioned due to several critical grounds which include geological and seismic factors, environmental impacts, downstream impacts which extends up to Bangladesh, conservation of socio-cultural heritage, impacts on health and hydro dynamics of the dam itself. The case study states that a total of 25,822 hectares of forest area in Manipur will be affected by this which will lead to felling of 7.8 million trees. If this happens this will invite serious climate change impacts.
Impacts of Hydropower projects in Sikkim:
Dams underconstruction and planning in Teesta Basin, Sikkim. Map by SANDRP
The three case studies on hydropower development in Sikkim presents situation where the indigenous people of the state have been shown a false dream of development through hydropower generation. The three case studies brings an in depth analysis of the fall out of hydro-development on the rivers and environment as well as how it is impacting the lager political arena in this small Himalayan state.
In the case study ‘Hydropower Projects on the Teesta River: Movements against Mega Dams in Sikkim’ the author Tseten Lepcha discusses the detrimental impacts of many hydropower projects on the ecosystem, livelihoods, religion, cultural identity, political rights of the people and demographic changes due to influx of outsiders for dam construction. The story of the valiant struggle of the project affected people under the banner of Affected Citizens of Teesta (ACT)’s can also be found here.
The case study by Ghanashyam Sharma and Trilochan Pandey titled ‘Water Resource Based Developments in Sikkim: Exploration of Conflicts in the East and West Districts’ describes how the government’s strategy of increasing state’s revenue through the hydropower route has been putting a huge stress on the local environment, the people and the culture.
The case study ‘Hydropower in Sikkim: Coercion and Emergent Socio-environment Justice’ by Amelie Huber and Deepa Joshi, brings to light that the new hydropower development discourse is couched in ostensible win-win scenarios: securing energy for the rapidly developing national economy, accelerating development hitherto ‘backward’ but hydro-potent areas; and generating ‘clean’ energy and thus taking the discourse away from the earlier dam related critique.
Four Case studies on Hydropower Development in Arunachal Pradesh:
There are four case studies on the hydropower development in Arunachal Pradesh and these case studies show the extent of damage which the construction of dams will do to the environment, society, culture and economy of the state. The greed of the state government for hydro-dollar is actually eroding societal values and rich bio-diversity of the state.
Hydropower Dams in various stages in Arunchal Pradesh. Photo Courtesy: International Rivers
The case study by Raju Mimi, titled ‘The Dibang Multipurpose Project: Resistance of the Idu Mishmi’ is focused on the Dibang Multipurpose project in the Dibang basin in Arunachal Pradesh and discusses two main issues of conflict. Firstly, the underlying justification of the project on grounds of economic viability as the displacement is considered to be negligible. Secondly the fear of Idu Mishmi’s of demographic imbalance in the Dibang valley due to huge influx of outside labourers for dam construction. The case study highlighted that total population of Idu Mishmi’s is only about 11,000 whereas the planned 17 projects in the Dibang basin will bring about 100,000 outsiders.
In this compendium there are two case studies on the Demwe Lower Hydro-Electric Project which is the lower most project of the 11 projects in the Lohit river basin and will be constructed near Parshuram Kund, culturally significant site. The LohitRiver enters the plains leaving the hills just after this site.
The first case study by Girin Chetia titled ‘Damming the Lohit: Claims and Counter Claims’ brings to light that even though there are 11 hydropower projects proposed in the Lohit river basin but no cumulative impact assessment study has been conducted for the river basin. Besides, the Demwe Lower project is situated in the border of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam but no downstream impact assessment have been taken up to assess the impacts on densely populated plains in Assam.
The second case by Neeraj Vagholikar ‘Demwe Lower Hydroelectric Project in LohitRiver Basin: Green Clearances Bypass Ecological and Socio-Cultural Concerns’ analyses this project from the perspective of environmental governance. The author shows that this proposed project violates various environmental and wildlife related laws in the country. The Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) had prescribed a cumulative impact assessment of multiple projects in the Lohit river basin; it delinked the environment clearance of the Demwe Lower and Demwe Upper from the results of the Lohit river basin study. There was also no public hearing held for this project in downstream Assam.
The case study by Azing Pertin titled ‘The Lower Siang Hydropower Project: A Peaceful Valley Erupts’ is focused on the proposed 2700 MW Lower Siang HEP one of the series of projects proposed in the Siang Basin. The project faced vehement opposition, led by Adi Student Union(AdiSU), Siang People’s Forum and Forum for Siang Dialogue on the grounds of social and ecological destruction – submergence of large tracts of forests and agricultural landscapes, destruction for rivers, massive socio-cultural and demographic changes, very little opportunity of sustainable livelihoods, increased seismicity in the region, and other major downstream impacts.
Dam induced Flood in Assam:
The case study titled ‘The Kopili Hydro-Electric Project: Downstream People Rise in Struggle’ is the only case study of a dam located in Assam. This case study presents how the excess water released from the Kopili Hydro Electric Project, led to floods in the downstream on 21 and 22 July, 2004. Due to this flood nearly one lakh people had to flee from their homes and the economic loss was immense. The calculations presented for a single farmer in the case study shows the extent of damage. This case study is very significant in order to present the situation of people leaving in the downstream of a dam.
The last case study ‘State Water Policy of Assam 2007: Conflict over Commercialising Water’ by Chandan Kumar Sharma shows that the draft State Water Policy 2007 bears clear signal for commodification of water and provides for river linking and construction of big dams. The author argues that this draft of state water policy was made by the state government under the pressure of the union government to fall in line with the National Water Policy where not much civil society participation was allowed. But civil society’s vehement objection and pressure on draft had resulted in making the community as the primary repository of rights to water, says the paper. While this may be true, this is difficult to ascertain since the state government has not finalised the water policy and final water policy is not available in public domain.
The compendium has two concluding chapters. The article ‘Water Conflicts in Northeast India: The Need for a Multi-track Mechanism’ by N.G. Mahanta is focused on the approach to be adopted in order to engage with water conflicts in the northeastern region. The author opines that large dams can further intensify the conflicts over water in the region.
The article by Sanjib Baruah titled ‘Whose River is it, Anyway? The Political Economy of Hydropower in the Eastern Himalayas’ was first published in Economic and Political Weekly and it is reproduced here. Though article focuses particularly on the Lower Subansiri project, but it also discusses most of the issues which have been addressed by various case studies in the compendium. In the article the author highlights that the government of India is aiming to take the ‘great leap forward in hydropower generation’ in the coming years and this will be done majorly on the basis of the hydropower projects in northeast. According to a vision document of Central Electricity Authority, by 2025-2026, India aims to add 400 hydropower dams with a total capacity of 107,000 MW. Out of this, according to CEA estimates Northeast India could generate as much as 58,971 MW of hydropower. Arunachal Pradesh alone has the potential of producing about 50,328 megawatts of hydropower – the highest in the country. A report published in Down to Earth in September 2011 stated that government of Arunachal has signed memoranda of understanding for 148 hydropower projects. An estimate done by Human Rights Law Network shows that, in a ten-year period, Arunachal Pradesh proposes to add hydropower capacity which “is only a little less than the total hydropower capacity added in the whole country in the 60 years of Independence.” In his article Baruah concludes that with so many dams in the upstream people of northeast, specially Assam have to live with the risk of sudden floods and at the mercy of the dam authorities.
Critical Issues:
The issues mentioned in this compendium bear great significance for the economy, polity and society of the northeastern region. This compendium was an opportunity to bring together water related issues of the region under one umbrella and the Forum has been successful in doing so. However there are a few critical issues which we would like to point out.
In the concluding chapter by Sanjib Baruah and as well as in the editorial it was highlighted that there is a fundamental difference “between the hydropower projects of postmillennial India and the multipurpose river valley projects of an earlier period in India’s postcolonial history. In the mid-20th century large multi-purpose river valley projects were taken up, to develop river basin region. They were driven by the spirit of decolonization itself…. by contrast, what is bring designed and built these days are almost all single-purpose hydropower dams with power to be produced and sold for profit by private as well as public sector companies.” It is clearly a wrong proposition that in mid 20th century large multi-purpose RVPs were the best options before the society than or were taken up in any participatory democratic way. History shows that the dams have actually created more flood disasters where there need not have been any. There are many other serious issues of performance of large dams in post Independent India.
In the concluding chapter by Sanjib Baruah, I also find it difficult to agree with the opinions made citing John Briscoe. The author said quoting him ‘In the Brahmputra Basin, there are large benefits from multi-purpose storage projects that are being forgone because power companies are licensed to develop “power only” projects, which are typically run-of-the river projects with few flood control or navigation benefits’. The idea that multi-purpose projects can be an optimum option for northeast is very problematic. Some of the issues with such projects can be found in the case study by Raju Mimi in the same compendium. In the conclusion part again quoting Briscoe (in fact quoting Briscoe, a senior officer of the World Bank who served for long in India and Brazil in early years of current millennium is seriously problematic since he stands discredited for his rabidly pro large dam views and who campaigned to ensure that the World Commission on Dams report was not adopted by the World Bank) Baruah writes, “unfortunately, despite there being a history of successful multipurpose projects in India, the Government of India now does not have an enabling framework which facilitates the same socially-optimal outcomes.” Here again we fail to find where is the successful history of multipurpose projects in India. There are detailed critiques available of some of Independent India’s biggest multi-purpose river valley projects, including those for Bhakra(“Unravelling Bhakra” by Shripad Dharmadhikary), Hirakud (by Prof Rohan D’Souza and others), Damodar Valley Projects (“One Valley and a Thousand: Dams, Nationalism, and Development, Studies in Social Ecology & Environmental History” by Daniel Klingensmith among others). SANDRP has been monitoring dam related concerns for more than a decade now and we find it hard to agree with this statement. For more details of SANDRP’s work one can look at the our website https://sandrp.in/ and our blog https://sandrp.wordpress.com/.
Though the case studies of the compendium have brought out several important concerns, some of the case studies need more detailed analysis.
The case study on seismic survey for oil exploration in the Brahmaputra brings to light a new dimension of water issues but could not justice to it. The case study said more about oil then water or river. There are several boxes which talks about the impacts of the seismic survey in a haphazard manner but those cannot be substantiated as an analysis of water conflict.
The case study on conflicts over drinking water in Tripura should include data of drinking water availability in the state. The author can dwell upon on each issue with more detailed emphasis or can take up one area out of the areas mentioned in the case study. The case study can also be substantiated through an analysis of policies on drinking water and sanitation in Tripura.
The case study on Kurichu dam project in Bhutan views the issue of trans-boundary conflicts between the two countries from a narrow perspective. The case study should have covered several more aspects of the Trans-boundary water issue. Specifically the case study does not give any detail of how much damage actually happened on the ground. The larger political and economic rationale for hydro-development in the small Himalayan state could have given better idea of the conflict.
Besides, this case study should have also included the element of flash floods which could help in broadening the scope of the case study. In fact flash flood is one of the important water related issues in northeast. There was a severe flash flood in GaiRiver in Dhemaji district in upper Assam on 15 August, 2011. This was due to breaching of the earthen dam[1] in the upstream of the river. This flash flood had submerged 17 villages and diverted its path making its way through the villages. In fact the cover page of this compendium (photo by the author of this review) depicts the guide bundh of the Gai river railways bridge which was washed away by the same flash flood.
The case study on floods in KopiliRiver could have elaborated more on the aspect how dams were constructed with false promises to people. As the whole region is speculating about the impacts of hydropower development in Arunachal Pradesh, this case study actually brings to light the after effects of dam construction. However this case study too could have elaborated its scope by bringing a comparison with the Ranganadi river floods which submerged the Lakhimpur town and other areas on 28th June 2008. This flood too was the result of water release from the upstream Ranganadi hydroelectric project.
The compendium overlooks some major issues related to floods which severely affect Assam every year. As the compendium wishes to cover water related issues in the region there should been a case study or a chapter dedicated to the overall situation of floods.
The compendium should have include issues related to climate change and impact on water in northeast, the trans-boundary issues with Bangladesh where India will be upstream state and hydropower dams which government of India wants to build in Mizoram. Though the impacts on Bangladesh was mentioned in some of the case studies, keeping the magnitude of the issue there should have been either a separate chapters on this. Analysis of water issues in northeast India from the perspective of gender is also missing in the compendium.
The compendium can also include a case study on the Pagladia dam project which was proposed in 1960s but faced strong opposition from the people. This project was seen as a multi-purpose project but even then people opposed it as they were aware of the inherent nature of the river. The name ‘Pagladia River’ means ‘mad river’ because it changes its course widely, drastically and suddenly.[2] This can also be taken as an example of how multipurpose river valley projects cannot be the answer to floods. According to the government records the project was supposed to be completed by 2008 but many say this project is out of the government’s priority list for now.
This compendium was released on 21st June, 2013 in a public function organized in Guwahati[3] and it was announced that this compendium will soon be out in the form of a book which will be useful. As first of its kind of initiative for northeast this compendium is very welcoming and we hope that the book will be able to bring the issues raised in the compendium in a more comprehensive and updated manner.
Parag Jyoti Saikia
South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (www.sandrp.in)
Email: meandering1800@gmail.com
[1] According to local people living in the villages of the Gai river basin, the high amount of sand in river bed had formed an artificial lake in the upstream which got breached on the day the flash floods occurred.
[2] Bharali Gita, “Pagladia Dam Project in Assam: A Case Study”, Conference on Redressing Inequalities of Displacement by Development: Dams and Mines. Ranchi: Council for Social Development, November 6-8, 2004.
Days after walking down the Gori, we go to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Dharchula sub-division, Pramod Kumar, who is busy coordinating rescue and relief on a war-footing, but still has the courtesy to meet. On being asked by me regarding the sudden release of water by the 280 MW National Hydro-Power Corporation (NHPC) Dhauliganga Hydro-Electric Project (HEP, see below the layout of the project given on NHPC website) at Chirkila and the ensuing damage downstream, he confirms that he received an emergency call on the night of 16th June, 2013 from the NHPC, asking that they be permitted to release the impounded water in their reservoir, because it was in danger of breaching. Under normal circumstances they do not need his permission. He also confirms that he had refused, because the water level in the Mahakali main-stem was already flowing at danger-mark. NHPC went right ahead and opened their gates at full on the night of 16th June, without authorization or any prior warning to anybody
second (cumecs), and at 12 am, on the night of the 15th June it jumps up to 389.92 cumecs. This is just the start of the flood. Joshi seems to balk right here, and says that they have not received data for the 16th June yet (the day I speak to him was the 8th of July), and that he may get it after a week or so. And anyway, he says, the powerhouse was abandoned from the night of the 16thJune, so getting data beyond that would be out of question. It is clear that Joshi was unwilling to give me flow-data for the duration of the flood-pulse. He had only minutes before informed me of how automated the whole operation was, and that it was possible for them to even operate the power-house sitting in their Dobat office-complex itself. The real scenario will be clear when we get flow data for the 16th and 17th of June.
The Study The study has been done by IRG Systems South Asia Private Limited (
SANDRP 
