On the 7th August 2015, SANDRP published a Press Release titled “As Krishna Bhima basin farmers in Maharashtra, Karnataka, AP & Telangana face drought, crop failure, Water scarcity, Maharashtra DIVERTED 350 MCM water from the basin & stored another 2535 MCM reserved to release, literally to sea!”[1]. On August 9, 2015[2], DNA, a leading newspaper in Mumbai published a report based on this story as their front page top story titled “Drought? Last month alone Maha govt drained 350 MCM water into sea!” Continue reading “Tata Power responds on the issue of Tata dams diverting water from Drought hit Bhima Krishna basin to Konkan, but it is a vacuous, insensitive response”
Tag: Drought
Dams, Rivers & People: August 10, 2015
HYDROPOWER
NORTH-EAST:ASSAM: Experts warned Centre Govt against rushing through big dam projects (08 Aug. 2015) Even local BJP leaders are against Big dams in North EAST: “BJP leader and former bureaucrat Chandrakanta Das said that the power-starved Northeast should generate electricity through small and run-of-the-river dams instead of big dams. We need power for development, but that should not come at the cost of our pristine environment. We should explore power generation through small and run-of-the-river dams,” he said.
SIKKIM: Delay in completion of 500 MW Teesta Hydropower Project cost Lanco dearly as lenders prepare for Rs. 2400 crore debt-equity conversion (10 Aug. 2015) Lenders to Lanco Teesta Hydro Power will convert part of their Rs 2,400-crore outstanding loans to the company into 51% equity in the most significant such takeover since the Reserve Bank of India allowed lenders to do so when borrowers fall behind on repayments. A consortium of lenders, including some large private and public sector banks, agreed to convert part of their loans to Lanco Teesta into equity at a recent meeting. Senior executives at a large commercial bank said that close to Rs 780 crore will be converted into equity under the capital market regulator’s formula. This will be the second such instance of a bank exercising its right to acquire a majority stake in an ailing company.
As Krishna Bhima basin farmers in Maharashtra, Karnataka, AP & Telangana face drought, crop failure, Water scarcity, Maharashtra DIVERTED 350 MCM water from the basin & stored another 2535 MCM reserved to release, literally to sea!
(Photo above: Koyna Dam)
Large parts of Krishna basin spanning Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana are facing massive rainfall deficits, drought like conditions and crop failures. The tail-end reservoirs of Srisailam and Nagarjun Sagar are almost empty. Telangana and Andhra Pradesh are already thinking of conserving the available water for drinking water. They are not even thinking of releasing any water for saving the crops in delta farmers. In upstream Maharashtra itself, the Ujani dam has ZERO live storage and perennially dry Marathawada has the highest rainfall deficit. Shockingly, in this very period from July 1 to Aug 6, Maharashtra has diverted more than 350 Million Cubic Meters of water (at most conservative estimates) FROM this very Krishna and Bhima basins to the High Rainfall area of Konkan (it already has had 1467.1 mm rain till Aug 7, 2015) and down to the sea! If this diversion was stopped since July 1, when the signs of severe monsoon deficits in the three states were already there[1], this water would have been available to save crops in lakhs of acres in the river basin, and some of it would have also flowed to Andhra Pradesh and Telangana and water may have been available for saving some crops. Even now these Koyna and Tata dams have 2535 MCM water in live storage that is reserved for diversion to Konkan and to sea, but wont be release for the failing crops across the basin. How can we continue such wasteful use of water in a water deficit basin, at the cost of livelihoods of lakhs of farmers? Even now it is necessary to URGENTLY review this situation and consider stopping diversion of water FROM Krishna basin to sea. This may save crops and livelihoods of lakhs of farmers. Continue reading “As Krishna Bhima basin farmers in Maharashtra, Karnataka, AP & Telangana face drought, crop failure, Water scarcity, Maharashtra DIVERTED 350 MCM water from the basin & stored another 2535 MCM reserved to release, literally to sea!”
Dams, Rivers & People: August 03, 2015
HYDROPOWER
NORTH-EAST: ARUNACHAL PRADESH: Mapithel Dam; Social organization demand decommissioning of Mapithel dam (03 Aug. 2015) Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) and Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) submitted memorandum to the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi demanding a halt to the construction of Mapithel Dam and immediate decommissioning of the project. A joint statement issued by AIPP Secretary General Joan Carling and NPHRM Secretary General Neingulo Krome said the construction of Mapithel Dam under the supervision of the Government of Manipur directly affects and threatens the several scheduled tribes in the affected districts whose sources of income are land and agriculture. It may be mentioned that when it is commissioned the dam would affect over 8,000 people in 22 villages. http://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=28..030815.aug15
UTTARAKHAND: Expert Body recommends modification of Uttarakhand hydro projects prevent 2013-like disaster (31 July 2015) An expert body appointed by the Centre to analyze the adverse ecological and environmental impact of hydroelectric power projects (HEPs) in Uttarakahand has told the Supreme Court that comprehensive modification of the projects is required to prevent a repeat of 2013 disaster in the state. In an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court, the Centre said the expert body (EB) had suggested promoters of the six projects– National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), Tehri Hydro Development Coporation (THDC), GMR and Super Hydro Pvt Ltd—to incorporate a number of safeguards in view of the 2013 disaster. The government said the projects would not be allowed to operate till the companies modify their projects. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Uttarakhand-hydro-projects-need-to-be-modified-to-prevent-2013-like-disaster-SC-told/articleshow/48290097.cms
Chief Minister asks industry to invest in small hydroelectric projects (27 July 2015) Chief Minister Harish Rawat today sought help from the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry Uttarakhand for investment in small and micro hydel projects in the state. He sought support for 2 MW to 5 MW hydel projects under the policy formulated by the state government. The state is still not realizing how small hydro projects are equally disastrous for sensitive mountains. In June 2015 SANDRP visit in Yamuna valley highlights how Gangani and Hanuman Ganga small hydro projects have caused irreversible losses to local environment and community people as well.http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/uttarakhand/cm-asks-industry-to-invest-in-small-hydroelectric-projects/110988.html
Dams, Rivers & People: July 27, 2015
HYDROPOWER
Thermal, Hydro Power projects on the blink despite clearances by government (23 July 2015) Power sector is now bereft of capital flow. While thermal power projects might see some respite, hydropower projects continue to fester even after getting all the clearances. This puts a question mark on the claims of the hydro lobby that environment ministry and environment clearances are responsible for delaying the projects. Of the 80 stalled power projects, around 25 are hydro-based. Due to delays, the cost of the project, in almost all cases, has increased manifold thereby inviting regulatory tiff over tariff. NHPC’s Subhansari Power Project remains stalled due to the agitation in Assam. NHPC officials need to be held accountable as to how did they start the work without addresing the downstream impacts issues. Due to their callousness, the cos has doubled and work is stlled for over 3.5 years. http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/power-projects-on-the-blink-despite-clearances-by-government-115072200024_1.html
JAMMU & KASHMIR: Baglihar Hydro Electric Power project threatens Doda, Kishtwar (27 July 2015) Baglihar HEP is making life difficult with landslides, floods and additional submergence: “Before construction of dam, rocks were visible on both banks of the river. But when water level increased and became stagnant, rocks are nowhere in sight and water has entered loose soil. The root cause of frequent landslides and sinking of area in Doda districts on both side sides of the dam is stagnant water.”GM Bhat, Geological expert. http://www.tribuneindia.com/…/baglihar-power-pr…/111641.html
Dams, Rivers & People: 20 July, 2015
HYDROPOWER
NORTH-EAST ARUNACHAL PRADESH: Green clearance to Dibang Project challenged in NGT (17 July 2015) The 2880 MW Dibang Multipurpose Project will see construction of a mammoth 278-metre tall concrete gravity dam and it will submerge a vast forest area of 4,577.84 hectares or 45.77 sq km, of which major chunks are community forests. The forest land to be diverted is also a major habitat of endangered species such as tiger, leopard, snow leopard, Himalayan Black Bear, Slow Loris, Himalayan Black bear, Leopard cat and Fishing Cat. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-green-clearance-to-country-s-biggest-proposed-hydro-project-challenged-in-ngt-2105267 Continue reading “Dams, Rivers & People: 20 July, 2015”
Six regions of India facing prospects of crop failure and drought?
At least six of the 34 Meteorological divisions of India seems to be facing the prospects of crop failure and drought, if we look at the rainfall in these divisions in last 18 prime monsoon days from June 25, 2015 (monsoon had set in almost all over India by that date) to July 13, 2015, the latest date for which division wise rainfall are available. In these six sub-divisions, the rainfall during these 18 prime monsoon days has been between 0.1 mm to 12.8 mm. Continue reading “Six regions of India facing prospects of crop failure and drought?”
Lawlessness in Maharashtra’s Water Sector
Above: Increasing height of a dam which holds no water Photo: Parineeta Dandekar
Guest post by Pradeep Purandare, pradeeppurandare@gmail.com
Irrigation Laws in Maharashtra: Politics of Non-Implementation
Laws are generally enacted to implement the policy by the ruling class & its government to promote & safeguard its own class & caste interests. However, while drafting the policy & laws, politically correct concepts & terminology in fashion is used for public consumption. New things are accepted because those come as conditions for getting the loan from donor agencies. Creating a desirable image or impression at national / international level can also be the motivation. Adopting a new policy or enacting a new law does not necessarily mean that the establishment of the day sincerely believes in that policy & law. Once the purpose of getting the loan and or creating an impression is served, government conveniently forgets implementing the policy & the law. Or, implementation is done in selective & superficial manner. Clauses / sections which were included for public consumption & which can really make the difference, if implemented in letter & spirit, are generally either put in cold storage or subsequently amended to make them more “practical & workable”. This does not happen as a result of inefficiency, callousness or indifference. This happens with purpose & by well defined strategy. This is politics of non-implementation! It is done to implement the hidden agenda. Of course, it’s not something new. It has been happening since long & in most of the walks of life. This paper makes an attempt to simply describe how politics of non-implementation is being done in water sector in general & in the field of irrigation in particular in Maharashtra – a supposedly progressive, highly industrialized & a modern State of India.
Enacting a law is not sufficient. The operative part which includes rules, notifications, agreements, government resolutions, orders & circulars as per the new Act is also equally important. If operative part is not in place, then the Act remains on paper for all practical purposes.
PLEASE SEE ANNEXURE 1 for Detailed table.
Gist of missing operative parts & its implications are given below:
In absence of rules (yes, MIA 76 does not have rules for last 37 years!) & non-issuance of basic notifications (rivers, command areas & appointment of Canal Officers), MIA 76 which is supposed to be the parent Act has remained mostly on paper. Locus standi of implementing authority i.e. Water Resources Department (WRD), therefore, can itself be questioned. The obvious result is there is no water governance. Free for all situation exists. Water theft, vandalism & tampering with canal system are rampant. Offences go un-punished. Irrigators, particularly the tail enders neither get water nor compensation. Politically influential irrigators grab all the benefits. Diversion of water from irrigation to non-irrigation, flow irrigation to lift irrigation & food crops to cash crops becomes easy. Since nothing is legally committed, nothing can legally be challenged. The overall situation is best suited for privatization. An un-notified river or command area, relatively speaking, can easily be handed over to private company. That’s seems to be the ulterior motive of missing operative part!
MMISF Act was brought in to legally provide for Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM). World Bank insisted for the enactment & made it a compulsory condition for getting the loan under Maharashtra Water Sector Improvement Program (MWSIP). WRD, therefore, had to succumb. It however did not comply in letter & spirit. Ambiguity in rules for WUAs at higher level, non formation of sub committees, delayed or non execution of agreements with WUAs, insincerity in the processes such as “joint inspection” to “handing over”, not providing measuring devices, confusion over powers of WUAs, keeping lift irrigation out of purview of the Act, inordinate delays in returning part of tariff to WUAs for carrying out maintenance & repairs and last but not the least, non involvement of WUAs either in water budgeting or in conflict resolution speak volumes about the actual implementation of MMSIF Act. Intentions of WRD are clear & obvious. It considers WUAs as just a stop gap arrangement before going for corporatization & contract farming. One can imagine WRD’s line of argument in near future. It could be as follows “We tried our level best but WUAs could not succeed. Government cannot now take the responsibility of water management. Privatization appears to be the only way out”. Incomplete legal processes thus help establishment & make tail enders vulnerable.
Maharashtra established an Independent Regulatory Authority (IRA) in water sector by enacting MWRRA Act. It’s no doubt a pioneering effort. But the actual implementation of this Act is frustrating. There was reluctance to prepare the rules. Rules were prepared after 7 years from the enactment of the Act & that too only after an order to that effect by the High Court. Prepared rules, it is alleged, are contradictory to the provisions of the Act. They have been challenged & the matter is sub-judice.[yesterday Maharashtra’s legislative council had to discuss the issue in the house & Minister for WRD had to stay the implementation of rules] State Water Board & State Water Council has been legally constituted way back in 2005 to respectively prepare & approve the Integrated State Water Plan (ISWP). Both the board & council have not yet started their functioning. Obviously ISWP which was to be prepared within one year from the enactment of the Act is still not in place even after 8 years. MWRRA as per its own Act is supposed to take decisions with reference to ISWP. But it is going ahead even without ISWP. Similarly, River Basin Agencies (RBA) have not been operationalized & issuing water entitlements by RBAs has not so far materialized. MWRRA Act has been amended in 2011 to retrospectively protect non transparent decisions of High Power Committee regarding transfer of water from irrigation to non-irrigation. Powers of MWRRA in respect of sectoral water allocation have already been withdrawn by the said amendment. Effective area under water entitlement thus has been drastically reduced. MWRRA recently decided the criteria for water tariff. But it opted for the safest path. It reduced the water tariff to avoid criticism. But in the process whether it could follow the mandate given by the Act is a moot point. Act says that water tariff should fully recover the O & M Cost & canal system should be properly maintained. Ever deteriorating condition of canals in Maharashtra, however, tell a different story. Regulation of all types of water (surface & ground water) & its uses for different purposes (drinking, domestic, industrial & irrigation) is supposed to be done by MWRRA. Nothing significant has been done so far. In fact, in case of dispute over sharing Godawari Waters between upper & lower Godawari basins, MWRRA has been a silent spectator. As a quasi- judicial IRA it could have done many things. But it preferred playing politics of non-implementation..
Very structure & framework of water governance are thus missing in Maharashtra & hence, there is no Rule of Law. Water conflicts of all types are on increase at all possible levels. Misappropriation & mismanagement is the end result.
It is necessary to develop pro-people intervention strategies & peoples participation in water sector. Implementation of existing water laws could be a necessary (but of course not sufficient) beginning. There are many provisions in the existing water laws that could help initiate pro people intervention.
Politics of ‘non-implementation by ruling class’ needs to be effectively & immediately challenged by `politics of implementation by pro people forces’. That would help promote people-centered interventions which are so urgently required to fight diversion of water from irrigation to non-irrigation & privatization of water.
Annexure 1:
Implementation of Water Laws in Maharashtra: A Critical Review
| Sections | Present status | Impact |
|
MIA,76 |
||
| Sec 114: Rules | Rules not prepared in 37 years | Act remains on paper |
| Sec11: River notification | Incomplete in many projects | People not informed/ opportunity of being heard denied. Locus standi of WRD doubtful |
| Sec 3: Command notification | Incomplete in many projects | —- do ——– |
| Sec 8: Appointment of Canal Officers | Done but not operative | No one takes initiative. Nobody is held responsible. Free for all situation. Water theft, vandalism & tampering with canal system are rampant. Offences go un punished. No FIR. No action. |
| Sec 75 to 87: Award of
Compensation |
Not used at all. | Irrigators don’t get compensation even if the agreed volume of water is not delivered at right time & place. No accountability for the Canal Officers. |
|
MMISF Act, 2005 |
||
| Sec 76: Rules | Prepared. Excessive use of “mutatis mutandis” |
Ambiguity in rules for WUAs at higher level |
|
Sec 20: Sub committees |
Not formed in last 8 years | Purpose of participation with decentralization & expanding the circle of knowledge & skill defeated. |
| Sec 21,29: Agreement | Not executed in time & at all levels of WUAs
Serious complaints about not having joint inspection in true sense, non- completion of agreed repairs & rehabilitation & reluctance by officers to hand over the system |
Purpose of delegation of powers & imbibing sense of responsibility defeated. Encroachment on powers of WUAs
Nexus between local Politicians & officers continues unabated. WRD loses its credibility. Poor quality of repairs & rehabilitation. In absence of real handing over of management to WUAs, power of water distribution remains with WRD officials. Only lip service to participation. |
| Sec 22: Joint inspection,
…..handing over … and Sec 23: Measuring devices (MD) |
Not executed in time & at all levels of WUAs
Serious complaints about not having joint inspection in true sense, non- completion of agreed repairs & rehabilitation & reluctance by officers to hand over the system Providing MD is not yet complete. Credibility of measurement records is doubtful |
Volumetric supply of water to WUAs mostly remains on paper. |
| Sec 28: Supply of water as per entitlement | In absence of proper water budgeting at project level, irrigation scheduling of main system & MD, supply of water as per entitlement is an exception rather than a rule. | Bulk supply of water based on entitlement given volumetrically is still a distant dream. WRD is not yet fully equipped for the purpose with compatible physical system. |
|
Sec 30: Powers to WUAs |
Not spelt out | WRD officials wield the real power. |
| Sec 38: Competent Authority | Not operative | WUAs don’t get any technical advise |
|
Sec 39 to 51: Lift Irrigation WUAs |
Provisions not brought in force | No control over – & regulation of – lift irrigation. Act simply not made applicable to lift irrigation.. |
|
Sec 52: Powers & functions of WUAs |
Only responsibilities(& not powers) have been spelt out | WUAs remain ineffective. |
| Sec 53: Powers & functions of Canal Officer | Emphasis on powers & not on responsibilities | In absence of accountability of any kind, WRD officials remain indifferent & callous |
| Sec 54: Sources of Funds of WUAs | Water tariff collected from the members of WUA is the only source of income. WRD has promised to return substantial part of tariff to WUA. However, the promise is not being kept. | Most of the WUAs are not economically self reliant. They face problems in routine maintenance & repairs of the canal system and can’t afford to maintain office & staff. |
|
Sec 60 to 62: Offences & penalties |
Not operative. |
No water governance worth the name. |
| Sec 63 & 64: Conflict Resolutions | Not operative. MWRRA indirectly attempts to bypass the powers of upper level WUAs through regulators | WUAs not involved in conflict resolution. Purpose defeated. |
|
Sec 68: Water budgeting at Project Level |
Not operative. | WUAs not involved in water budgeting. Purpose defeated. |
| Sec 70: Water supply for non-irrigation purposes | Water entitlement issued only to select WUAs in selected projects. Unit for issuing entitlement is not project as a whole. Therefore, ineffective provision. | Water supply to non-irrigation gets priority even during periods of shortage of water. Second priority given to irrigation by amending State Water Policy is not being honoured. |
|
Sec 71: Recovery of water charges |
Coercive measures not operative. | Recovery of water tariff is very poor. |
| Sec 72: Act to apply to
Existing WUAs |
Difference of opinion between WRD & Cooperative Department regarding how to operationalize the provision |
Act not being applied to existing WUAs |
|
MWRRA Act, 2005 Act amended in 2011 to retrospectively protect non transparent decisions of High Power Committee regarding transfer of water from irrigation to non-irrigation |
||
| Sec 3: Establishment of Authority |
Retired bureaucrats are in control. |
Powers of MWRRA regarding sectoral allocation withdrawn.
Effective area under water entitlement drastically reduced. There is hardly any regulation as per the Act. Issue of releasing water to Jayakwadi project from up – stream projects is the glaring example. |
| Sec 5: Selection Committee | Serving bureaucrats are in control. | Members of selection committee select themselves as Member / Secretary of MWRRA & join the authority soon after retirement from Government. |
| Sec11: Powers, functions duties of authority | Selective & limited implementation. Sec 11 (f) not implemented. Project clearance even without Integrated State Water Plan [ISWP] | Adhocism, confusion & regional imbalance in water resources development may further increase |
| Sec 12: General policies of Authority |
Not implemented even when water users have moved the court of law. Several petitions pending in Mumbai High Court |
Principles of Tail to head irrigation & equitable distribution of water at river basin level not implemented leading to political agitations & increased animosity within regions of the State. |
| Sec 13: Dispute Resolution Officers |
Appointed. Not active. |
In absence of information & awareness about provisions in the Act, water users don’t insist for suitable action. Hence, it is assumed that absence of complaint means absence of dispute itself. |
| Sec 14: Permission of River basin Agency |
River Basin Agencies though exist as per law, they have not started functioning like RBAs |
Since RBAs have not issued any water entitlement & not officially permitted any water use whatsoever, every water use since enactment of the Act could be, legally speaking, unauthorised & hence, illegal. |
| Sec 15: State Water Board |
Legally constituted but not at all functioning. |
SWB (Chairperson- Chief Secretary) is supposed to prepare ISWP. Nothing happened in last 8 years. |
|
Sec 16: State Water Council |
Legally constituted but not at all functioning. |
SWC (Chairperson- Chief Minister) is supposed to approve ISWP. And then MWRRA should function as per ISWP. Nothing happened in last 8 years. MWRRA is taking decisions violating Sec 11 (f) of its own Act. |
|
Sec 21: Special Responsibility of Authority |
Not implemented | Gravity & seriousness of issues regarding backlog in irrigation has not reduced. In fact, it has increased a lot. |
|
Sec 22: Disputes & Appeals |
Not in use by the water users. Lack of awareness. |
Grievance redressal mechanism provided in the Act, if used, could reduce number of cases going directly to court of law. |
| Sec 23 : Directives of
Government |
Not given so far | Government could have used this route instead of amending the Act in haste & panic. It could have also given directions to MWRRA in case of Jayakwadi dispute. |
| Sec 26: Punishment for
non-compliance |
Not used so far. |
No effective governance |
|
Sec 30: Rules |
Prepared late only after High Court’s order. Rules to certain extent are contradictory to the provisions in the Act | Discontent about Rules in Marathwada. Rules challenged in court of law. MLAs requested to challenge the rules in legislative assembly & council |
References:
- Maharashtra’s State Water Policy, July 2003
- Maharashtra Irrigation Act, 1976 (MIA76),
- Maharashtra Management of Irrigation by Farmers Act, 2005 (MMISF Act)
- Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Act, 2005(MWRRA Act)
- Purandare Pradeep, “Wanted – Rule of Law”, http://www.downtoearth.com
***
– Pradeep Purandare
Retd. Associate Professor, Water & Land Management Institute, Aurangabad, Maharashtra
(The above piece is based on a paper presented at the International Conference, Dec 19-21, 2013,Organized by College of Social Work, Nirmala Niketan, Mumbai, India)
pradeeppurandare@gmail.com, http://jaagalyaa-thewhistleblower.blogspot.in/, http://www.irrigationmainsystem.com
Thirsty sugarcane in dry Marathwada means a loss of 2 million farmer livelihoods
Above: Gangakhed sugar factory from Parbhani Marathwada which has crushed 7 Lakh Tonnes of cane till 21 Feb 2015. Parbhani has received a mere 346 mm rainfall this year, nearly equal to what it received during epic drought of 1972
~~~
Although Marathwada region in Maharashtra is no stranger to droughts, it’s facing a singularly acute crisis this year. Kharif crops had failed in all of the 8139 Kharif villages in the region with yields less than 50% of government standards (paisewari). Rabi is under cloud too with all 396 villages assessed for production showing less than 50% yield. And yet, area under and production of water guzzler crop like Sugarcane is going up. In 2013-14, Marathwada grew over 2 lakh hectares of sugarcane and is now crushing the cane in its 61 sugar factories using thousands of lakhs of litres water every day.
Does this make any social, economic or environmental sense? No
But do we have options? It seems so. Let us see how. Continue reading “Thirsty sugarcane in dry Marathwada means a loss of 2 million farmer livelihoods”
Can Marathwada afford to undertake Sugarcane Crushing in this terrible drought?
Since 2012, farmers in Maharashtra, especially in Marathwada and Vidarbha region of central and eastern Maharashtra are faced with unending mountains of crisis. What started as drought of 2012 went on in form of violent rains at places in 2013, hailstorms of February-March 2014, scanty monsoon in 2014 and unseasonal rains at places in November 2014, affecting lakhs of farmers. Agricultural production has suffered losses as impact of scanty rainfall has been compounded by absence of rains in critical time windows when soybean was filling and cotton bolls were forming. More than 8000 villages in Marathwada region which comprises of Aurangabad, Nanded, Parbhani, Latur, Beed, Hingoli, Jalna and Osmanabad have recorded crop losses of more than 50%.
The entire Winter Assembly of the newly formed Government seems to be clouded by discussions of drought package and increasing farmer suicides in Marathwada and Vidarbha. Since January 2014, more than 400 farmers have committed suicide in Marathwada region, and the pace is picking up worryingly since the past month. Hydrological, meteorological and agricultural droughts are becoming more pronounced in Marathwada.
But can this be attributed to vagaries of nature alone?
A brief analysis of the underlying reasons for the crisis in Marathwada and its future implications:
Truant Monsoon of 2014
As per SANDRP’s analysis of district-wise rainfall figures of Marathwada in monsoon 2014, the picture which arises is dismal:
For 2014, departure from normal rainfall for 6 out of 8 districts in Marathwada was more than 40% and rest two districts it was more than 50%, indicating a huge reduction in rainfall. However, contrary to what is being stated in the media, the region received satisfactory rainfall in 2013 monsoon. In fact, 6 districts of the 8 received more than 100% of normal rains and remaining two districts received 88% and 95% of normal rains last year. This is one of the reasons that the reservoir storage in 2014 did not fall as sharply as they did in 2012-13 drought. On 15th October 2014, Jayakwadi dam in Aurangabad had 42% Live storage, which was more than October 2013 storage of 33% and 2012, when it had reached dead storage already (http://www.mahawrd.org/). The entire Marathwada region too showed large reservoir storage of 47%, which is not extremely alarming.
Significantly, 2012-13 drought also unfolded in a similar manner, with highly satisfactory monsoons of 2011.
At the same time, the region is facing one of the worst droughts in recent history today.
This seemingly contradictory situation underlines a number of things, most important being: large dams do not automatically equate with water in farmers’ fields. Work on many projects (most projects in Marathwada) is incomplete ( for example: canals of projects like Lower Dudhana, Jayakwadi Phase II, etc), while contractors and politicians have made a pretty packet from the contracts, many projects are ‘evaporation machines’ than a water supply systems, without canals and distributaries or systems to govern water management. The available impounded water is a valuable political tool, and is used as such. Water allocation and management is far from being sustainable, transparent and accountable.
According to news reports, in the past 11 months, 454 farmers only in Marathwada[1] have committed suicide due to number of reasons, most linked to crop failure and debt. Strikingly, after late November 2014, 52 farmers committed suicides mainly from Beed, Nanded and Osmanabad regions.
| District | Number of farmer suicides since January 2014 | |
| 1. | Beed | 122 |
| 2. | Nanded | 104 |
| 3. | Osmanabad | 54 |
| 4. | Parbhani | 49 |
| 5. | Aurangabad | 40 |
| 6. | Jalna | 22 |
| 7. | Hingoli | 29 |
| 8. | Latur | 34 |
The issue has been raised in the Winter Assembly by the enthusiastic opposition and the CM is yet to announce a drought relief package. It is expected to be close to 8000-9000 Crores or more.
At the same time, there is a huge tussle going on between Nashik and Nagar on one hand and Marathwada on the other, for waters Godavari which originates in Western Ghats flows through Northern Maharahstra and then becomes the lifeline of Marathwada region. Nashik and Ahmednagar have constructed slew of large dams on Godavari and have always been reluctant to release water for Jayakwadi dam in Aurangabad in the downstream. We saw this episode flaring up last year and we are seeing an action replay this year as the HC has ordered immediate release of water from upstream dams for Jayakwadi. (See:http://indiatogether.org/share-environment). (Notably, this is the first time I have witnessed that the Dam Storages data of www.mahawrd.org, the official website of the Water Resources Department is not updated with weekly Dam Storage Levels. This had not happened even at the peak of 2013-12 Drought. Our queries to WRD on this front have been unanswered till date.)
WRD officials and administration have taken cautious stand and water in reservoirs is now reserved mainly for drinking water purposes, any release in downstream for irrigation is being delayed and is being made only after strong negotiations, badly hitting rabi cultivation, which is already less than last year.
Even as conflicts flare up, protests rage and assembly is disrupted, sugarcane crushing goes on unhindered in Marathwada, in whopping 61 Sugar factories!
On the unfortunate and expected lines, the government has not said a word about restricting cane crushing in Marathwada this year, which itself guzzles massive amounts of water, apart from cane cultivation. On the other hand, the party president, Amit Shah himself attended first crushing day of some factories (one of which was reportedly captured by relatives of a BJP MLA by fraud![2])
A look at sugarcane cultivation and crushing season so far in Marathwada:
(All data obtained by SANDRP from Sugar Commissionarate, Maharashtra Government, December 2014)
Area under sugarcane in Marathwada in 2013-14 and Sugar factories
| District | Area under sugarcane (in hectares) | Number of Sugar factories | |
| 1. | Aurangabad | 15,373 | 9 |
| 2. | Jalna | 11,083 | 5 |
| 3. | Beed | 27,299 | 10 |
| 4. | Parbhani | 25,567 | 6 |
| 5. | Hingoli | 18,037 | 3 |
| 6. | Nanded | 28,057 | 9 |
| 7. | Osmanbad | 43,635 | 16 |
| 8. | Latur | 61,479 | 12 |
| TOTAL | 2,30,530 Hectares | 61 Factories | |
| TOTAL SUGARCANE CULTIVATED IN MARATHWADA FOR CRUSHING | 154.28 Lakh Tonnes |
So around 61 sugar factories will crush 154.28 Lakh Tonnes Cane in a period when drought is so bad that water will not be released from reservoirs for irrigation!
In doing so, the factories will use a minimum of 1500 litres of water to crush one tonne of cane. To crush 154.28 lakh tonnes, minimum amount of water used will be: 23,142,000,000 Litres or 23.1 Million Cubic Meters. This is the lowest estimate.
This amount would be sufficient to irrigate nearly 8,000 acres of high yielding groundnut, more of Jowar or can be sufficient for drinking water needs of nearly 15 lakh 85 thousand people[3] till the onset of 2015 monsoon!
This water will be used till the end of crushing season when the drought will be extremely severe if we look at current indices.
Is there a justification of doing so? Will a 10,000 Crore drought package come close to ameliorating the impact of water loss at the peak of drought?
In addition, the pollution control mechanism of most sugar factories is pathetic. Pollution Control Board has raised this number of times. Uncontrolled water and soil pollution by sugar factories will additionally pollute groundwater and water bodies, further affecting water security of the region.
This water may be sourced from dams and groundwater. SANDRP has witnessed in 2012-13drought, sugar factories in Marathwada, mainly Osmanabad region lifted water from dams even when water levels had dipped below dead storage. What will be the impact of this siphoning on local drinking water security?
We should not forget that one of the costliest political lesson for NCP came when Ajit Pawar uttered extremely insulting remarks on dry reservoirs, mocking people’s plight. This was in context of a protest by a lone farmer from Mohol, urging water for drinking, even as sugar factories on Mohol used lakhs of litres of water when the farmer, Prabhakar Deshmukh, was fasting in Mumbai! Needless to say, the ruling party’s defeat was sealed through such acts. (More about Sugarcane in Solapur here: https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2013/04/22/why-solapur-sugarcane-and-sustainability-do-not-rhyme/)
Even in terms of groundwater, Marathwada region has literally touched rock bottom. In a report by GSDA (Groundwater Survey and Development Agency) submitted to Government of Maharashtra,[4] it has been reported that in 249 villages of Marathwada, abstraction has been 100% and there is no more water to draw. Not surprisingly, the regions suffering largest groundwater problems are surrounded by sugarcane and sugarcane factories.
In the past too, SANDRP has underlined how sugarcane in drought affected areas contributed to worsening drought of 2012-13. Then Solapur was in crisis. This year, the district which has 28 sugar factories two years back has 34 sugar factories!
All government announcements about bringing sugarcane under drip have remained on paper and sugarcane continues to rule the drought politics of the region, regardless of the political party. In fact, the Cooperation Minister BJP Government Chadrakant Patil has announced that the only clause which has been limiting further sugar factory rush (of having a minimum aerial distance of 15-25 kms between two factories[5]), can be diluted “ to promote healthy competition”. 200 factories are lined up for licenses with the Sugar Commissionarate! There is no thought about the impact of this decision on water profile of Maharashtra.
This defies logic. The work of Winter Assembly was disrupted several times yesterday (10th December 2014) by aggressive opposition asking for an immediate drought package for Marathwada and Vidarbha. How can a 4,000 or 10,000 Crore Drought Package address these systemic issues? How can this package address siphoning off water from a drought hit region in peak drought? The opponents are happy discussing help to sugar factories for drought relief, not raising any points about impending impacts of crushing cane in drought.
In the long term, there is a need to reduce area under sugarcane and provide proper incentives, fair support price, forward and backward market linkages and support for initiatives like horticulture under drip (and there are several success stories from Marathwada on this), dairying, oil seed and pulses cultivation and processing, dryland farming and importantly, equitable and transparent water management involving all farmers in the region, not restricted to a few.
It is high time that long term decisions are taken in order to make Marathwada truly drought proof and free from clutches of ‘drought packages’ and opportunistic politics, year after year. A start can be made by restricting cane crushing in the region immediately.
-Parineeta Dandekar, SANDRP, parineeta.dandekar@gmail.com
End Notes:
Marathwada Farmers need Water: http://72.78.249.126/Agrowon/20141013/5520233630699177815.htm
SANDRP Analysis on water issues in Maharashtra:
Open Letter to Devendra Fadnavis: https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/11/14/open-letter-to-devendra-fadnavis/
Why Solapur, Sugar and Sustainability do not rhyme: https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2013/04/22/why-solapur-sugarcane-and-sustainability-do-not-rhyme
[1] http://www.esakal.com/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsId=5611377824684291267
[2] http://www.loksatta.com/mumbai-news/bjp-leaders-closed-try-to-take-over-controle-on-sugar-factory-in-paithan-1049861/
[3] @ 80 litres per capita per day
[4] http://www.loksatta.com/maharashtra-news/no-rain-in-marathwada-1047256/
[5] http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/maharashtra-likely-to-abolish-25-km-limit-between-two-sugar-units-114112300348_1.html
Further work on SANDRP on Drought, Maharashtra and Sugarcane can be found in Category: Maharashtra
SANDRP 