Interbasin Diversion Dams in Western Ghats: Unknown impacts and uncertain Benefits

May 19, 2014May 19, 2014 SANDRPLeave a comment

Discussions on Interlinking of Rivers are gaining momentum as new government takes charge at the centre. It is predicted that the new government will be supportive of ecologically and socially questionable plan of interlinking rivers. In this backdrop, it will be interesting to study the fate of a little known scheme of diverting west flowing water to the Godavari Basin in Maharashtra. While the entire ‘grand’ plan includes many such schemes, we are focusing on one of the biggest interbasin diversion project under this scheme. Manjarpada Phase I project which is on a shared basin between Maharashtra and Gujarat, located in the Dindori Taluka of Nashik District. We also look at the status of about 28 interbasin diversion schemes proposed and under construction in this region, their justifications, benefits as well as impacts.

Manjarpada Phase I under Upper Godavari Irrigation Project

Manjarpada Phase I forms part of the Upper Godavari Irrigation Project under the Water Resources Department, Maharashtra. The original proposal of the Upper Godavari Irrigation Project included Dams like Waghad, Karanjvan, Palkhed and Ozarkhed, which received administrative sanction in 1966. Work was started in 1968. From here on a number of components like Punegaon Dam, Tisgaon Dam, several canals kept getting added to the scheme. However, it remained essentially an intra basin project, there was no inter linking rivers component here.

In 2008 a radically different component was added to Upper Godavari Project. This was the inclusion of 12 diversion weirs on Paar, Taar, Damanganga Basin Rivers that in normal course would flow into Gujarat. These weirs envisaged near the ridge line, transferring waters of these into dams built in the Godavari Basin, via deep canals across the Western Ghats, which will transfer water from west flowing rivers to the east flowing Godavari. According to the White Paper on Irrigation Projects brought out by the Water Resources Department of Maharashtra in December 2012, these diversion weirs and Manjarpada Phase I scheme added an irrigation potential of about 30,000 hectares in the Upper Godavari Projects. The total irrigation potential of the entire Upper Godavari projects is estimated as 74,000 hectares (including 30,000 hectares from Diversion projects), of which potential of 69000 hectares is claimed to be created. This is unbelievable as the Diversion weirs, with a total command of 30,000 hectares, are just about half complete. The White Paper states that about 55% work on Manjarpada project and about 60% work on 11 diversion weirs has been completed.

An interbasin transfer scheme that claims a cumulative irrigation potential of 30,000 hectares will have significant impact on ecosystems, communities and downstream hydrology. But no such studies have been conducted for these projects, there has been no public consultation process and it is not even known if there is any interstate agreement for this transfer. The most striking example is Manjarpada Phase I project which envisages transferring about 500 million cubic feet (Mcft) from the Paar basin into Punegaon dam in the Godavari basin by way of a dam and two significantly big tunnels. Officials of Water Resource Department have stated that the project, submerging 95 hectares of land, also needs Forest Clearance for 65 ha forest land, which has not been granted yet, although work is in an advanced stage! This is clearly illegal as per the Forest Conservation Act (1980).

SANDRP’s visit to Manjarapada Phase I Project When we visited the site of Manjarpada project, we were first struck by the name. The project has nothing to do with Manjarpada village, but is entirely based in Devsale Village of Dindori Taluk. Work on the main dam has been stopped for many months now. The villagers say that this is due to local protests, while the officials claim this is due to paucity of funds.

No impact assessment of the project has taken place. When we visited Devsale village, we were mobbed by villagers who wanted to show us the damages caused by the project for which they have received no compensations. The incessant blasting of the tunnel in the hardrock has resulted in cracks to many homes. More than 250 villagers claim that they have lost water from their shallow wells/ bore wells. More than 50 well owners have submitted a memorandum to the Collector and Zilla Parishad office about drying up of their wells.

Above: Manjarpada Dam wall under construction. Photo: Amit Tillu for SANDRP

The villagers indicate 2 tunnels under construction for the same project, one of which is complete in 1 km length and the other complete in nearly 8 km length, with a huge air vent 20 m wide and over 150 m deep. The depth of the tunnel underground is about 150-300 feet.

Above: Under construction tunnel at Manjarpada Phase I Photo: Amit Tillu for SANDRP

The laborers employed by the subcontractor do not understand Marathi and cannot respond to questions asked by the villagers. Work on the main dam wall has stopped since the last 2 years. Villagers say that blasting and tunneling has severely affected groundwater in the region, which has fallen drastically after tunneling. Blasting has resulted in not only cracks in over 100 homes, it has led to collapse of more than 10 built open wells, turning them into puddles. This was witnessed by us. Displaced families have not been resettled[1] yet.

Corruption involved in the unfeasible Manjarpada Project: Whistle-blower of the Water Resources Department Vijay Pandhare has been highlighting issues about Manjarpada project since a long time, when he was in service as Chief Engineer at Maharashtra Engineering Training Academy. He had pointed serious irregularities about this project in his letters to the Secretary, Maharashtra Water Resource Department, state Chief Minister Prithviraj Chavan as well as separately to Dr. Chitale who was supposed to be investigating the Maharashtra dam scam.

Pandhare talked exclusively with SANDRP on Manjarapada Project, he said: “This project is planned to transfer about 500 million cubic feet of water and is costing about Rs 500 crores and these estimates will increase. It should have costed a fraction of this. The entire process of Manjarapada Phase 1 was driven by the politician and contractor lobby and there was never any space for rational questioning. In addition to Manjarpada Stage I, the department is now also pushing for Manjarpada phase II downstream of this project, which will divert water right into the Tapi Basin. Now the catchment area of Manjarpada Phase I and Phase II actually overlap and the projects are simply unfeasible as there is no water availability as stated in the water availability certificates. This needs to be thoroughly investigated and I had written about this to many authorities, in vain.”

Shri. Pandhare is justified in raising these issues. If we look at the internal note of MID, with SANDRP, it states that in 2008 Manjarapada project was approved Rs. 62.54 Crores. Till December 2013, Rs 122.66 Crores were spent on this project! This has resulted in 30% work on spillway, 80% on connecting tunnel, 100% on open canal, 72% on diversion tunnel.

The last line on the project drops a bomb. It states: “An estimate for Third administrative approval for Upper Godavari Project, which includes the cost of this project at Rs 430.74 crores for Manjarpada project, has been presented before the government for approval.” So within 5 years, cost of the project shot up nearly 6 folds!

Above: One of the several open wells collapsed due to balsting for Manjarpada project Photo: Amit Tillu for SANDRP

Pandhare writes in his letter to the Secretary and Chief Minister, the letter that initially shook the water management circles in Maharashtra[2]. “The system that makes cost estimates in WRD is has been nearly killed. So the field officer has been made in-charge of working on estimates. In reality the contractor makes these estimates and they are sanctioned without checking. Otherwise such unfeasible and costly work would not be undertaken… In case of Manjrapada project, the cost estimates, especially tunnel excavation costs have been bloated beyond measure. The benefits are hazy. When Phase I is questionable, unfeasible and hugely costly Manjrpada II is being pushed by political backing. This project has a water availability certificate, when in fact the catchment does not have enough water.” He has specifically requested Dr. Chitale to investigate this project.[3]

When we met the Executive Engineer, MI Projects (Local Sector), for Nashik division, he agreed that there is controversy surrounding Manjarpada Projects, especially related to feasibility and overlap of catchment area, but refused to comment further. He softly added that political interference with water resource department should reduce. In the meantime, Chagan Bhujbal, former MP from Nashik region (he lost in 2014 Parliamentary elections by huge margin of close to 2 lakh votes) has been stating that Manjrapada II will happen at any cost.[4]

One of the official stated that Manjarpada project is the ‘Boss’ of these schemes as it will route water from many schemes in the Paar Basin into the Godavari Basin. Though he later added that the main reason for pushing Manjarpada was that the Punegaon Dam, downstream Manjarpada has not been filling up in monsoon and Manjarpada will aid it. This again underlines Pandhare’s claim that water availability certificates being given for projects in Maharashtra (like Punegaon) are not scientific and driven by other motives!

Above: Villagers at Devsale talking about issues of Manjarpada Project I Photo: Amit Tillu for SANDRP

Incidentally, according to white paper, it’s interesting to see the list of water users downstream of these projects. They include Ranwad sugar factory, K Distillery, Ashokumar Hatcheries, Everest Industries, Seagram Distillery, Shivam chemical, Kadwa Sugar industry, Dinodri MIDC (which is a Wine MIDC in Maharashtra) & have a reservation on 136 MCFt. While Manmad taluka suffered acute water stress in drought in 2012-13, water supply to distilleries and wine industries continued.

This whole episode involving the project, its decision making process, lack of impact assessment and credible techno-economic appraisal and monitoring raises many questions. In the first place, the Manjarpada project highlights the need for thorough participatory processes that should be undertaken before taking up such projects, especially when they involve interbasin transfers.

Maharashtra and Gujarat have signed an MoU to transfer waters from Damanganga River into Vaitarna basin through Bhugad, Khargihill and Pinjal Dams and tunnel systems. The tunnel envisaged between Pinjal and Khargihill stretches over 64 kilometers, more than 5 times the tunnel in Manjarada. It is clear that the impacts of not only the dams, but the tunnel systems will be huge and need investigation.

More than 19 Diversion Projects diverting “unutilized water going waste to the Arabian Sea”

When we met officials at the Minor Irrigation Division (MID), they showed us the map of intricate links planned in the entire Damangagang, Paar, Naar Basin as well as parts of Vaitarna and Ulhas basin to transfer water “flowing unutilized to the Arabian Sea” into the Godavari Basin. It is difficult to imagine that a project of this massive scale, which can transfer nearly 400 MCM from West Flowing basins into the Godavari basin is going on without any project specific impact assessment, cumulative impact assessment, cost benefit studies, environmental appraisal, environment management plan, public consultations, environmental monitoring and based on questionable water availability studies.

The Maharashtra Irrigation Dept GR dated Sept 2005 approved the proposal of diversion schemes near the ridge line to divert water which was “going waste, unutilised into the Arabian Sea” to Godavari Basin in the East. 19 such schemes have received approval from the Hydrology Project (Jal Vgyan Prakalpa) Nashik. Of these 19 schemes, 13 have been included in the second administrative approval of the Upper Godavari Project, but there are in all nearly 28 diversion schemes under consideration. Table in Annexure 1 provides details of the various schemes under this project.

Above: Diversion Weirs at Dindori, with deep canal on the upstream transferring water Photo: Parineeta Dandekar, SANDRP

SANDRP team also visited some of these diversion weirs.

In case of Amboli Diversion Weir, its capacity is supposed to be close to 1 MCM (million cubic meters). It was bone dry in May when SANDRP team visited it. Sagar Marathe, who resides next to the weir states that the weir, now complete, hardly holds any water in it. The reason seems obvious. Just 200-300 mts upstream the dam wall, a high canal embankment runs, which means that the dam has nearly no catchment area! There is no study on the amount of water that is indeed diverted into Kashyapi River here, a tributary of Godavari.

Above: Dam wall and the dry Amoboli Diversion Weir reservoir can be seen on the left, on the right is a tall embankment of an older canal which runs parallel to the dam wall and is much longer. Effectively, the dam has nearly no catchment. Photo: Parineeta Dandekar

In case of Waghera diversion weir, which is supposed to be under construction, the tribal villagers told SANDRP that the mud dam has been existing since the past 20-25 years and the only work going on is digging the canals! But the MID note does not state that the dam is already existing, possibly indicating an irregularity.

These examples are only indicative. They highlight the need for transparent and participatory studies surrounding these projects.

Above: Unlined canal in Dindori, transferring water onto Waghad Dam. Photo: Parineeta Dandekar, SANDRP

Environment laws violated, but MoEF in dark and inactive! Manjarpada Diversion and other diversion dam projects are coming up in violation of the EIA Notification 2006, but MoEF seems to know nothing about it. Manjarpada or other diversion schemes cannot claim exclusion from the environmental appraisal process since it involves huge irrigation, in addition to inter basin transfer, domestic & industrial water supply.

The entire diversion scheme raises big questions about significant impacts, needs of the downstream population, local opposition and finally questionable and unassessed benefits. We hope MoEF will take cognizance of the legal violations and take stringent steps against Maharashtra government. Unfortunately Maharashtra is mired with too many of such examples, in addition to the dam scam.

– Parineeta Dandekar ( parineeta.dandekar@gmail.com), Amit Tillu ( amittillu@gmail.com) with inputs from Himanshu Thakkar ( ht.sandrp@gmail.com)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Annexure 1

Table 1 Overview of Interbasin diversion projects planned to divert water into the Godavari Basin.

	Name	Basin	Basin in which water is transferred	Quantity		Remark
	Manjarpada Diversion Project Nashik	Par	Godavari: Punegaon and Karanjvan Dams	17.16 MCM
	Golshi Mahaji Flow Diversion Project, Dindori	Damanganga origin 10 nallahs to be diverted	Waghad Dam, Godavari	0.47 MCMto be transferred		Current cost around 32 Crores( 12.97 spent, 21.31 requested)
	Nanashi Flow Diversion Project, DindoriNashik	Nar-Par. Dam at the origin of Par, from here to Hattipada DW, from there to Karanjvan Dam	Karanjvan Dam, Godavari	1 MCM into Godavari 0.55 MCM for local use		Initial estimate was 3.04 crores in 2008. Actually 3.81 crores spent, Now application for 17.1 crores made for 3^rd administrative approval
4.	Golshi 1, Flow Diversion Project, Dindori Dindori	Damanganga Basin	Waghad Dam	3.11 MCM		1.29 crores in 2008.3.15 crores asked in 3^rd administrative approval
5.	Hatti pada, Flow Diversion Project, Dindori DindoriNashik	Paar Basin	Karanjvan dam, Godavari Basin	0.93 mcm to Karanjvan Dam. 0.67 mcm for local use		3.11 crores in 2008, 7.64 crores spent till Dec 2013, now requested: 14.24 crores in 3^rd approval
6.	Dhondalpada Flow Diversion Project	NA	Godavari basin	1.73 MCM Consists of5 saddle dams
7.	Chaphyacha pada	Na	Godavari	0.30 MCM
	Ranpada Diversion project	NA	Godavari	0.35 MCM
	Payarpada Flow Diversion Canal, Dindori Nashik	NA	Godavari	2.039 MCM		Local opposition to Land aquisition. Hence work not started.
	Ambaad Diversion canal. Dindori Nashik			0.40 MCM		Local opposition to land acquisition. Work not started
	Pimpraj F diversion Project	NA	Godavari	1.26 MCM
	Ambegan F Diversion Prjct	NA	Godavari	1.40 MCM
	Jharlipada F Diversion Prct		Waghad Dam, Godavari Basin	1.05 MCM
	Chimanpada Flow Diversion Project Dindori		Godavari	0.83 MCM for diversion; 0.45 MCM for local use,		No technical Sanction yet
	Waghera Flow Diversion Scheme, TrimbakNashik	Damanganga Basin	Godavari ( no dam, u/s of Ganga pur Dam)	1.19 MCM		Sanctioned cost in 2007 was 15 crores. 80% work complete, Link cut work under progress
	Pegal wadi Flow Diversion Project, Trimbak, Nashik	Vaitarna Basin	Godavari	0.695 MCM		In 2004, 17.92 crores approved
	Amboli (Bombiltekpada)		Godavari	0.92 MCM		17.92 Cr approved in 2004 (an error?)
	Total			34.83 MCM
Schemes which do not have administrative approval, but are included in the Upper Godavari Project by the Godavari Irrigation Development Corp.
	Velunje-Amboli Dvrsn Prjct	Damanganga	Godavari		1.447 MCM		16.07 crores estimated
	Kalmuste Diversion project	Damanganga	Godavari		23.141 MCM by a diversion weir		333 Crores estimated price
3.	Kapwadi Diversion Project	Ulhas	Godavari		7.04 MCM		Estimated cost 60.8 Cr
	Sub Total				31.62 MCM
Projects with survey permissions and administrative approval
	Lift dvrsn prjct 3, Surgana	Paar	Godavari		94.37 MCM
	Lift dvrsn prjct 4, Surgana	Paar	Godavari		89.12 MCM
	Sub Total				183.49 MCM
Water Diversion from Upper Vaitarna Basin to Godavari Basin
	Note: GOM approved the scheme to fit doors to the saddle dam of Vaitarna project and transfer water into Godavari. However, Thane Circle of KIDC had acquired 4689 hectares of Upper Vaitarna Project. Eventually, Dam height was reduced and 623 hectares was additional land left which should have been returned to the PAPs. But this was not done. There is a strong opposition of local people to any survey without this return. No has been conducted as yet.				28.50 MCM.
6 Diversion projects for Ahmednagar under very primary planning
	Hivra Walvani Diversion Weir		Pravara		18.46 MCM		13 hectares forest land
	Samrand Diversion weir		Pravara		17.98 MCM		6 hectares forest land bot fall in PA. Hydrology Project communicated that the project is not supported by the GOM. CE, KIDC has written in 2012 that there is no water to transfer to the east.
	Sub Total				36.44 MCM
Transfer water from Shai and Kalu Basins into Akole between Harishchandragad and Ajoba Mountain into Mula basin
	Tolarkhind Tunnel Project				18.08 MCM		CE, KIDC has written in 2012 that no surplus water available in Shai & Kalu Basins for dvrsion.
	Khirehwarer Tunnel Prject				40.01 MCM
	Sadada Tunnel Project				11.13 MCM
	Pathar Ghat dvrsn canal pr				7.67 MCM
Diverion from Kalu and Shai Basin					76.89 MCM
TOTAL PLANNED DIVERISON FROM WEST TO EAST in Godavari Basin					391.77 MCM

Source: Minor Irrigation Department, Nashik Division

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

END NOTES:

[1] http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/land-lost-to-irrigation-project-tribal-families-reel-in-poverty/

[2] https://sandrp.in/irrigation/Letter_Maharashtra_Irrigation_Scam_Oct12.pdf

[3] https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/03/03/vijay-pandhares-letter-to-dr-chitale-please-fix-responsibility-of-the-irregularities/

[4] http://www.deshdoot.com/news.php/news/4313229

Arunachal Pradesh · Dams

Dibang Project Rejected Forest Clearance for the Second Time

May 17, 2014September 24, 2020 SANDRP8 Comments

PROJECT UNABLE TO SUBMIT SATISFACTORY PROPOSAL EVEN SIX YEARS AFTER PM LAID FOUNDATION STONE!

In a remarkable decision, the Forest Advisory Committee (FAC) of MoEF has rejected the forest clearance to 3000 MW Dibang multipurpose project for the second time in its meeting held on 29 -30 April 2014. In that meeting FAC considered the Dibang multipurpose project for diversion of massive 4577.84 ha of biodiversity rich forest land which would lead to cutting down of huge 3.24 lac trees.

Continue reading “Dibang Project Rejected Forest Clearance for the Second Time” →

Chenab · Jammu and Kashmir

Massive Kwar and Kiru HEPs on Chenab, J and K : Poor quality & cut paste EIAs, flawed public hearing

May 10, 2014May 11, 2014 SANDRPLeave a comment

It seems we do not want to learn any lessons from the massive Uttarakhand disaster of June 2013. Two more huge capacity hydropower projects have been submitted to the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) of Ministry of Environment & Forest (MoEF) for grant of Environmental Clearance (EC) with very poor quality Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (EIA) reports.

EIA reports of Kiru Hydro Electric Project (HEP) (660MW) and Kwar HEP (560 MW) proposed in Kishtwar district, Jammu and Kashmir by Chenab Valley Power Projects Ltd. (CVPP) were submitted to the EAC for River for its 74^th meeting held on 5-6 May, 2014 for grant of EC. The projects are run-of-river schemes proposed on river Chenab as a part of cascade development of Chenab basin.

Vicinity Map (Source Kiru EIA Report)

Partial Map of Commissioned and Proposed HEPs in Chenab River Basin (Map by SANDRP)

Chenab basin may have one of the highest concentrations of hydropower projects among all basins in India[1]. The basin has over 60 HEPs under various stages of planning, construction and commissioning in states of Himachal Pradesh (HP) and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

While 49 of these projects are planned or under construction in Chenab in HP, 28 projects of combined generation capacity of 5,800 MW are at an advanced stage of obtaining (Environment Ministry) clearances[2]. State of J&K has 13 projects planned of total capacity 8,623 to 8,923 MW. These consist of at least four operational projects (of total 1563.8 MW), three under construction projects (of 1450.5 MW) and six proposed projects (of 5608.7 MW).

Table 1: Cascade Development of Chenab Basin Source: EIA report of Kiru & Kwar
Sr. No.	Scheme	River	Capacity
1	Salal (Stage- I & II)	Chenab	690 MW
2	Sawalkot	Chenab	1856 MW
3	Baglhar (Stage-I & II)	Chenab	900 MW
4	Shamnot	Chenab	370 MW
5	Ratle	Chenab	850 MW
6	Dulhasti	Chenab	390 MW
7	Kwar	Chenab	560 MW
8	Kiru	Chenab	660 MW
9	Kirthai-I	Chenab	350 MW
10	Kirthai-II	Chenab	990 MW
11	Barinium	Chenab	240 MW

Himalayan ecosystem, of which the Chenab river basin is a part, is known to be geologically fragile. Cascade of hydel projects proposed on the river basins of this region would make the region even more vulnerable to extreme and erratic weather events, which will increase in changing climate. This has already been witnessed during Uttarakhand disaster of June 2013. Expert Body (EB) headed by Dr Ravi Chopra recently has officially acknowledged this connection in the report submitted to MoEF[3]. In light of this, a thorough impact assessment of all the proposed hydro power projects in this region is thus of critical importance. Various organizations and experts including SANDRP have repeatedly highlighted the fact that Cumulative Impact Assessment (CIA) of all the proposed, under construction and operational projects and carrying capacity assessment (CCA) of the river basin to see if it can support the massive number of HEPs in safe and sustainable way is one of the first steps before considering clearances to HEPs in this region. Without such a study, considering any hydropower project in the basin will be an invitation to disaster[4].

Even though the MoEF sanctioned TORs for cumulative impact assessments of the HEPs on Chenab in HP in February 2012, this critical task was entrusted to the Directorate of Energy, Government of Himachal Pradesh. This is a clear case of conflict of interest. Further the project specific ECs were delinked from the CIAs[5].

More importantly, no such study has been initiated in Chenab basin in J&K or in the Chenab basin as a whole. State of Jammu and Kashmir is not even considering CIA of HEPs on Chenab in the state as MoEF has not asked for it yet. CIA of the entire Chenab basin including HP and J&K is not being considered, which itself is violating MoEFs Office Memorandum dated May 28 2013. The OM states that all states were to initiate carrying capacity studies within three months from the date of the OM No. J-11013/I/2013-IA-I. Since this has not happened in case of Chanab basin in J&K, considering any more projects in the basin for Environmental clearance will be in violation of the MoEF OM.

On Cumulative Impact Assessment, the OM said, “While, first project in a basin could come up without insisting on cumulative impact study, for all subsequent hydro-power projects in the basin, it should be incumbent on the developer of second/ other project(s) to incorporate all possible and potential impacts of the other project (s) in the basin to get a cumulative impact assessment done.” The EIA of both the projects does not include the cumulative impacts.

MoEF continues to give clearances to individual HEP projects despite of poor quality Project Feasibility Reports (PFRs) and EIA reports submitted for appraisal. Kiru & Kwar EIA reports are a classic example of such poorly conducted EIAs. The EIAs demonstrate several serious issues across various stages from TOR non-compliance, non assessment of impacts, cut and paste job, lack of any references, faulty public hearings, the issued raised at public hearings have not been addressed in EIAs, as statutorily required. SANDRP recently made detailed submissions to EAC highlighting these issues for both the projects. Some highlights below:

Copy paste job while preparing EIA reports Both the reports are prepared by a consortium of RS Envirolink Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Gurgaon) and Jammu University. Kiru EIA report demonstrates a casual approach towards impact prediction and proposing mitigation measures in EMP. The report also misses out on a number of important aspects of EIA like impact of construction activities on geology, flora fauna, impact of climate change, cumulative impacts of cascade development in Chenab basin etc. While Kiru EIA is inadequate on several fronts it was utterly shocking to discover that Kwar EIA report is a complete replica of the Kiru EIA Report. Entire text, save project specific numbers, remains the same in both reports, to the extent that the Kwar EIA report mentions Kiru instead of Kwar at several places!! The impact prediction for both the cases is so vague and generic that the changes in numbers for project-specific details like proposed installed capacity, submergence of reservoir, FRL, head race tunnels etc. do not reflect at all in the reports!

Brief Project Profiles Kiru H.E. Project and Kwar H.E. Project are run-of-river schemes proposed on river Chenab located in the district Kishtwar of J&K.

Kiru HEP envisages the construction of a 193 m long and 123 m high concrete gravity dam above the river bed across river Chenab at village Kiru with four intake, four pressure shafts, an underground powerhouse of 4 units of 165 MW each. Impoundment will cover an area of 1.03 Km extending 6.5 km upstream of dam. The average river bed level at the dam site is about EL 1394 m corresponding to an FRL of 1515 m, the gross storage of the reservoir is 41.50 Mcum and area under submergence is 1.03 Km.

Proposed dam site for Kiru HEP(Source Kiru EIA Report)

Kwar HEP envisages construction of a concrete gravity dam 101 m high from river bed across river Chenab at village Padyarna, four number intakes, four pressure shafts, an underground powerhouse to accommodate 4 units of 140 MW each and two number tail race tunnel. FRL of reservoir is proposed at EI 1385M. Gross storage of the reservoir at FRL is 27.167 Mcum. The reservoir will submerge an area of about 0.8 Sq. Km at FRL.

Proposed dam site for Kwar HEP (Source Kwar EIA Report)

TOR non-compliance First and foremost glaring issue about the proposed projects is the non-compliance with the TORs (Terms of Reference) laid down for conducting the EIA. These TORs were granted by MoEF. We have listed here only an indicative list of non compliance below, not an exhaustive one.

Kiru HEP The TOR clearance letter was issued for Kiru project on Sept 9, 2008, the TORs are valid for a period of 3 years, but the project developer never came back for extension of the TOR on expiry of 3 year period and has come now for EC over 5.5 years after the TOR clearance. Thus the TOR clearance is no longer valid for Kiru HEP as per the law. Also originally the TOR clearance for Kiru was given for 600 MW installed capacity. The EIA however has been conducted for 660 MW capacity. No permission was sought by the PP for this increased capacity.

Kwar project has undergone several changes since the grant of TOR on 17 March 2010. Table given below compares some of these changes. First and foremost alteration has been in the proposed total power generation. While the TORs were granted for 520 MW the EIA has been conducted for 560 MW. Number of affected families goes up by 160% and project cost escalates by 29%. The TORs were granted for over four years back and the project authority never got back to EAC/MoEF for renewal of the TOR as other projects do. Thus the TORs granted originally do not remain valid in this case too.

Table 2: Changes in the scope of Kwar project after grant of TOR on 17 March 2010
Sr. No.	Parameter	Scope at the time of TOR clearance	Current scope of the Proposed Project
1	Total power Generation	520MW	560 MW
2	Land requirement	5 Ha Government land	93.66 Ha Government land
3	Power House Units	4 x 130 MW	(4 x 140MW)
4	Affected families	35	91
5	Project Cost	Rs 3386.11 Cr	Rs. 4375.50 Crores at Jan’2012 PL

Casual approach towards impact prediction

Kwar EIA copy pasted from Kiru EIA report: It is evident that the EIA consultants have done nothing but copy paste job while preparing Kwar EIA report. At certain places Kwar report mentions ‘Kiru’ instead of Kwar. See for example point number 1.7 in Index of Kwar EIA mentions ‘Need of the Kiru HE project’ instead of Kwar and point number 4.4 mentions ‘Basin characteristics of free draining area of Kiru HEP’ (p.3 & p.6 of the document). Page 28 of Kwar EIA states that “The case for forest clearance of Kiru HE Project for diversion of 29.75 ha of forest land has been approved in the 81st meeting of J&K State Forest Advisory Committee (FAC) held on 09.12.2013…”

Other than very project specific figures, the entire text for both the reports is exactly the same. Impact prediction is the heart of an EIA study. However in Kwar EIA report an important chapter like Chapter 8- “Identification, Prediction and Evaluation of Environmental Impacts” is also copy pasted. The text of the chapter is same as that of Chapter 8 from Kiru EIA report save the project specific numbers and their description. The impacts predicted are vague and are conveniently kept the same in both the reports. It is clear that no real field work or application of mind is done. Such an EIA study defeats the basic purpose of conducting an EIA.

Impact of construction activities: The Kiru project involves a reservoir of live storage 10.5 MCM, a concrete dam on height (from river bed) 123.0 M & length 193 M, construction of 4 head race tunnels (of 7 m dia and 165 to 190 m length each) for discharging the water to an underground powerhouse of 4 units of 165 MW each. The project also envisages 33.4 Lakh CuM of construction material required from the project site.

The Kwar project involves construction of 101 m (above river bed)/ 109 m (above deepest foundation) high concrete gravity dam, Underground power house complex of four units of 140 MW each, Two concrete lined 9.5 m internal diameter main tailrace tunnels (having length of 2676 m and 2883 m) amongst several other features like four 5.65 m internal diameter main pressure shafts (each with a length of 108-182 m), etc. The project also envisages 38.36 Lakh CuM of construction material required from the project site.

View of Naigarh Nala Rock Quarry at Kwar Dam site (Source Kwar EIA Report)

All these activities will have significant impact on the geology and hydrology of the region. However no significant assessment or quantification of these impacts in terms of change in drainage patterns, springs in the project area, increased thereat of landslides, seismic activities has been carried out.

While talking about the impact of construction activities, the only impact of these two EIAs discussed in the chapter is ‘muck generation’. It does not mention impacts of tunneling and blasting involved in construction and also does not talk about its impact on fragile geology and hydrology of Himalayan region at all[6]. While talking about quarrying activities in the same chapter it states only two impacts viz. visual impacts and noise generation[7]. Impacts on landslides have been randomly dismissed stating that the sliding activity may not be significantly induced by project construction activities[8]. The reports trivialize the impacts on migratory fish Mahseer by stating that the upstream migration of this fish from the lower reached of the Chenab River have already been blocked by Salal and Baglihar, Dul Hasti dams. Thus they conclude that impact of this project on this fish species is not expected to be significant[9]. Option for fish ladder and fish lift has been ruled out for both the projects stating that it is not techno-economically feasible at the project site. Development of a hatchery at the project site has been proposed instead. The impact of the project on all the fish available in the river should have been assessed based on baseline assessment of the fisheries in Chenab River, which is not done. Secondly, there is no credible evidence to show that hatchery as a management option is useful or effective.

Left Bank slide for Kiru Project downstream of Ludrari Nala (Source Kiru EIA Report)

Right Bank slide for Kiru Project about 16 km downstream of Gulab Gargh (Source Kiru EIA Report)

The southern boundary of the Kishtwar National Park is approximately at an aerial distance of 11 km away from the proposed project, it is claimed, but this needs to be independently assessed. Also, just because it lies outside the boundary of study area which is radius of 10 KM, the EIA does not consider the impacts on this national park at all! EIA reports for both Kiru and Kwar HEPs simply state that the proposed activities shall have no impact on the National park[10].

Biodiversity at Kishtwar National Park (Photo: Travel Places[11] & Beauty Spots of India[12])

Several Important aspects of EIA are missing

No mention of free flowing river stretch: There is no mention of what is the flowing river stretch upstream and downstream of the project. As is clear from the EIA, the elevation difference between FRL of Kiru HEP (1515 m) and TWL of upstream Kirthan II (1526.5 m) is just 11.5 m. The elevation difference between TWL of Kiru HEP (1388 m) and FRL of downstream Kwar HEP (1385 m) is just 3 m. Similarly the elevation difference between TWL of Kwar HEP (1270 m) and FRL of downstream Hasti HEP (1264 m) is just 6 m. However, it is not clear what the flowing river lengths in all these locations are. Unless this length is assessed and is found to be adequate for river to regain its vitality, the project should not be considered and it should be asked to change the parameters.

Environmental Flows: The Kiru EIA report states that significant downstream impacts related to the water quality, fisheries, socio-economic and aquatic biodiversity are not foreseen since toe power house is proposed downstream of the dam and tail water level is EL 1388.52 m, discharge will be less only in a “very small stretch of about 800 m”. This seems to show the ignorance of the EIA consultants about how biodiversity in a flowing, lively river like Chenab survives.

Kwar EIA report states that the water entering the reservoir will be released back to river at a distance of 2.6 KM downstream. The report claims that though there in no human activity in this stretch of 2.6 KM the aquatic life will be definitely affected, as also terrestrial biodiversity, groundwater recharge, use of river and silt flow pattern.

10% of average of lean season discharge has been prescribed to be released through the dam gates as environmental flow for both the projects. This quantity has been calculated as 9.0 cumecs based on discharge data of the river. There is no mention of environmental flows in EMP. Firstly, this is even below the norms being followed by EAC and MoEF (30% in monsoon, 20% in lean season and 25% in rest, each at 90% dependability). Secondly, the amount of E-flow required needs to be arrived at based on actual assessment, but no such assessment has been done.

Impact of peaking generation not assessed: The reports talk about advantage of hydropower in terms of ability to providing peaking power. However, when a project operates as peaking station, there are severe impacts in the downstream and also upstream (rim stability). These impacts have not been assessed, nor is it assessed how the project will perform in the cascade development it is in.

Some other important aspects of impact assessment that report misses out on are:

Impact of the project on disaster potential in the project area as well in the downstream due to construction and also operation at various stages, say on landslides, flash floods, etc.
Social and Environmental Impacts of construction and operation of the coffer dams and diversion tunnels during construction phase are not included.
The reports do not even mention Climate Change.Impact of climate change on the project and impact of the project on the local climate has not been assessed. No mention or attempt has been made about or to assess the impact of green house gas emissions from the project.
Impacts on the flood characters of the river due to this dam, what will be the changes and how these will impact downstream areas.
Impact of changing silt flows downstream from desilting chamber and from silt flushing in monsoon on the downstream areas not analyzed. A detail account of how the silt from the dam would be flushed out annually and what would be the impact of this in the downstream as well as on the geo morphology, erosion, stability of structures etc was not done.
Options Assessment is missing, this is crucial part of the EIA to establish that among all options, including non project option, the given option is the least cost and best option.

Cumulative Impacts not assessed The EIA report gives list of Major hydroelectric projects executed /under execution/ under investigation so far in the basin in J&K which are a part of Cascade Development. Kirthan HE Project (990MW with proposed FRL at 1764 m and TWL at 1526.50m) which is yet to be commissioned is proposed upstream of Kiru (660 MW with FRL at 1515M). Downstream of Kiru is Kwar HE Project (560 MW with FRL at 1385 m and TWL at 1270 m) which is yet to be appraised and Dul Hasti HE Project (390 MW with FRL at 1264 m) which is commissioned.

Impoundment of Chenab at Dul Site (Source: Kwar EIA Report)

Moreover, the EIA does not provide the list of hydropower projects being taken up in Chenab basin in upstream Himachal Pradesh^{^[13]}. The cumulative impacts of all such projects will be huge.

The report summarizes cumulative impacts in single sentence: “The increased pressure will include uncontrolled logging, hunting of wildlife, non-timber forest product collection, livestock husbandry, the cultivation in forest areas and forest fires.”[14]

EIA report completely misses out on the detailed analysis of cumulative impacts in terms of

Impacts on flora, fauna, carrying capacity, livelihoods
Impact of reduction in adaptive capacity of the people and area to disasters in normal circumstance AND with climate change
Impacts on springs and drainage pattern
Disaster potential of the area
Tunneling and blasting
Geological disturbance caused
Seismic impacts
Carrying capacity

Inadequate Dam Break AnalysisThe Dam break analysis does not take into account the cumulative disaster potential including existing and proposed upstream and downstream projects. The EIA report also does not include cumulative disaster management plan.

Improper Public Hearing Public hearing conducted for both the projects were flawed. Excerpts from the speeches made by the officials from J&K State Pollution Control Board (SPCB) and CVPP that are noted in the public hearing report show that what these persons spoke was inappropriate, misleading and intimidating[15]. Also point wise responses to the issues raised by people at the Public Hearing are not provided in the EIA, as statutorily required. Hence even when people ask for Resettlement and Rehabilitation as per latest Act of 2013 (made effective from Jan 1, 2014), the EIA talks about National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy of 2007. The public hearing report strangely end for both projects with the officials asking those who are for the projects to raise their hands. There is no formal provision for voting for or against the project. Such public hearing should be declared null and void and fresh public hearing should be conducted.

Poor quality EIA reports that reflect pro hydro bias of the consultant EIA is the most effective tool to ensure environmental compliance in India. Needless to state that it is of critical importance. Casually predicted, unaddressed impacts and copy paste job of the Kiru and Kwar EIA reports once again highlights the poor quality of EIA reports submitted to the ministry for grant of EC. These reports decide fate of the project, of the people and environment surrounding the project site. Such quality of the report is most definitely not acceptable.

Further, an EIA report is an attempt to understand what are the adverse social and environmental impacts of a project and weather the impacts are acceptable, if the project is viable, optimal and desirable. The answer to this exercise can also include the answer that the project is not viable or desirable or acceptable. In view of this, the EIA consultant needs to be completely unbiased and should be ready to even conclude that the project is unacceptable. However, in case of the EIA consultant for the Kiru & Kwar HEP, EIA starts in very 1^st chapter with a shockingly unscientific and biased statement: “Hydropower projects are dependable, renewable, economic, environmentally benign sources of energy with ability to stop and start instantaneously.” This statement is factually wrong on many counts (e.g. hydropower project is renewable or dependable or environmentally benign source of energy). It, along with whole para 1.2 also reflects the bias of the EIA consultants RS Envirolink Technologies Pvt Ltd (with Jammu University) and we urge the EAC and MoEF to reject such poor quality and biased EIAs and take other necessary steps to debar such agencies from doing any EIA or environmental studies in future.

CONCLUSION Looking at serious issues above, based on merit of the EIA reports, as well as complete cut-paste jobs, we are hopeful that the MoEF will not recommend EC for these projects. This case also highlights the importance of cumulative impact assessment in an over developed Himalayan basin. When the experience with Uttarakhand flood disaster of June 2013 is fresh, we hope that MoEF will not commit another blunder.

Amruta Pradhan, SANDRP

END NOTES:

[1]https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2013/07/01/pm-kick-starts-850-mw-ratle-project-in-jk-without-full-impact-assessment-invitation-to-another-disaster-in-chenab-basin/

[2]https://sandrp.in/hydropower/Dams_on_Chenab_How_many_are_too_many_Dec2012.pdf

[3]https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/report-of-expert-committee-on-uttarakhand-flood-disaster-role-of-heps-welcome-recommendations/

[4] Refer to SANDRP studies on Chenab

https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2013/07/01/pm-kick-starts-850-mw-ratle-project-in-jk-without-full-impact-assessment-invitation-to-another-disaster-in-chenab-basin/

https://sandrp.in/hydropower/Dams_on_Chenab_How_many_are_too_many_Dec2012.pdf

https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/05/06/massive-hydropower-capacity-being-developed-by-india-himalayas-cannot-take-this-onslought/

[5]https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2013/07/01/pm-kick-starts-850-mw-ratle-project-in-jk-without-full-impact-assessment-invitation-to-another-disaster-in-chenab-basin/

[6]p.291 of Kiru EIA Report & p.288 of Kwar EIA report

[7]p.293 of Kiru EIA Report & p.289 of Kwar EIA report

[8]p.298 of Kiru EIA Report & p.294 of Kwar EIA report

[9]p.307 of Kiru EIA Report & p.303 of Kwar EIA report

[10]p.221 of Kiru EIA Report & p.223 of Kwar EIA report

[11]http://www.4to40.com/travel/index.asp?p=Kishtwar_National_Park&state=Jammu_and_Kashmir

[12]http://beautyspotsofindia.com/kishtwar-national-park-jammu-kashmir/

[13] See for example: https://sandrp.in/basin_maps/Hydro_%20Electric_Projects_in_Chenab_River_Basin.pdf

[14]P. 306 of Kiru EIA

[15]The Public hearing report of Kiru says that Shri Sajjad Mufti, Regional Director of J&K SPCB said at the public hearing, “Construction of project should not deteriorate the environment….” This is a very strange, untruthful and inappropriate statement from J&K SPCB official. Why should the official be speaking at all at the public hearing and that too make such a statement that would also affect the atmosphere of the public hearing? Similarly the statement of GM of CVPP at the public hearing, “The most viable and cleanest of all (sources of power) is hydro power” was again, wrong, intimidating and inappropriate. The statement of Shri Khursheed Ahmed Butt of CVPP, “forest clearance has already been granted to the proposed project” is incorrect since the proposal for forest clearance for the project has not even come before FAC. Such public hearing should be declared null and void and fresh public hearing should be conducted.

The Public hearing report of Kwar says that the GM of CVPP said at the public hearing, “The best source of power generation is hydro power” was wrong, intimidating and inappropriate. The statement, “forest clearance has already been granted to the proposed project” is incorrect since the proposal for forest clearance for the project has not even come before FAC.

[16] See for details and link to PCA orders: https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2013/12/23/international-court-asks-india-to-release-more-water-and-rejects-plea-to-re-interpret-february-verdict-on-kishanganga/

Assam · brahmaputra · Embankments · Floods

Matmora (Assam) Geo-tube Embankment on Brahmaputra: State Glorifies, but No End to Peoples’ Sufferings after Three Years of Construction

May 6, 2014 SANDRP3 Comments

The state of Assam in the northeastern India annually bears the brunt of floods and where embankment construction and repairing seems like permanent affair. Displacement of people living on the banks of rivers due to river bank erosion is another major issue here. The braiding and meandering river Brahmaputra and its tributaries continue to erode the banks rapidly. The Brahmaputra is well known for the rate in which it erodes. Among the places in the path of the river where the brunt of erosion has been felt severely include the following:

–        Rohmoria and Dibrugarh town in Dibrugarh district,
–        Matmora in Dhakukhana subdivsion of Lakhimpur district,
–        Majuli and Nimati Ghat in Jorhat district,
–        Lahorighat in Morigaon district and
–        Palashbari and Gumi in Kamrup district.

Map of areas taken up for erosion protection in Assam (Source– Assam 2011, A Development Perspective, published by Planning and Development Dept., Govt. of Assam) — Map of areas taken up for erosion protection in Assam. Source– Assam 2011, A Development Perspective, published by Planning and Development Dept., Govt. of Assam

SANDRP recently traveled to Matmora and Nimati ghat, two of these areas.

Bearing the Brunt of Erosion Silently Once a large village now only the name Matmora remains. Locals show us towards the middle of the river, to indicate where the village used to be. The rate of erosion is such that the Brahmaputra dyke from Sissikalghar to Tekeliphuta (popularly known as Sissi-Tekeliphuta dyke/embankment) takes the shape of a bow for nearly five kilometers at this place. From 2010, Matmora became very significant in the embankment history of India since country’s first embankment using geo-textile technology was constructed here. This was constructed at the bow shaped eroded line using geotextiles tubes. These tubes were filled up using water and sand from the banks of the river. This five kilometer embankment became a part of the Brahmaputra dyke from Sissikalghar to Tekeliphuta which is 13.9 km long. For the state government and Water Resources Department (WRD) of Assam, Matmora geotube embankment is a story of success of preventing floods and erosion. But what we saw in Matmora presents a different picture.

At Nimati Ghat, the river Brahmaputra is eroding its banks ferociously and people are intimidated by the river. A local person whose village used to be nearly two kilometers from the present bank line, told me, “Nothing can stop Baba Brahmaputra from claiming what he wants”. At Nimati Ghat, the Water Resources Department (WRD) is doing anti erosion work using geo-bags.

Funding for Embankments in Assam The total length of embankments in Assam is 4448 km as stated in a debate in the Legislative Assembly of Assam in 1998. Even though the present length of embankments is not known, it is very clear that the state of Assam continues to construct of newer embankments. In a recent analysis by SANDRP, it was found that the funds continue to increase for construction of embankments in the state. In five years from January 2009 to December 2013, the Advisory Committee in the Union Ministry of Water Resources for consideration of techno-economic viability of Irrigation, Flood Control and Multi-Purpose Project Proposals (TAC in short) had given clearance to projects worth Rs 1762.72 crores. A detailed list of these sanctioned projects can be found in Annexure 1 below.

Matmora Geo-tube embankment after its construction in 2010. Source– Assam 2011, A Development Perspective, published by Planning and Development Dept., Govt. of Assam.

Has Geo-tube been helpful for the people Between January 2009 to December 2013, the Brahmaputra dyke from Sissikalghar to Tekeliphuta, was considered twice by the TAC. The committee in its 95^th meeting on 20^th January 2009 accepted the project titled “Raising and Strengthening to Brahmaputra dyke from Sissikalghar to Tekeliphuta including closing of breach by retirement and anti-erosion measures (to protect Majuli and Dhakukhana areas against flood devastation by the Brahmaputra, Lakhimpur district, Assam). The estimated cost of this project was Rs 142.42 crore and its project proposal envisaged – (i) Raising and strengthening of embankment for a length of 13.9 km, (ii) Construction of retirement bund with geo-textile tubes of length 5000 m. (iii) Construction of 2700 m long pilot channel.

Geo-tube embankment in Matmora, three years after construction. Photo: SANDRP.

Protection work of the same dyke was considered in the 117^th meeting held on 21^st March 2013 under the proposal for “Protection of Brahmaputra dyke from Sissikalghar to Tekeliphuta at different reaches from Lotasur to Tekeliphuta from the erosion of river Brahmaputra Assam.” The estimated cost of this project was Rs 155.87 crore. According to the minutes of 117^th TAC meeting, the scheme envisaged “restoration of existing embankment in a length of 15300m at upstream and downstream of existing geo-tube dyke, Sand filled mattress in a length of 15604 m at river side slope, geo-tube apron length of 7204 m and Reinforced concrete porcupines as pro-siltation device at different reaches to prevent floods and erosion in Dhakukhana Civil sub-division of Lakhimpur district and Majuli sub-division of Jorhat district.” In the same minutes,while referring to the previous project proposal of 95^th meeting the minutes stated that, it “was taken up primarily for closure of breach in the existing embankment including raising of embankment around the breach area only. The proposed works in the present scheme were in the same river reach and these would be required to protect the bank from further erosion and provide flood protection.”

This clearly shows that the geo-tube embankment in Matmora cannot be called a success. Government documents which showed that major part of the Brahmaputra dyke from Sissikalghar to Tekeliphuta remained vulnerable even after the construction of the geo-tube embankment. In fact submitting a proposal for the whole Sissi-Tekeliphuta embankment at first and later saying that the money was spent in constructing a smaller part of the embankment also raise questions. The time gap between the two proposals also raises questions. If the whole money from first proposal was to be spent in constructing only a part of the embankment, why was it not stated clearly in the first proposal? In fact, this was not stated in the first proposal and second proposal reflects that the first project failed to achieve the objectives. If the first proposal was indeed only for part of the embankment, why the proposal to strengthen the larger part of the embankment took 5 years to appear before the committee? The latter proposal also did not mention about the breach which swept away a large part of the Sissi-Tekeliphuta embankment from Jonmichuk to Amgiri Tapit under Sissikalghar and Jorkata village panchayat. According to the local people this breach occurred in the morning hours of 25^th June 2012. The photo below shows the breach happened at the Jonmichuk end.

The breached area of 2012. This photo is taken from the new embankment and the lake formed at this spot can also be seen. Photo - SANDRP — The breached area of 2012. This photo is taken from the new embankment and the lake formed at this spot can also be seen. Photo – SANDRP

Jonminchuk area is nearly 15 km upstream of the geotube embankment in Matmora and part of the Sissi-Tekeliphuta embankment. A new embankment of nearly four kilometer long is being constructed at this place but the remnants of the old embankment still exist. The embankment was breached for nearly 3 kms and the water which entered the fields during that time could no longer go out and a large lake has been formed at this place, see the photo. It was surprising to see people living in the patches of the old embankment.

In the downstream, right from the point where the geo-tube embankment ends, the condition of the Sissi-Tekeliphuta embankment is pathetic. There were cracks in the embankment and water seepage has almost shattered the embankment. The embankment was in need of urgent repairs.

Condition of the Sissi-Tekelphuta embankment at the end point of the geo-tube embankment towards the village side. Photo - SANDRP — Condition of the Sissi-Tekelphuta embankment at the end point of the geo-tube embankment towards the village side. Photo – SANDRP

Sissi-Tekelphuta embankment at the same spot mentioned above towards the river side. Photo - SANDRP — Sissi-Tekelphuta embankment at the same spot mentioned above towards the river side. Photo – SANDRP

Besides, one does not have to travel far to find erosion in the downstream of the geo-tube embankment. After travelling, less than three kilometers from the end point of the geo-tube embankment, rapid erosion was observed at the place where the Matmora and Tekeliphuta ghats join, due to low water level. This joint ghat is more than a kilometer from the toe line of Sissi-Tekeliphuta embankment but seeing the rapidity of the erosion the locals opine that the river would reach the toe of the embankment within this monsoon. It was difficult to believe that the river can erode so fast, until a young man pointed towards a black line in the middle of the river and said that that area which now seemed to be char/sand bar used to be his village three years back. He with his family now live beside the embankment. In this ghat we also witnessed that spurs constructed from the embankment inside the river, mainly to divert the flow of water, have been eroded as well.

The Spur has also been eroded. Photo - SANDRP — The Spur has also been eroded. Photo – SANDRP

Erosion at Matmora-Tekeliphuta Ghat. Photo - SANDRP — Erosion at Matmora-Tekeliphuta Ghat. Photo – SANDRP

It is also important to note that protection of Majuli from floods was one of the main aims of the geo-tube embankment project, but there were reports of devastating floods affecting Majuli in 2012 & 2013.

After geo-tube comes geo bags With the construction of geo-tube embankments being hailed as a success by the state government, construction of embankments using geo-bags followed. Geo-bags are smaller than geo-tubes and come at a cheaper cost. Embankments on many rivers were constructed using geo-bags which were also used for erosion protection. But effectiveness of the geo-bags as protective measure to flood and erosion, still remains disputed. A news report titled “ADB, river engineers differ on geo-bags” published in Assam Tribune on 9^th September 2010 reported about the difference of opinion among the water resource engineers of Assam and powerful lobby of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for the use of geo-bags to resist Brahmaputra erosion in Palasbari-Gumi and Dibrugarh. Referring to the engineers the news report stated “They have alleged that the ADB provided 23,000 geo-bags for an experiment. They were dumped in the month of September 2009 at a 150-metre-long selected erosion-prone reach at Gumi for testing their efficacy. But, a diving observation made in the month of December 2009, suggested that the bags were not launched uniformly in a single layer as it was claimed. They were found lying in a haphazard manner in staggered heaps with gaps in between and the total distance they covered was only about 8 metres, against the claimed and required 35 metres…..The ADB then carried out another diving observation at Gumi in May last (2010) and found no bag at the site. The State WRD did not get any feedback from the ADB on this issue.”

Work of piling up the geo-bags is going on in Nimati Ghat. Photo - SANDRP — Work of piling up the geo-bags is going on in Nimati Ghat. Photo – SANDRP

Status of the geo-bags put last year. Photo - SANDRP — Status of the geo-bags put last year. Photo – SANDRP

The spot where not a single Geo-bag was seen. Photo - SANDRP — The spot where not a single Geo-bag was seen. Photo – SANDRP

Nimati Ghat was the other place which SANDRP visited to find out the effectiveness of geo-bags. The work of piling up the geo-bags for erosion protection was going on when SANDRP visited the area in the second week of April 2014. The bags which were used previously for the same purpose were seen to be mostly lying in water in shattered condition. Locals told us that majority of the bags are now under water. In the eroded bank line, these geo-bags were lying without any order and in a way suggesting how the river has dealt or to say played with these jumbo bags. In this bank line, there was a stretch of nearly five meters where the river has eroded more than the other parts. At this stretch none of the geo-bags were to be seen.

There were also contradictions regarding when the present erosion protection work at Nimati ghat had started. Some of the shopkeepers of the ghat said that the work of putting up geo-bags started in February 2014. But according to the contractor in charge of the work, the work started in November 2013. Construction or repairing of embankment just few months before the advent of monsoons is one of the constant criticisms, leveled against the Water Resources department of the state and in Nimati too we heard the same complaint.

Is Geo-tube really a ‘permanent solution’ to floods? In the present discourse of floods in Assam this has become a very significant question. The local people have been fed with various information about geo-tube and most of which are wrong. The life of embankment constructed using geo-tube is of 100 years, we were told by the locals when we travelled to the upstream areas of Matmora geo-tube. This is absolutely not true. In fact, for Prof Chandan Mahanta of IIT Guwahati the scouring[1] done by the river Brahmaputra will be the major cause of concern for geo-tube embankments in the long run.

The geo-tube embankment has already faced threat of scouring right after its construction in the monsoons of 2011. It was on the morning of 14^th July, 2011 when two of the apron tubes at the tail of the embankment, were launched due to increase force of water. The apron tubes were laid at the toe of the geo-tube embankment and with the increased force of water scoured at the bottom by the embankment toe line. WRD engineers flung into action and immediate repairing work was taken up at the site. According to WRD engineers this had happened because the trees which were left outside the embankment had obstructed and increased the force of water and they were immediately cut down. Concrete porcupines were also thrown into the water. Asomiya Pratidin, a regional newspaper reported this on that day but thereafter no report on this could be found. The incident was almost forgotten. When we visited the geo-tube embankment, it was observed that along the toe-line of the embankment a scour line runs for substantial length of the embankment. This clearly shows that scouring by the river has increased in this area. The news report published in Assam Tribune [2]also points out a significant problem associated with geo-bags – “The lobby is mounting pressure for use of geo-bags in the form of bank revetment. Bank revetment is generally not adopted in Brahmaputra because of many reasons. Most important of them is – it produces a permanent deep channel along the existing riverbank.”

On the issue of lobbying behind geo-tube, an interesting perspective was provided by activist-researcher Keshoba Krishna Chatradhara who coordinates ‘Peoples’ Movement for Subansiri and Brahmaputra Valley (PMSBV)’. He opines that the construction of geo-tube embankment in Matmora was an experiment, done to see whether such embankments can withstand the flood and erosion of Brahmaputra. The reason for choosing Matmora first and not other severe erosion affected places like Dibrugarh or Rohmoria, was because even if the embankment fails it won’t be as significant loss for the state compared to those places. Dibrugarh is one of the most important towns of upper Assam with a glorious history whereas Rohmoria became important for the state when Oil India Limited found oil deposits in Khagorijan[3]. Infact several local people and activists also opined that the Sissi-Tekeliphuta embankment which is on the north bank of the river was cut several times, to save the areas in the upstream south bank, mainly the Dibrugarh town. They said that in the past, before the geo-tube embankment came, whenever there was any news of water rising in Dibrugarh, there would soon be a breach in Sissi-tekeliphuta embankment. In fact considering these breaches in the larger Sissi-tekeliphuta embankment, Mr. Chatradhara opined that even if the geo-tube embankment survives the flood, erosion and breaches in future, it might become a small island in midst of a submerged land as there will surely be breaches in the rest of the Sissi-Tekeliphuta embankment.

ADB loan for Geo-textile Embankments in Assam After the construction of the geo-tube embankment at Matmora, the state government is leaving no stone unturned to make it sound like a glorious success. But it is surprising to know that, even before the Matmora embankment was commissioned in December 2010, the state government have filed proposal for two more embankment project where geo-textile would be used for construction and got it cleared. The two subprojects of Assam Integrated Flood River Bank Erosion Risk Management Project (AIFRERM) in Dibrugarh and Palashbari were cleared in the 106^th meeting of TAC held on 16^th September 2010. It is important to note that for the total AIFRERM project ADB is giving a loan of $56.9 million. The cost of Dibrugarh and Palashbari subprojects are Rs 61.33 crore and Rs 129.49 crore respectively. But these investments have been cleared without even doing a post-construction impact assessment of Matmora geo-textile embankment. The Palashbari subproject also included erosion protection for Gumi area through the use of geo-bags but the Assam Tribune report quoted above already mentioned about how geo-bags scheme has failed in that area.

It is important to note here that, the first geo-tube embankment has been constructed only three years back and it would be premature to give any verdict of success, on the contrary there are many signs of failure. But the state government of Assam and the Assam Water Resources department are claiming it as success without really any credible basis and than have used that self certification to go on building more embankments using geo-textile and in several occasions these plans have failed. They first should have done a detailed impact assessment of the embankment at Matmora before going on building more embankments of the same nature.

It seems the Assam government, ADB and CWC are pushing these projects to deflect attention from the failure of embankments in flood management. Such attempts won’t succeed, but it is possibly a ploy to prolong the use of embankments as a flood management technique.

Parag Jyoti Saikia (meandering1800@gmail.com)

Annexure 1

Flood and Erosion Projects approved for Assam – 2009 to 2013

TAC meeting no & date	Project	Appr. year	River/ Basin	L of Emba. (m)	Original (revised) Cost-CrRs	Benefitting area (Ha)	Decision
95^th -20.01.2009	Protection of Sialmari Area from the erosion of Brahmputra	2002	Brahmaputra	NA	14.29 (25.73)	NA	Accepted
	Protection of Bhojaikhati, Doligaon and Ulubari area from the erosion	2002	Brahmaputra	NA	14.52 (27.92)	NA	Accepted
	Raising & strengthening Brahmputra Dyke from from Sissikalghar to Tekeliphuta including closing of breach by retirement and anti erosion measures	New	Brahmaputra	NA	142.42	NA	Accepted
96^th -16.02.2009	Flood protection of Majuli Island from Flood and Erosion Ph-II & III	New	Brahmaputra	NA	115.03	NA	Accepted
96^th -16.02.2009	Restoration of Dibang & Lohit rivers to their original courses at Dholla Hattiguli	New	Brahmaputra	NA	23.32 (53.11)	NA	Accepted partly & suggested that proposal of coffer dam, pilot channel, etc. to be put up for expert opinion
101^st -30.11.2009	Raising and strengthening to Puthimari embankment	New	Brahmaputra	NA	30.23	15000	Accepted
	Anti Erosion measures to protect Brahmputra Dyke on left bank	New	Brahmaputra	NA	27.97	5000	Accepted
	Protection of Gakhirkhitee & adjoining areas from erosion	New	Brahmaputra	NA	19.06	20,000	Accepted
102 -28.1.’10	Emergent measures for protection of Rohmoria in Dibrugarh District	New	Brahmaputra	NA	59.91	18,000	Accepted
106^th -16.09.2010	Raising and strengthening of tributary dyke along both banks of Kopili River	New	Kopilli/ Brahmputra	NA	110.72	NA	Accepted
	Assam Integrated Flood River Bank Erosion Risk Management Project	New	Brahmaputra	NA	61.33	NA	Accepted
	Assam Integrated Flood River Bank Erosion Risk Management Project	New	Brahmaputra	NA	129.49	NA	Accepted
110th – 20.07.2011	Protection of Majuli from Flood and Erosion Ph II & III	2011	Brahmaputra		115.03		Accepted
110th – 20.07.2011	Restoration fo rivers Dibang & Lohit to their original courses at Dholla Hatighuli	2011	Brahmaputra		54.43		Accepted
111th – 17.08.2011	Protection of Biswanath Panpur including areas of upstream Silamari and Far downstream Bhumuraguri to Borgaon against erosion	New	Brahmaputra		167.09		Accepted
117 – 21.3.’13	Protecion of Sissi-Tekeliphuta dyke from erosion – Lotasur to Tekeliphuta	New	Brahmaputra	153000 m	155.87	153000 m	Accepted
118th – 30.07.2013	Flood management of Dikrong along with river training works on both banks embankment	New	Dikrong/Brahmaputra		105.96		Accepted
118th – 30.07.2013	Flood management of Ranganadi along with river training works on both bank embankments	New	Ranganadi/Brahmaputra		361.42		Accepted

[1] Scour can be termed as a specific form of the more general term erosion. In case of geo-tube embankments Scour is the removal of sediment from the bottom of the geo-tubes. Scour, caused by swiftly moving water, can scoop out scour holes, compromising the integrity of a structure.

[2] ADB, river engineers differ on geo-bags – http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=jun2410/at08

[3] See ‘Rohmoria’s Challenge: Natural Disasters, Popular Protests and State Apathy’ published in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol XLVI NO 2, Janurary 8, 2011.

Himalayas · Hydropower · Hydropower Performance

Massive Hydropower capacity being developed by India: Himalayas cannot take this onslaught

May 6, 2014May 8, 2014 SANDRPLeave a comment

At least 49 large[1] hydropower projects are under construction in India today, with a cumulative capacity of 15006 MW[2]. As per the latest bulletin from Central Electricity Authority[3], “Status of Hydro Electric Projects under Execution for 12th Plan & beyond (Excluding projects above[4] 25 MW)” dated March 31, 2014, 35 of these projects (9934 MW) are expected to be commissioned in 12^th Five Year Plan[5] and remaining 14 with installed capacity of 5072 MW would provide benefit beyond 12^th Plan.

Considering that 1534 MW capacity has already been added in first two years of ongoing 12^th Five Year Plan (during 2012-13 and 2013-14), CEA projections means that India hopes to add massive 11468 MW capacity during the current five year plan. This will be higher than capacity added in any other five year plan and 254% of the capacity addition during the last, 11^th Five Year Plan (2007-12) when India added 4514 MW. The graph below shows how steeply our hydropower installed capacity is going up over the last 25 years.

Rapidly Increasing installed capacity of Large Hydropower Projects in India

The proponent of even more accelerated hydro capacity addition misleadingly talk about the need for having 40% of installed grid capacity as hydro.

In line with this, the CEA came out with plans to add 65000 MW in 13th Five Year Plan (2017-2022: 30 000 MW) and 14th Five Year Plan (2022-2027: 35 000 MW). (see http://www.energylineindia.com/ of May 6, 2014)

There is no science behind this advocacy. It is basically a suggestion possibly based on the general assumption that peaking demand is 40% higher than base-load demand. Hence if we have 40% installed capacity from hydro in the grid, this can take care of total demand optimally. However, this is based on assumption that hydro capacity is indeed used for peaking. This assumption is completely wrong in India, with no agency monitoring or even reporting how much of the hydro generation currently provide peaking power. Without such optimum use of current hydro capacity, where is the case for 60:40 grid capacity ratio for hydro? It goes without saying that when hydro projects are used for peaking power, there are additional social and environmental impacts in the downstream and upstream. These need to assessed and those who suffer are compensated.

On similar lines, one can answer the advocacy for claim that hydro is clean, green, renewable and cheap source of power or that run of the river or small hydropower projects are more environmentally benign. However, this blog is not attempting to answer all such fallacies here, it needs a separate blog.

While this is happening, the Expert Appraisal Committee of Union Ministry of Environment and Forests on River Valley Projects has been clearing projects at break a neck speed with almost zero rejection rate. Between April 2007 and Dec 2013, this committee recommended environment clearance to 18030.5 MW capacity, most of which has not entered the implementation stage. Moreover, this committee has recommended 1^st Environment clearance (what is technically called Terms of Reference Clearance) for a capacity of unimaginable 57702 MW in the same period. This is indicative of the onslaught of hydropower projects which we are likely to see in the coming years.

Figure 1 TORs (First Stage EC) and EC recommended by EAC between April 2007 - December 2013 — Figure 1 TORs (First Stage EC) and EC recommended by EAC between April 2007 – December 2013

Table: Sector-wise & plan-wise number of & capacity of under construction HEPs

Sector	During 12^th FYP		After 12^th Plan		Total
Sector	No of Projects	Installed capacity, MW	No of Projects	Installed capacity, MW	No of Projects	Installed capacity, MW
Central	11[6]	5312	3	2615	14	7927
State	12	1506	3	736	15	2242
Pvt	12	3116	8	1721	20	4837
Total	35	9934	14	5072	49	15006

Among the three sectors, the largest number of under construction projects (20) are from private sector. However, among all sectors of under construction projects, central sector projects have the highest installed capacity (7927 or 53% of under construction capacity of 15006 MW).

Figure 2 Sectorwise ownership of under-construction HEPs in Numbers

Vulnerable Himalayas are the target In the second table the state-wise and sector-wise break of numbers and capacity of under construction HEPs has been given. Himachal Pradesh has the highest number and highest installed capacity projects among all states. That state also has the highest installed capacity (8139 MW or over a fifth of operating HEP capacity at national level) of large operating hydropower projects. Sikkim, however, has the highest number and capacity of private sector hydropower projects under construction. In fact, half of the total national-level private sector projects which are under construction are in that tiny state. Their installed capacity is more than half the installed capacity of all the private sector hydropower projects under construction at national level. Ironically, the state also has the highest biodiversity in the country.

Figure 3 Installed Capacity of under construction HEPs, sector-wise ownership, in MW

Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand also have 5 and 3 private sector HEPs under construction respectively. The 5 Himalayan states of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh between them have 38 of the 49 under construction hydropower projects with total capacity of 13550 MW or over 90% of under construction capacity. In addition, the projects of Mizoram, Meghalaya, W Bengal (Teesta L Dam IV) and Punjab (Shahpur Kandi on Ravi River) are also in Himalayan zone.

Table: State-wise & sector-wise number and capacity of under-construction HEPs

State	Central Sector		State Sector		Private Sector		Total
State	No of projects	Installed Capacity, MW	No of projects	Installed Capacity, MW	No of projects	Installed Capacity, MW	No of projects	Installed Capacity, MW
J&K	1	330	1	450	1	850	3	1630
Himachal P	4	2532	6	956	5	460	15	3948
Uttarakhand	4	2135	–	–	3	505	7	2640
Sikkim	–	–	–	–	10	2622	10	2622
Arunachal P	3	2710	–	–	–	–	3	2710
Mizoram	1	60	–	–	–	–	1	60
Meghalaya	–	–	1	40	–	–	1	40
W Bengal	1	160	–	–	–	–	1	160
Punjab	–	–	1	206	–	–	1	206
Madhya Pr	–	–	–	–	1	400	1	400
Maharashtra	–	–	1	80	–	–	1	80
Andhra Pr	–	–	3	410	–	–	3	410
Kerala	–	–	2	100	–	–	2	100
Total	14	7927	15	2242	20	4837	49	15006

Figure 4 State-wise and sector-wise number of HEPs under construction

Figure 5 State-wise installed capacity of under construciotn HEPs

Diminishing Returns This blind rush for hydropower projects (which have serious and irreversible impacts on social and ecological systems) is difficult to understand and justify considering their poor generation performance, rising costs and availability of better options. To illustrate, in the graph below we can see how power generation per unit (MW) installed capacity has been steadily reducing over the last two decades. From 1993-94 to the latest year of 2013-14, there has been a huge drop of 16.5%.

Diminishing power generation from India's Hydropower Projects over the last two decades — Diminishing power generation from India’s Hydropower Projects over the last two decades

Yawning gap between promised and actual generation of Hydro Projects Another way to look at performance of hydropower projects would be to compare the projected (as promised in Techno Economic Clearance) and actual generation (both at 90% dependability) of electricity by HEPs. This assessment shows that about 89% of India’s operating hydropower projects are generating at below the promised levels. Shockingly, half of under performing projects are generating at below 50% of promised generation levels.

How much Peaking Power are we generating? A third way to assess the hydropower generation is in terms of peaking power, a USP[7] of hydropower projects. However, no figures are available as to how much of the generation from hydropower projects are happening during peaking hours. No agency in India is even monitoring this or reporting this: including CEA, Central or State Electricity Regulatory Authority, National, Regional or State Load Dispatch Centers, Union or state Power Ministries or individual operators. In short, there is no case for justifying more hydro in the name of providing peaking power if we are neither monitoring nor optimizing hydropower generation during peaking hours. One expected CEA to do this job, but it seems they are busy lobbying for hydropower projects rather than functioning as India’s premier Technical Power sector agency.

Invitation to disaster? The consequences of such massive capacity addition are and will continue to be disastrous for the rivers, forests, biodiversity and people. The Uttarakhand disaster of June 2013 has shown the vulnerability of hydropower projects in Himalayas, as well as their impacts. The disaster and independent reports[8] also show how the construction and operation of these projects have contributed to compounding the proportion of the disaster. Climate Change is accentuating this situation and will continue to do so with increasing intensity as per the IPCC reports.

Role of HEPs in Uttarakhand disaster: CEA and CWC in denial mode This analysis of under construction hydropower projects as reported in the latest CEA bulletin shows that Himalayas is the target for overwhelming majority of hydropower projects being taken up India (& neighbouring countries like Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan and Tibet). The Uttarakhand disaster showed how hydropower projects are increasing the existing vulnerabilities and disaster potential of the Himalayan region in times of natural calamities. An independent committee appointed by MoEF following Supreme Court orders of Aug 13, 2013 pointed out the role of hydropower projects in Uttarakhad disaster of June 2013.

It should be highlighted here that multiple hydropower projects should invite cumulative impact assessment. As Supreme Court order of Aug 13, 2013 highlighted, such cumulative impact assessment need to be done in a credible way and not the way AHEC of IITR did for the Bhagirathi-Alaknanda basin.

Strangely, instead of accepting this reality and taking this into account in decision making processes, Central Water Commission and Central Electricity Authority are in a denial mode! They collectively submitted a completely unscientific and unfounded report to Union Environment & Forests Ministry, advocating for hydropower projects rather than assessing their role in disaster, which was the mandate given by Supreme Court of India to MoEF. The CEA is clearly jeopardizing whatever credibility it has in joining hands with CWC. It would be better for both the agencies to accept and wake up to these realities.

Else, such onslaught of hydropower projects on Himalayas is likely to be an invitation to further disasters all across the Himalayas. All our decision makers and all others concerned need to take note of this urgently.

Himanshu Thakkar (ht.sandrp@gmail.com)

END NOTES:

[1] Defined as those projects having installed capacity above 25 MW

[2] In reality, there are many other large HEPs under construction, but his figure is based on CEA.

[3] http://cea.nic.in/reports/proj_mon/status_he_execution.pdf, CEA has been pretty irregular in putting up these bulletins, after Nov 2013, the next bulletin was available only now.

[4] In reality, this should be “below”, we have italicized the word since the error is in the original.

[5] Ending on March 31, 2017

[6] CEA projects that out of 2000 MW installed capacity of Lower Subansiri HEP in Arunachal Pradesh, 1000 MW will be commissioned in 12^th Plan and the rest of 1000 MW thereafter.

[7] Unique Selling Proposition

[8] https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/report-of-expert-committee-on-uttarakhand-flood-disaster-role-of-heps-welcome-recommendations/

Madhya Pradesh · Narmada

Why is This Dam being constructed? Is this not an example of Big Dam Fundamentalism?

April 18, 2014April 22, 2014 SANDRP4 Comments

Imagine that a state government wants to build a Big Dam, with height of 31.75 m on a Big River. The River has already seen a large number of dams, agitations, controversies and legal disputes.

This dam is going to cost several hundred crores of rupees, just the initial civil works’ cost is Rs 299.43 Crores[1] out of approved construction cost (alone) of Rs 438.18 Crores[2].

But this dam will not provide any irrigation. Not supply any water to anyone. Will not do any flood control. Will not be a net generator of power. In short it can claim none of the benefits that a standard dam project claims.

And yet it will have fairly serious impacts. Hundreds of hectares of fertile, useful land will be destroyed. River itself and biodiversity of the river will be destroyed. In the downstream too there will be huge adverse impacts. Hundreds of tribal families will be adversely affected. Almost all of them have been affected by an upstream dam project. The government has refused to answer any of their concerns. The people are already agitated and have declared their opposition[3],[4] and have also legally challenged the project.

However, we do not know full social or environmental impacts of the dam, since such an impact assessment has never been done. The work on this project according to the government started in Feb 2013. Any such dam project would require impact assessment, management plan, public hearings, environmental appraisal, clearance, monitoring and compliance mechanism. But this one had none of it and does not want to do any of it! It does not have even a Rehabilitation Plan. Not even one on paper, as most such plans are.

Majority of the purported benefits of the project are supposed to legally go to another state, but that state has said it does not want the dam, nor does it want to share costs or benefits. And still the state government has started work on the dam.

We are used to telling a lot of bad dam stories. But this one seems to be a unique one.

Why does the state government want to build this dam? What are the benefits and for whom? Why is the Union Environment Ministry allowing such an illegal dam? Is this not dam fundamentalism?

Ok, enough of mystery. Let us understand what this project is about.

Garudeshwar Dam This story is about Garudeshwar dam[5] on Narmada River in Bharuch district in Gujarat. With height of 31.75 m, it is a major dam, since any dam above 15 m height is considered big dam by national and international definitions. The Garudeshwar Dam will create a huge 12 km long reservoir.

Ongoing work at Garudeshwar Dam site. Photo: SANDRP

Sardar Sarovar Dam in the upstream of Garudeshwar dam. Photo - SANDRP — Sardar Sarovar Dam in the upstream of Garudeshwar dam. Photo – SANDRP

Map of Garudeshwar dam affected area. It also shows the Sardar Sarovar on right side. Photo: SANDRP

It is proposed just downstream from the most controversial Sardar Sarovar Dam Project (SSP). The SSP is being constructed under the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award of 1979. The Garudeshwar Dam is proposed as part of the power component of the SSP, to act as downstream storage when the 1200 MW River Bed Power House (RBPH) of SSP will act in a Pump Storage Supply (PSS) mode. This means that Garudeshwar Dam’s basic function is to store the water released from RBPH during peak hour power generation. This water stored in the Garudeshwar dam is then to be pumped back to the SSP reservoir during off peak hours. Pumping the water back to the reservoir typically takes about 20% more power. This is in comparison with the power generated when a unit of water was released from the upstream dam (SSP in this case) during generation mode. It means that Garudeshwar Dam will be net consumer of electricity. This kind of project could have economic viability when there is additional tariff for power available during peak hours, which is not the case today. In absence of such valuation, such projects are not even economically viable.

According to the NWDT award, Madhya Pradesh gets majority, or 57% share in the power benefits (and costs) from SSP, Maharashtra gets 27% and Gujarat 16%.

Another objective of the Garudeshwar Dam[6] is to create a reservoir surrounding Statue of Unity, being propagated as the world’s highest statue on a small island 3 km downstream of the SSP Dam.

None of the required Statutory clearances obtained The minutes of the 80^th meeting of SSCAC (Sardar Sarovar Construction Advisory Committee, the statutory interstate body to coordinate construction of SSP, it is chaired by Secretary, Union Ministry of Water Resources and includes senior officials of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan, in addition to Narmada Control Authority) held in March 2013 notes on the issue of Garudeshwar Dam, “The work to be taken up by GOG in compliance of all statutory clearances. The committee accordingly directed GOG to take further follow up actions.” It was no secret to SSCAC that GOG had taken no clearances, how could then SSCAC wash its hands off with such a statement?

As per Supreme Court Order of Oct 2000 (Narmada Bachao Andolan vs Union of India and Others), as also earlier statutory orders under NWDT, the sanction of Rehabilitation Sub Group and Environment Sub Group of Narmada Control Authority is to be obtained prior to every stage of work related to SSP. No such sanction has been obtained by these authorities. In fact, as per letter written by Shekhar Singh, a member of ESG of NCA on March 24, 2013, there has not even been impact assessment of the Garudeshwar Dam, which is necessary before ESG can consider clearing the work on Garudeshwar work:

“Garudeshwar weir, to be built 12 km downstream of the SSP dam with a live storage capacity of 32.9 Million Cubic Meters is a component of the Sardar Sarovar Project, as was envisaged by the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award of 1979. However, as far as I recollect, the environmental and social impacts of construction and operation of Garudeshwar weir (GW) have never been brought before the ESG of NCA. In my estimation, the construction and operation of the GW will have significant social and environmental impacts, since it will entail a reservoir of about 12 km in length and unknown width and submergence area. The weir will have the potential of affecting the fisheries in the immediately surrounding areas and also of affecting the downstream river and its biodiversity, and other related aspects. This is especially because the weir will control the flow of water and silt downstream. However, I do not know whether there has been a comprehensive assessment of the environmental and social impacts of the GW and its contribution to the cumulative impact of all the projects and activities in the area. And if there has been, I do not believe that this has been put up to the ESG for its approval.”

River Narmada from Indravarna village which will be affected due to construction of Garudeshwar dam. The map on the ground speaks volumes about locked between two dams and a river in reality. — River Narmada from Indravarna village which will be affected due to construction of Garudeshwar dam. This image speaks volumes about Narmada, the river in reality and the river locked between two dams as there in the map. Photo: SANDRP

Similarly, since it is a work under SSP, the R&R policy of SSP is suppose to apply to the people affected by the Garudeshwar Dam. This also means that a R&R Plan have to be prepared and consent of the affected people taken and R&R completed a year before the construction work, which too has not been done, nor a sanction of RSG of NCA taken.

The reservoir upstream of the Sardar Sarovar Dam has been declared eco sensitive zone and protected area. The Garudeshwar Dam will create a reservoir that will be affecting the river close to the SSP Dam and thus will be within the eco sensitive zone and legally, such a work requires clearance from National Board of Wildlife, but such a clearance has not been taken.

Since Garudeshwar Dam is proposed in tribal area, consent of the gram sabhas is also legally required. No such consents have been taken.

Thus, the work that has been going on is completely illegal.

State benefiting the most, questions need for the Garudeshwar Dam Official documents obtained by SANDRP under RTI Act shows that GoMP has repeatedly shown their disagreement with the need for Garudeshwar Dam. Here are a few instances from official records. Strangely, in spite of this clear disagreement from a majority beneficiary state, the decision to go ahead with the project was taken by Gujarat and endorsed by SSCAC. The other statutory bodies like the Narmada Control Authority and its Environment Sub Group and Rehabilitation Sub Group were not even consulted.

June 2011 The minutes of the 101^st meeting of the PSC of SSCAC held in June 2011 noted, “Summing up the discussion the Chairman observed that the extent of disagreement is now so acute that the very need of Garudeshwar Weir is being questioned.”
July 2011 The events thereafter moved rapidly. Following a request letter of GOG on July 21^st, 2011, Secretary to Union Water Resources Ministry (also chairman of SSCAC and NCA) called a meeting of participating states on 25^th July, 2011. At this meeting, Madhya Pradesh continued its disagreement with the need for the Garudeshwar weir, as recorded in the minutes of the meeting[7], providing reasons of their opposition: “The representative from Govt of MP also informed the stand of their government on the construction of the said weir mentioning that State of Madhya Pradesh will become surplus in power by the year 2014 and as such, Madhya Pradesh may not like to avail such a costly peak power. According to their calculations, the tariff for peak power may be more than Rs 6 per unit. In view of this, State of Madhya Pradesh is not in the favour of the proposal of the Garudeshwar Weir requiring the sharing of the cost of construction and the energy required for reversible operations.”
The response of the Secretary (MoWR) was strange[8], “GOMP to review their stand of surrendering their share of peak hour power generation by reversible operation on RBPH machines and confirm about the same for further course of action.”
The fact that GOG and Union Govt (even as opposite parties were ruling the state and the centre, showing amazing collusion of pro dam fundamentalism) were so much hand in glove that the secretary, brushing aside the objections of the majority beneficiary state of MP, decided to push unwanted dam down the unwilling state’s throat: “Secretary (MOWR) while concluding the meeting, stated that the construction of Garudeshwar Weir needs to be taken up urgently & completed expeditiously…”.
March 2012 The Government of Madhya Pradesh (GoMP) pointed out in their letter dated 21.03.2012 to SSCAC[9]), “there is no mention about Garudeshwar Weir in the NWDT Award”.
The GoMP also made it clear in this letter that GoMP does not concur with the proposal in view of “the change in power tariff scenario”.
Aug 2012: The 104^th meeting of PSC of SSCAC records on this agenda Item no 104-5, “The representative of GOMP conveyed that, at this stage, they don’t agree with above decision and a note of dissent in this regard will be sent soon.”

So the state that was supposed to get 57% benefits and also pay same proportion of costs, has refused to concur with the scheme.

Status of work According to the Agenda notes for the 81^st meeting of SSCAC held on March 28, 2014, till Dec 2013, 6.88% of excavation was the only physical progress on the Garudeshwar weir. Financial Progress achieved was even less, at 3.19%.

Some recent Developments:

Oct 2013 The affected people and eminent Gujarat citizens write to MoEF and GOG[10] to immediately stop illegal work on Garudeshwar Dam. Affected people and their leaders were put under house arrest when Chief Minister and former Deputy PM L K Advani came to the Kevadia Colony to lay foundation stone for the proposed Statue of Unity.
Jan 3, 2014 Gujarat Government[11] is considering use of force to suppress the movement against the illegal work on Garudeshwar Dam.
Jan 27, 2014 Tribal women of 70 villages to be affected by the Garudeshwar dam go to the site of ongoing work and ask the contractor to stop the work as it is illegal, without necessary clearances, impact assessments and consents.
Women leading the protest against Garudeshwar Dam. Photo: http://www.counterview.net/

Jan 31, 2014 National Green Tribunal order (Lakhan Musafir & Anr Vs. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd and others – Application 10/2013 WZ): “We deem it proper to grant three (3) weeks time to Respondent No.1 to file reply affidavit and make it clear that in the meanwhile if any work done, it will be subject to final outcome of the present Application, without claiming any right of equity arising out of execution of construction work and without pleadings in advance of any ‘fait Accompli’.
Feb 25, 2014 NGT order: “Learned Additional Advocate General, seeks time to file comprehensive reply affidavit, as regards the nature of project in question. He submits that filing of such affidavit requires co-ordination of various departments and Agencies, which will take certain time. He, therefore, seeks reasonable time to complete the exercise of preparing reply affidavit. He undertakes to maintain directions as regards keeping of equity, in the light of earlier order dated 31^st January, 2014.” The application next comes up for hearing on May 9, 2014.
April 1, 2014 People of 70 villages affected by Garudeshwar Dam hold protest demonstration in Vadodara.
April 14, 2014 Blasting at Garudeshwar village for the dam leads to rock fall on people, endangering lives of children and also shaking of houses.

A milestone on the way to Sardar Sarovar, with the dam in the background. Photo: SANDRP

Conclusion It is clear that Garudeshwar Dam does not have any justification, any impact assessment study, any required statutory clearances, any consents from affected Gram Sabhas and or even from the state which is supposed to get majority of the questionable claimed benefits. This dam seems like a symbol of Gujarat Government’s dam fundamentalism.

The reason as to why the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests is not taking action against this illegal work or why the Union Water Resources Ministry is supporting the work or why the political opposition in Gujarat is silent on this dam is still a mystery. However, under the current circumstances, the project must be stopped immediately. We hope NGT takes this step urgently. It is high time that political parties fighting elections in the area and Gujarat take a stand on this dam immediately.

Himanshu Thakkar (ht.sandrp@gmail.com)

END NOTES:
_________________________________

[1] “The letter of acceptance-cum-work order for the construction of Garudeshwar Weir across river Narmada near village Garudeshwar has been issued to agency M/s Rithwik Project Pvt Ltd, Hyderabad by SSNNL, Gandhinagar vide letter No. CPC/ Garudeshwar Weir/ 2011/657-P-II dated 04.05.2012”, as per Minutes of 104^th meeting of PSC of SSCAC held on Aug 23, 2012.

[2] Minutes of 104^th meeting of Permanent Standing Committee of SSCAC held on Aug 23, 2012, obtained by SANDRP under RTI.

[3] That the officials knew about the opposition is clear from the Gujarat Samachar clipping of Oct 22, 2012, carrying warning from affected people that if their issues are not settled, the work on the dam will be stopped. This clipping was included in the agenda notes for the 80^th meeting of SSCAC held on March 25, 2013.

[4] The minutes of the 105^th meeting of the PSC of SSCAC held in Feb 2013 noted on the issue of Garudeshwar dam, “The representative of GOG informed that work is delayed due to objection of the local peoples for giving better R&R package”.

[5] Calling is weir is clearly an attempt to mislead everyone, giving an impression that is a low dam, which it is not.

[6] http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/garudeshwar-weir-could-pave-way-for-sardar-statue/776013/

[7] Annexure 79.2(C).5 with the Agenda for 79^th meeting of SSCAC held in Feb 2012

[8] Agenda of the 79^th meeting of SSCAC held in Feb 2012.

[9] Obtained by SANDRP under RTI Act.

[10] http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/tribal-body-demands-scrapping-of-garudeshwar-weir-113102901241_1.html

[11] http://www.counterview.net/2014/01/government-now-considering-to-use-force.html

Maharashtra

El Nino and Maharashtra: Lets dig the Well before we are thirsty

April 17, 2014April 22, 2014 SANDRPLeave a comment

2012-13 was described by the Maharashtra government as the worst drought in the state since 1972. Weather scientists are predicting that conditions are fast developing that seems like a repeat of 2012. The Reserve Bank of India has already warned the states about the possibility of El Nino and be ready for the worse. Maharashtra could take several steps to be ready for this developing situation, including using its available water storage in reservoirs around the state prudently.

Yes, it’s that time of the year again when we need to be alert to weather predictions and reservoir storages. Especially for Maharashtra. At this time last year, following poor 2012 monsoon, many of the bigger reservoirs were at 0% live storage for months (Ujani, Jayakwadi, several projects in Marathwada, etc). A satisfactory monsoon 2013 and some small contribution from the ill-fated hailstorms has resulted in better status of Maharashtra reservoirs storages at this point in time.

However, Maharashtra (like the country) needs to be extra cautious with using the available resources. Several institutes and bodies like Skymet, Buraeu of Meteorology, Australia, National Weather Service USA, etc. are predicting a strong possibility of El Nino effect this year, which generally results in poor monsoons. Sky met is specifically saying that this year may be a repeat of 2012 poor monsoons. The report also states that Vidarbha, Marathwada and Central Maharashtra, could face monsoon deficit.[1] Bureau of Meteorology, Australia has issued notice stating a 70% or more chance of El Nino this year. They state “Although the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is currently neutral, surface and sub-surface ocean temperatures have warmed considerably in recent weeks, consistent with a state of rapid transition. International climate models surveyed by the Bureau indicate continued warming of the central Pacific Ocean in coming months. Most models predict sea surface temperatures will reach El Niño thresholds during the coming season.”[2] A similar prediction has been made by US agency National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Climate Prediction Centre.[3] While some weather scientists are saying that we should not panic and wait for IMD’s (India Meteorological Department) official forecast on April 25 and the next one in June, however, it would certainly be useful to be careful from now onwards.[4]

According to the latest Central Water Commission (CWC) Reservoir bulletin of 090414 regarding water levels in 85 selected major reservoirs in India, the 12 major reservoirs of Maharashtra have a combined storage of 4.471 BCM (Billion Cubic Meters) which is still good 38.73% of live storage capacity of 11.544 BCM. This is down from 6.522 BCM (over 50%) on Feb 6, 2014. It is not clear where this huge 2 BCM water has been used up in these two months.

However, Maharashtra is indeed lucky to have this 4.471 BCM water in 12 major reservoirs[5] at this time. We need to use this prudently in view of the forecast that situation similar to what prevailed in 2012 when Maharashtra experienced bad drought could get repeated in coming monsoon. Government needs to take advance steps to ensure that storage capacity is not frittered away and there is less land under water intensive sugarcane and such other crops. Media, civil society and independent observers need to be vigilant in this regard to ensure that mistakes of 2012 are not repeated and available resources are used wisely.

In terms of wise water management and effective use of available reservoir storage, waiting for June IMD forecast will be much too late. It will be wiser if water management is cautious starting from now. At this time, already some regions are facing water scarcity.

Maharashtra farmers are already in dire states due to 2012 drought followed by hailstorms and the disastrous impacts of extreme weather events in 2014. Another drought possibility is bad news, but impacts can be reduced with wise planning and prudent advance steps. Maharashtra Water Resources Department Website[6] provides further details about storage position. Let us look at basin-wise water storage position.

Godavari Basin

Marathwada: In Marathwada, the overall live storage is 31% on 17^th April 2014, including Major, Medium and Minor storages. However, this gives a misleading picture as many dams with better storages (like Vishnupuri) are placed at the end of the basin.

Dams like Manjra, Lower Terna and Seena Kolegao are already at 0 live storage, while Jayakwadi is at 15% (It was at 0%, along with six other dams of Marathwada even before this time last year).

In the upstream of Godavari Basin, Kadwa sub basin is showing severe water scarcity already. The region consists of premier onion and grape growing belt of Maharashtra, as well as wine processing centre. The chronically drought affected town of Manmad lies here and last year, it received water after 51 days in March from the upstream Palkhed Dam.[7] Surprisingly, Palkhed is currently at 5% Live Storage, when this time last year it was at 19% live storage. Water releases from Palkhed were extremely contentious last year. This year with even lesser storage, things may flare up again and wise water management, curb on non-essential uses (in dry period) like wine industry, preventing siphoning water from canals for cash crops, etc., needs to be observed to avoid stress in coming two months or more. Kadwa Dam shows a dipping live storage at 2%, while Nilwande Dam in downstream Ahmednagar shows just 3% against 7% last year.

Vidarbha shows a better picture at 58% live storage, Lowest being Bagh Kalisarar inn Bhandar at zero live storage. Now this project, though in heavy rainfall region of Bhandara has been at 0 live storage since January for the past 6 years! Either the information about the project is incorrect, or the dam has serious issues which need urgent attention.

Krishna-Bhima Basin

Ujani which was at 110% LS earlier this year after many years because of the monsoon in 2013 is now showing LS of 22% on April 17.[8] Two irrigation rotations have been released from the dam. It was reported that last rotation was used up largely by sugarcane,[9] leaving little for other crops. Ujani was at sub-zero storage (-39%) at this time last year. According to that standard, it has a good storage now, which should be used very cautiously. Solapur has added several new sugar factories this year, in addition to the 28 factories and the area under sugarcane has increased tremendously because of good rainfall.[10] Keeping the possibility of a weak monsoon in 2014, water to sugarcane must be controlled and curtailed, else we will see a repeat of 2013, only on a larger scale.

1920 MW Koyana Hydropower Project: Surprisingly in Koyana, the reservoir level this year is worse off than last year at the same time, which is not the case for any other Maharashtra reservoir in CWC bulletin. While this year it is at 30%, last year it was at 47% as on April 9.

Falling Groundwater tables: Recent GSDA report[11] has warned that groundwater levels in more than 2700 villages in Maharashtra has fallen below 1 meter than the average levels in the past 5 years. This is definitely alarming as groundwater is the water lifeline of rural Maharashtra. Out of the 2700 villages, levels in nearly 1200 villages have fallen below two or even three meters (for 497 villages).

Sugarcane: Area under sugarcane has increased in Maharashtra following good rains in 2013. This cane will demand more water in its lifecycle in farm and also for crushing. Agricultural Minister of India too did not find it appropriate to curb the wide spread plantation of sugarcane in drought prone areas even when national and global sugar prices were falling.It is estimated that current year may see more than 10,00,000 hectares of sugarcane which will demand water.The government has not even taken its own promise of enforcing drip to sugarcane.

There seem to be turbulent times ahead and it will be advisable if water management in Maharashtra tightens up to respond to upcoming challenges. The fact that there is useful water storage in some reservoirs and that warning is available in advance could be blessings if necessary steps are taken.

Parineeta Dandekar, parineeta.dandekar@gmail.com

Himanshu Thakkar, ht.sandrp@gmail.com

END NOTES:

[1] http://www.skymet.net/

[2] http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/enso/

[3] http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/expert_assessment/sdo_discussion.html

[4] http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/el-nino-may-disrupt-monsoons

[5] These 12 reservoir include: Jayakwadi, Ujani, Koyna, Khadakwasla, Isapur, Mula, Yeldari, Girna, Upper Vaitarna, Upper Tapi, Pench and Upper Wardha.

[6] http://mahawrd.org/default.htm

[7] http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-newdelhi/a-drop-in-the-bucket/article4560869.ece

[8] http://www.agrowon.com/Agrowon/20140415/5237052667319190169.htm

[9] http://www.agrowon.com/Agrowon/20140415/5237052667319190169.htm

[10] https://sandrp.in/Sugarcane_and_Drought_in_Solapur_june2013.pdf

[11] http://www.esakal.com/esakal/20140416/4977647275092496415.htm

Climate Change · Maharashtra

Maharashtra State Action Plan on Climate change: Farmers Suffer, State and consultant TERI unaffected

April 8, 2014October 20, 2020 SANDRP3 Comments

Even as rural areas in otherwise-drought hit Maharashtra (as also in neighbouring areas of Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh) are trying to cope with the immense damages due to untimely rain and hailstorms in Feb-March 2014, the IPCC Assessment Report 5 by Working Group II warns that extreme weather events may increase in their frequency. This was also supported by the IPCC Special Report on Extreme Events in 2012.

Sr No	Event	Date
1	NAPCC made public	June 30, 2008
2	Mah state council on CC formed by a GR	Sept 2008
3	Work awarded to TERI “to assess Climate Change Vulnerability and Adaptation Strategies for Maharashtra State and to prepare a Climate Change Adaptation Action Plan for the State” at the cost of Rs 98 lakhs; to include six case studies	Aug 20, 2009
4	Maharashtra govt order regarding TERI (6 members in addition to Dr Pachauri and Dr Leeana Srivastava as advisors) given above task, along with Met office, Hadley Centre, UK (2 members) and formation of state coordination committee for this under the chairmanship of Chief Secretary	Nov 26, 2009
5	Dept of Environment conducted decision makers workshop CC adaptation and mitigation	Feb 24-25, 2011
6	State advisory committee on CC created with chief minister as chair	July 8, 2011
7	First meeting of State advisory committee on CC	Feb 2013
8	Meeting (latest) held on draft climate change action plan with Chief Secy in chair	Oct 7, 2013
9	Mah Env department gives RTI response to SANDRP: “The final action plan on climate change is not yet submitted by TERI to Govt of Maharashtra”	Apr 2, 2014

Back to back in two years, Maharashtra faced a drought (in 2012-13), touted to be worst in past 40 years, to a hail and rain event which broke records of past hundred years (and perhaps even more) several times over. Studies are pointing out that the coastal region and the traditionally drought-affected part of Marathwada and Vidarbha is specifically vulnerable to climate change.

It is also highlighted by the IPCC reports, experienced painfully by Maharashtra that: “Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development.”

So how prepared is Maharashtra to face, adapt to and mitigate the challenges put forth?

Information obtained by SANDRP under RTI underlines the fact that respective governments have given no priority, time or importance to consider climate change or its impacts on societies and ecosystems.

The Maharashtra State Council on Climate change was formed in Sept 2008 by a GR, its Chairperson was the then Chief Minister and included ministers from Agriculture, Water resources, Industries, etc. This Council awarded work related to State Action Plan on Climate Change to TERI on 20^th Aug 2009 and TERI was supposed to complete this Study in two years, that is by Aug 2011.

More than four and a half years latter, TERI has still not completed the report on State Action Plan on Climate change and Government of Maharashtra does not seem too bothered by it.

The process by which TERI was given the task of doing the SAPCC also seems inappropriate. The process is described in Maharashtra government order of Nov 16, 2009, where there is no mention of any competitive bidding. The order says that Dr RK Pachauri of TERI was asked to make a presentation on climate change in Maharashtra, based on which it was decided to give the task of preparing the SAPCC to TERI and Met Office, UK at the cost of Rs 98 lakhs. This is clearly inappropriate process.

It’s been 5 years since the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) was made public in June 2008. NAPCC itself was formulated in non-transparent, non-participatory way by Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change. Several States have submitted and are working towards their Action Plans.

In Feb 2011, Chief Minister Prithviraj Chavan announced Advisory committee on Climate change similar to PM’s council on CC. However, the Government Resolution for the State Council on CC came only on 8^th July 2011. Some its current 19 members include Chief Minister (chair), Deputy Chief Minister, Ministers of Environment, Agriculture, Water resources, Rural Development, Chief Secretary, Secy-Environment, etc. Some Expert members include Sunita Narain, Jamshed Godrej, Anu Agha, Dr. R.K. Pachauri, Dr. R. A. Mashelkar, Dr. Anil Kakodkar and Ajay Mathur from Bureau of Energy Efficiency.

The Terms of Reference of the Committee indicate the following duties:

(a) To evaluate the study being done by TERI in the State and recommend strategies. (Emphasis added)

(b) Provide an oversight to the State Government in the drafting an action plan to combat climate change;

This council was to meet “at least twice a year to review situation on CC and adaptation strategy” as per the GR. It has met just once in last 33 months.

After giving contract to TERI in 2009, announcing State Council on CC in 2011, the first and only meeting of the State Council on Climate Change happened only in Feb 2013! Minutes of the meeting claim that final report from TERI is expected in March 2013. However, there was no discussion on this important report or even a discussion to hasten the formulation and implementation of this report. Strangely, TERI and MET Office UK had already published a note on the Action Plan in 2012[1] itself, when the State Action Plan is still not final even today!

There is also issue of conflict of interest here: when TERI is given the task of preparing Maharashtra SAPCC, how can Dr. Pachauri, who heads TERI be on the State Council to oversee the preparation of SAPCC? Secondly, Dr. Pachauri is a member of PM’s Council on Climate Change, which recommends state action plans and then his own organisation, TERI is awarded the work to prepare the action plan for Maharashtra. Is not there a conflict of interest here?

Moreover, Sunita Narain and Dr. Pachauri are also members of PM’s Council on Climate Change and having seen the performance of PMCCC in bringing out business as usual NAPCC in non-transparent, non-participatory way. The state government should have appointed independent members who have knowledge of the state.

The minutes of the first meeting of the state council seem to suggest that the meeting had rather unfocused discussions. The meeting had interesting conclusion: “All the members Council were of the opinion that the implementation of the existing schemes/ plans need to be focused on climate change adaptation strategies and did not encourage going in for further studies.” In spite of such a clear conclusion, we see neither the state action plan in place, nor adaptation of the existing schemes/ plans with the climate change implications in Maharashtra. In fact, Sunita Narian was also member of the Kasturirangan committee on Western Ghats, but we see no effective reflection of climate change concerns in the conclusions of the Kasturirangan committee.

The Chief Minister said in conclusion, “Providing income support to farmers was of utmost importance to the Government. A special “Climate Change Cell” would be established in the state to focus on climate change issues”. There is no evidence of functioning of any such cell, more than a year after that meeting.

There have been some meetings of High Powered Committee on climate changed, headed by Chief Secretary, the latest meeting happed on Oct 7, 2013.

The minutes of the Oct 2013 meeting notes, “The officers of the disaster management department were attending the meeting for the first time, which according to the Chief Secretary was not very useful given that they do not have any background in the subject area as well as the previous discussions.” Considering how important is the role of disaster management in climate change context, this callousness of disaster management department seems disturbing. The minutes also noted the need for additional Rs 40 lakhs to get run off (hydrology) data.

The minutes of the meeting ends with this conclusion: “Chief Secretary instructed TERI, to finish the consultations with respective departments for validations of data and finalise the recommendations within a month time, post which the presentation could be made before the cabinet.” However, that was in Oct 2013, but even in April 2014, there is no sign of the State Action Plan on Climate Change, an exercise that has dragged on for over 4 and half years now.

While all this has been going on without any conclusion, action plan or implementation of any necessary actions, the millions of the vulnerable people of the state are suffering and more than 20 farmers have committed suicide in the face of inconsolable loss.

The State Action Plan on Climate change is not a magic wand that will cure all ills. It is, however, one of the indicators of the seriousness and intent of our administration in tackling the real and grave challenges. Right now, there seems to be no seriousness and no intent.

Parineeta Dandekar (parineeta.dandekar@gmail.com),
Himanshu Thakkar (ht.sandrp@gmail.com)

END NOTES:

[1] http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/media/pdf/c/a/GOM_brochure_for_web.pdf

2. https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/03/11/maharashtra-farmers-face-impacts-of-hailstorms-and-states-inaction-plan-on-climate-change/

3. https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/04/03/dams-are-not-climate-friendly-readings-from-ipcc-wg-ii-report/

4. VERY TRAGIC story of how hailstorms have hit poor farmers in Marathawada in Maharashtra: http://www.livemint.com/Specials/jkcra6zQqMShlFJjzmvXeN/Death-and-despair-in-hailstormhit-Marathwada.html

Gujarat · Narmada

Why is media missing the real Gujarat story: Gujarat Satya Samachar!

April 4, 2014April 23, 2014 SANDRP5 Comments

It seems large parts of mainstream national media have gone underground these days. If you view most of the English and some Hindi news channels or most of the English and Hindi newspapers, you suddenly find proliferation of reports favouring Mr Narendra Modi and BJP. The repeated highlighting of the doctored pre poll analysis, without attempt at in-depth analysis or investigation into the credentials of the agencies doing such predictions is only one troublesome part. But even in reporting of the news, there is a clearly discernable pro-BJP tendency and an attempt to black out or under report or mis-report the news surrounding BJP’s rivals, particularly the news around Aam Admi Party (AAP). This was most evident in reporting of AAP’s trip to Gujarat in first week of March 2014.

There will be no doubt to any objective viewer that AAP’s trip punctured the well-crafted balloon of Gujarat’s development image. To many Gujaratis like me, this was not such a big breaking news. But strangely, the media that is supposed to report realities in an objective manner, should have been happy reporting this significant development. Arvind Kejriwal’s hour long speech in Ahmedabad at a hugely attended meeting should have been reported extensively in the media. Strangely, large parts of the mainstream media (both print and electronic) almost blacked this out.

This no doubt reflected poorly on the media that has been accepting the claims of Modi and BJP as gospel truths, since an independent media should have exposed the reality of these claims on its own through trips like the one AAP members did. The speech in Ahmedabad on March 8, 2014 was a good opportunity for the media to correct their own failure. In stead of using that opportunity, by not reporting or under reporting or mis-reporting, the media has further discredited itself.

It reminds one of an episode in Gujarat not long ago. “One morning some years ago, Gujarat’s residents found a newspaper on their doorsteps. They hadn’t subscribed to it, and it carried a vaguely familiar masthead. It was called Gujarat Satya Samachar, to make it resemble the state’s largest circulated newspaper, Gujarat Samachar. It was produced by Gujarat’s information department (a portfolio held by chief minister Narendra Modi) and contained reports of the state government’s achievements”, wrote former Divya Bhaskar (Gujarati edition of paper from Bhaskar group) editor Aakar Patel in his column in Mint on March 1, 2014.

The reason Gujarat government resorted to Gujarat Satya Samachar was “belief was that the local media was either suppressing stories about government successes or was critical of Modi to the point of antagonism”. The Gujarat Satya Samachar did not run much beyond a couple of issues, since Gujarati media quickly fell in line, the way government wanted. In fact, this episode should not give a misleading picture that Gujarati media was depicting the reality of Gujarat’s development before the government resorted to Gujarat Satya Samachar. Far from it.

While traveling through various parts of Gujarat, I have seen frustration of the aam Gujarati about the way the state is ruled over the last decade and more. Repeatedly, common people on the street have told me, during my numerous trip in the state, about corruption, break down of the regular basic facilities like schooling (everyone seems to have to go for tuitions and tuition classes, “then what are the schools for?” as one frustrated autorikshaw wala told me) or electricity or water and pro-big-industries bias of the state establishment. Intellectuals and independent observers have talked about the huge gap between claims of the Gujarat government and reality for long.

Ahmedabad is supposed to be shining with Sabaramati river front development, but if you go a dozen kilometers upstream or downstream you realize that this is just for the benefit of the real estate developers of the city. The state of the river elsewhere is as bad as Yamuna in Delhi. Even the water you see in Sabarmati flows in it through a fraud. This water is from Narmada project and not a drop from it was planned or allocated for Ahmedabad city or Sabarmati River. The project was proposed and justified for drought prone areas of Kutch, Saurashtra and North Gujarat. They are not getting this water, in stead farmers of Saurashtra are fighting FIRs and cases for using Narmada water! Farmers everywhere are feeling discriminated when the state government favours big industries at their expense and without transparency or due justice or their participation. The tribal belt is not only neglected, it is facing prospects of more and more displacement and deforestation in the name of dams, river linking projects and industrial zones and corridors.

Narmada Waters flowing unused in the Rann of Kutch, harming the eocsystem and saltpan workers livelihoods Photo: Counterview.net — Narmada Waters flowing unused in the Rann of Kutch, harming the ecosystem and saltpan workers livelihoods Photo: Counterview.net

While traveling through the tribal areas near Sardar Sarovar dam, Savitaben Tadvi of Indravarna village told us about the repression they are facing while peacefully opposing the Garudeshwar dam on Narmada river, which has neither any valid approval nor any impact assessment or consent from the affected villages in the upstream or downstream. Lakhan Musafir of Umarva village took us to the washed out portion below the Sardar Sarovar dam, including the viewers park, about which there is so little information in public domain. Rohit Prajapati of Paryavaran Suraksha Samiti, showing the proposed site of the statue of Unity, publicized as world’s highest statue, just downstream of the Sardar Sarovar Dam, said how the foundation stone was laid on Oct 31, 2013 by arresting the peacefully opposing tribals, but that project neither has any impact assessment, nor any of the statutorily required approvals. As Nandini Oza, after traveling for over a thousand kilometers in Gujarat recently said, “You can actually smell development at Vapi, Ankaleshwar!”

Pollution of Damanganga at Vapi Photo: Tehelka

Protest against the Bhadbhut Barrage also on Narmada Photo: Counterview.net

BJP’s prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi, who as a chief minister, resorted to Gujarat Satya Samachar to show slightly critical Gujarati media its place and succeeded in arm-twisting them, has been resorting to less than Satya in his electioneering. Just to illustrate, during his trip to North East, he did not mention his support for either large hydro projects or inter linking of rivers, which are facing huge opposition in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and other states. But during his speech in following week on February 26, 2014 in Madhya Pradesh, he talked about the North East region being “heaven for hydro power generation”. In that same state of Madhya Pradesh, his party chief Minister flashed full page advertisements (at public expense) for three straight days about Narmada Kshipra link as harbinger of the ILR dream of former prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. In reality it is just a pipeline water supply project with questionable viability and justifiability, without even impact assessment or participation of the people of the Narmada or Malwa region. There is already opposition to the project from among the farmers of the Narmada Valley.

There are others who have taken an objective view of Gujarat story. Revealing research by two professors of British Columbia, Canada about GUJARAT GROWTH VS DEVELOPMENT recently[1] showed: “This is a perplexing picture of development. Gujarat has done so much better in terms of growth and so much worse in terms of development than other states. Why has the fast growth not translated into meaningful development? Finally, it is the grassroot-level institutions that run schools, health clinics, bring water and sanitation to households, and bring the fruits of growth to the multitudes. Could it be that the centralised model of governance that works well for big investment projects does not work as well for grassroot institutions? Or, is this high growth with low development model indicative of the priorities of the government of Gujarat? Or is it something else altogether? It would be good to know the answer.”

Protest against the illegal Garudeshwar Weir Photo: Counterview.net

The trouble is, large part of mainstream media has mostly blacked out all this critical news. This situation is no doubt very bad for Indian democracy. As a senior journalist from financial paper told me, whenever there is extraordinarily positive report about any company or party, first question that arises is, how much has the reporter been paid to write such a story! Media should be wary of at least such a perception.

Himanshu Thakkar, SANDRP

END NOTES:

[1] http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/gujarats-growth-for-growths-sake/99/

[2] An edited version of this article was published in April 2014 at: http://www.civilsocietyonline.com/pages/Details.aspx?509

[3] Also published at: http://www.hotnhitnews.com/Real-Gujarat-An-Underreported-Story-By-Himanshu-Thakkar-HotnHitNews-13702042014.htm

Some other relevant links:

[4] http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/in-gujarat-tribal-people-get-a-raw-deal/article5873973.ece

[5] VERY INTERESTING Column by AAKAR PATEL, calling Modi a TYRANT, who hates democracy and revers only the dead: http://www.livemint.com/Leisure/NP7LlgqacegDU1PoTm3HKI/The-oneman-armys-forward-march.html

[6] How Modi’s government has treated RTI acitivists: http://www.firstpost.com/politics/narendra-modis-gujarat-model-has-no-space-for-rti-activists-1214009.html

[7] Why the growth fundamentalist THE ECONOMIST refused to back Modi: “But for now he should be judged on his record—which is that of a man who is still associated with sectarian hatred. There is nothing modern, honest or fair about that. India deserves better.” See: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21600106-he-will-probably-become-indias-next-prime-minister-does-not-mean-he-should-be-can-anyone?fb_action_ids=10202394265351839&fb_action_types=og.likes&fb_ref=scn%2Ffb_ec%2Fcan_anyone_stop_narendra_modi_

[8] http://indiatogether.org/could-modi-be-a-development-disaster-government by Ashish Kothri

[9] http://www.ndtv.com/elections/article/election-news/blog-gujarat-s-development-pre-dates-modi-considerably-505647?pfrom=home-topstories by Reetika Khera, Development Economist at IIT Delhi

[10] http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/gujarat-one-of-the-most-water-starved-states-in-india-un-report/article1-1205787.aspx

[11] BJP’s PM candidate Modi showing his true colours: Opposes even RTI: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/in-karnataka-modi-targets-upas-aadhaar-rti/

[12] http://www.hindustantimes.com/elections2014/state-of-the-states/gujarat-s-pride-wilting-it-s-also-land-of-failing-crops-and-dying-men/article1-1206339.aspx

[13] “Hemantkumar Shah, an economics professor at Gujarat University, has challenged Modi’s claim of dramatic economic growth. He said data reveals the state’s economic and human development parameters worsened under Modi.” http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/City/Mumbai/Growth-declined-poverty-increased-in-Gujarat-under-Modi-Guj-varsity-prof-claims-in-book/articleshow/33463710.cms

[14] “CAG reports and data on economic and social development from various sources make it evident that the much-touted “Gujarat model” of development is non-inclusive, socially divisive and highly ineffective in key areas.”

By ATUL SOOD and KALAIYARASAN A.” Gujarat Model: Fiction and Facts: Frontline Cover Story, April 4, 2014: http://www.frontline.in/cover-story/fiction-and-facts/article5795324.ece?ref=sliderNews (needs registration to get full story)

[15] http://themadeconomy.blogspot.in/2013/08/Facts-behind-Modi-and-Gujarat-Model.html

[16] “To sum up, the “Gujarat model” story, recently embellished for the elections, is misleading in at least three ways. First, it exaggerates Gujarat’s development achievements. Second, it fails to recognise that many of these achievements have little to do with Narendra Modi. Third, it casually attributes these achievements to private enterprise and economic growth. All this is without going into murkier aspects of Gujarat’s experience, such as environmental destruction or state repression.” From Hindu article by Jean Dreze, See: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-gujarat-muddle/article5896998.ece

[17] Another warning from eminent people against voting for Narendra Modi for Prime Minister: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/10/if-modi-elected-india-future-gujarat

[18] Is Modi’s fabled Gujarat model lawful and accountable? http://www.firstpost.com/politics/is-modis-fabled-gujarat-model-lawful-and-accountable-1491885.html

Arunachal Pradesh · Assam · brahmaputra · Embankments · Ministry of Water Resources

Analysis MoWR’s Advisory Committee’s Decisions for Northeast – January 2009 to Dec 2013

April 2, 2014April 2, 2014 SANDRP1 Comment

This is analysis of the decisions of the Advisory Committee in the Union Ministry of Water Resources for consideration of techno-economic viability of Irrigation, Flood Control and Multi Purpose Project Proposals (TAC in short) for North East India[1] from 95^th meeting of January 2009 to 122^ndmeeting held in December 2013. In our last analysis of TAC minutes we have covered the decision taken for NE states from July 2011 to December 2013 which is available at – https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/03/19/lack-of-transparency-and-accountability-remains-the-norm-of-functioning-for-mowrs-advisory-committee/. In this analysis, we have covered the same for an extended period. In these five years TAC has accepted project proposals worth of 5515.46 crores. In calculating the total cost of the projects considered we have considered only the projects whose proposals were given clearance by TAC. In these five years, some of the projects also made two appearances with revised costs. In such cases the higher revised cost has been taken into consideration, e.g. Khuga Multipurpose Project and Dolaithabi Barrage Project, both located in Manipur were accepted by the committee in its 100^th meeting (held on 9^th October 2009) with revised cost of Rs 381.28 crore and 251.52 crore respectively. In the 115^thmeeting (held on 24^th July 2012) of the TAC, these two projects were considered again where the cost for Khuga Project was Rs. 433.91 cr and for Dolaithabi Project it was Rs. 360.05 Cr. The same is the case for the Thoubal Multipurpose Project which appeared in 101^st and 115^th meeting of the TAC.

Within these five years, TAC has given financial clearance to 26 flood and erosion control projects and majority of these projects are from Assam. The committee gave the clearance to 6 irrigation projects, 3 barrage projects and 3 multipurpose projects.[2] The committee also gave clearance to a strom water drainage improvement project below Greenfield Airport at Pakyong in Sikkim within this period.

In this period, largest no of considered (25) and approved (20) projects were from Assam. Assam also has the maximum cost of projects among all states (Rs. 2631.99 Cr). Highest number of projects were considered (16) and approved (14) in the year 2009, with total cost of Rs 2321 Crores, which too was highest among all the years.

As found in our previous analysis, in the last five year from 2009 to 2013 TAC has not rejected a single project. Five projects had been deferred but were approved in the subsequent meetings within the same period. In the 108^th meeting (held on 4^th January 2011), the TAC did not discuss two projects on the Brahmaputra river stating “It was observed that the flood control and anti erosion scheme of Brahmaputra Board are implemented through Central Fund, which do not require investment clearance from the Planning Commission. Therefore, these schemes need not be put up to the Advisory Committee. However, the technical aspect of such project may be looked into by Central Water Commission as per past practice.” But both these projects were reconsidered in the 110^th meeting of TAC (held on 20^th July 2011) and were cleared by the committee.

So this seems like a rubber stamping committee, clearing everything that comes to it. Reading of the minutes of the meetings also reveals that there are hardly any critical questions asked on merits of the questions for the massive delay and cost escalations that most of the projects suffer. Nor is there an discussion about the performance of the projects.

As we noted earlier, this committee functions in most non transparent, non participatory and unaccountable way. Neither the minutes nor the agenda notes of the meetings are in public domain. Following our letters along with TAC analysis in April 2011, addressed to Planning Commission, Union Ministry of Water Resources, Central Water Commission and members of the National Advisory Council, for the first time, TAC minutes were put up on CWC website (see: http://www.cwc.gov.in/main/webpages/TAC%20minutes.html). However, the last uploaded minutes were for the 115^th meeting held in July 2012, after which minutes have stopped being uploaded. Secondly, some of the links are not working and all the files are unnecessarily large PDF files since only scanned pages of the minutes are put up, in place of the PDFs of normal word files, which would be of much smaller size. The TAC also has no independent, non government members, all the members are government officials. As we wrote to MoWR and Planning Commission in April 2011 and again in March 2014, there is urgent need for TAC to have such members so that they provide objective perspective about the projects that come up before TAC.

The importance of functioning of this committee cannot be over emphasised. As we wrote in our letter to MoWR and Planning Commission, TAC “considers dozens of such projects with huge economic, social, environmental and other implications for the country in every one of its meetings. All of these projects are supposed to be public purpose projects, and are taken up using public resources. The Planning Commission accords investment clearance to the projects only after the TAC clearance. This Committee’s decisions are perhaps the ones which impact on India as a whole the most – as they relate to land and water – which are the basic life sustaining and livelihood providing resources for the people.”

It is high time that first effective steps are taken to ensure that the functioning of this committee becomes more transparent, participatory and accountable.

State-wise list of projects cleared by TAC

State	No of Projects Considered	No of projects approved	Total cost of the projects
Arunachal Pradesh	4	4	106.6
Assam	25	20	2631.99
Manipur	10	10	2268.99
Meghalaya	1	1	5.63
Sikkim	1	1	48.55
Tripura	6	6	453.7

Note: No projects from Mizoram and Nagaland have come to TAC in this 5 years period.

Year-wise List of Projects Cleared by TAC

Year	No of Projects Considered	No of projects approved	Total cost of the projects
2009	16	14	2321
2010	5	5	663.67
2011	12	9	497.33
2012	5	5	2208.81
2013	9	9	1439.45

Meeting-wise List Projects Cleared by TAC January 2009 to December 2013

Sl. No	Meeting no	Date of meeting	No of projects considered	No projects approved	No of projects deferred	No of projects rejected	Total cost of the accepted projects, Rs Crore
	95^th	20.01.2009	4	3	1	0	196.07
	96^th	16.02.2009	2	2	0	0	168.14
	100^th	09.10.2009	6	5	1	0	264.73
	101^st	30.11.2009	4	4	0	0	77.26
	102^nd	28.01.2010	1	1	0	0	59.91
	103^rd	11.03.2010	1	1	0	0	302.22
	106^th	16.09.2010	3	3	0	0	301.54
	108^th	04.01.2011	2	0	2	0	0
	109^th	04.03.2011	3	3	0	0	70.13
	110^th	20.07.2011	5	4	1	0	211.56
	111^th	17.08.2011	1	1	0	0	167.09
	112^th	14.09.2011	1	1	0	0	48.55
	115^th	24.07.2012	5	5	0	0	2208.81
	117^th	21.03.2013	1	1	0	0	155.87
	118^th	30.07.2013	2	2	0	0	467.38
	119^th	29.08.2013	2	2	0	0	601.67
	120^th	13.09.2013	1	1	0	0	42.96
	121^st	08.10.2013	2	2	0	0	146.01
	122^nd	20.12.2013	1	1	0	0	25.56
	Total		47	42	5	0	5515.46

95^th meeting (20.01.2009): Accepted TOTAL – Rs 196.07 crores (revised costs have been taken into consideration)

SN	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ Basin	Original (revised) Cost-CrRs	Decision
1	Protection of Sialmari Area	Morigaon/ AS	2002	B’putra	14.29 (25.73)	Accepted
2	Protection of Bhojaikhati, Doligaon and Ulubari	AS	2002	B’putra	14.52 (27.92)	Accepted
3	Protection of Majuli Island Ph II-III	AS	New	B’putra	116.02	Deferred the proposal with suggestion to prepare the cost at current prices.
4	Raising & strengthening Dyke from from Sissikalghar to Tekeliphuta including closing of breach by retirement and anti erosion measures	AS	New	B’putra	142.42	Accepted

96^th meeting (16.02.2009): Accepted Total – Rs 168.14 crores

SN	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ Basin	Original (revised) Cost-CrRs	Decision
1	Flood protection of Majuli Island Ph-II & III	AS	New	B’putra	115.03	Accepted
2	Restoration of Dibang & Lohit rivers to their original courses at Dholla Hattiguli	AS	New	B’putra	23.32(53.11)	Accepted partially & suggested that proposal of coffer dam, pilot channel, etc. may be put up to the Standing Committee for expert opinion

100^th meeting (09.10.2009): Accepted: TOTAL – Rs 897.53 crores

SN	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ Basin	L of Dam	Original (revised) Cost-CrRs	Benefit Irri CCA	Annual Irrigation	Decision
1	Borolia Irrigation Project	AS	1980	Brahmaputra	92 m	6.775 (135.93)	9717	15,000 Ha	Deferred due to non-submission of State Finance Concurrence
2	Khuga Multipurpose (Major- Revised)	Manipur	1980	Khuga/ Imphal	230 m	15 (381.28)	9575	14,755 Ha	Accepted
3	Dolaithabi Barrage Project (Med Revised)	Manipur	1992	Iril/ Manipur	79 m	18.86 (251.52)	5,500	7,545 Ha
4	Gumti Irrigation Project (Revised)	Tripura	1979	Gumti	96 m	5.88 (83.01)	4,486	9,800 ha	Accepted
5	Khowai Irrigation Project (Revised)	Tripura	1980	Khowai	96 m	7.10 (83.01)	4,515	9,320 Ha	Accepted
6	Manu Irrigation Project	Tripura	1981	Manu	82 m	8.18 (98.71)	4,198	7,600 Ha	Accepted

101^st meeting (30.11.2009): Accepted TOTAL – Rs 1059.26 crores

SN	Project	State	Appr. year	River/ Basin	L of Dam	Original (revised) Cost-CrRs	Benefit Irri CCA/ flood prot.	Annual Irrigation	Decision
1	Raising & strengthening to Puthimari embankment	Assam	New	B’putra	NA	30.23	15000 Ha	NA	Accepted
2	Anti Erosion measures to protect left B’putra Dyke	Assam	New	B’putra	NA	27.97	5000 Ha	NA	Accepted
3	Protection of Gakhirkhitee and its adjoining areas	Assam	New	B’putra	NA	19.06	20,000 Ha	NA	Accepted
4	Thoubal Multipurpose Project (revised)	Manipur	1980	Thoubal/ Imphal	1074 m	47.25 (982)	21,862 ha	33,449 Ha	Accepted

102^nd meeting (28.01.2010): Accepted TOTAL – Rs 59.91 crores

SN	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ Basin	Original Cost-CrRs	Benefit-flood protsn	Decision
1	Emergent measures for protection of Rohmoria in Dibrugarh Dist	Assam	New	Brahmaputra	59.91	18,000 Ha	Accepted

103^rd meeting (11.03.2010): Accepted: TOTAL Cost of approved projects: Rs 302.22 crores

Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ Basin	L of Dam	Original (revised) Cost-CrRs	CCA (Ha)	Annual Irrigation (Ha)	Decision
Champamati Irrigation Project	Chirag/AS	1980	Champamati/B’putra	258.5 m	15.32 (309.22)	17,414	24,994	Accepted

106^th meeting (16.09.2010): Accepted TOTAL – Rs 301.54 crores

SN	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ Basin	Original (revised) Cost-CrRs	Decision
1	Raising & strengthening of tributary dyke on both banks of Kopili River	Assam	New	Kopilli/ B’putra	110.72	Accepted
2	Assam Integrated Flood River Bank Erosion Risk Management Project	Dibrugarh/ Assam	New	Brahmaputra	61.33	Accepted
3	Assam Integrated Flood River Bank Erosion Risk Management Project	Palasbari/ Assam	New	Brahmaputra	129.49	Accepted

108^th meeting (04.01.2011): Accepted TOTAL- Rs 0

SN	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ Basin	Original (revised) Cost-CrRs	Decision
1	Restoration of Dibang & Lohit rivers to their original courses at Dholla Hattiguli	AS	New	Brahmaputra	23.32(53.11)	The technical aspect pf this type of project may be looked in to by CWC as per past Practices.
2	Protection of Majuli Island from flood & erosion, Ph II-III	AS	New	Brahmaputra	116.02	The technical aspect pf this type of project may be looked in to by CWC as per past Practices.

109^th meeting (04.03.2011): Accepted TOTAL – Rs 70.13crores

SN	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ Basin	Original (revised) Cost-CrRs	Decision
1	Anti Erosion & Flood Protection work in Dikrong Basin	Arunachal Pradesh	New	Dikrong	23.68	Accepted
2	Anti Erosion & Flood Protection work in Bhareli sub Basin	Arunachal Pradesh	New	Bhareli	16.81	Accepted
3	Anti Erosion & Flood Protection work in Siyom Basin	Arunachal Pradesh	New	Siyom	29.64	Accepted

110^th meeting (20.07.2011): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 211.56 crores

Sl No	Project	Dist/State	Appr. year	basin	original cost (Rs. Cr)	decision
1	Anti Erosion & Flood protection in Tawangchu basin	ArP	New	Tawangchu	36.47	Accepted
2	Protection of Majuli from Flood & Erosion Ph II & III	Assam	2011	Brahmaputra	115.03	Accepted
3	Restoration of rivers Dibang and Lohit to their original courses at Dholla Hatighuli	Assam	2011	Brahmaputra	54.43	Accepted
4	Protection of Balat village from flood and erosion of river Umngi in W Khasi hill district	West Khasi hill/Meghalaya	New	Brahmaputra	5.63	Accepted

111^th meeting (17.08.2011): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 167.09 crores

Project	Dist/State	Appr. year	basin	original cost	decision
Protection of Biswanath Panpur including areas of upstream Silamari and Far downstream Bhumuraguri to Borgaon	Sonitpur/Assam	New	Brahmaputra	Rs 167.09 Cr	Accepted

112^th meeting (14.09.2011): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 48.55 crores

Sl No	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	original cost (Rs. Cr)	decision
1	Improvement of Strom Water Drainage below Greenfield Airport at Pakyong	Sikkim	New	48.55	Accepted

115^th meeting (24.07.2012): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 2208.81 crores

Sl No	Project	Dist/State	Appr. year	basin	original cost (Rs. Cr)	decision
1	Thoubal Multipurpose project	Manipur	1980	Brahmaputra	1387.85	Accepted
2	Khuga Multipurpose project	Manipur	1980	Brahmaputra	433.91	Accepted
3	Dolathabi Barrage Project	Manipur	1992	Brahmaputra	360.05	Accepted
4	ERM of Imphal Barrage Project	Manipur	New	Brahmaputra	16.8	Accepted
5	ERM of Sekmai Barrage Project	Manipur	New	Brahmaputra	10.2	Accepted

117^th meeting (21.03.2013): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 155.87 crores

Sl No	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	basin	Ht / L of Dam/Embnk.	original cost (Rs. Cr)	Benefit flood prot. (Ha)	decision
	Protection of Sissi-Tekeliphuta dyke from erosion – Lotasur to Tekeliphuta	Assam	New	Brahmaputra	153 km	155.87	10117	Accepted

118^8h meeting (30.07.2013): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 467.38 crores

Sl No	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ basin	original cost (Rs. Cr)	Benefit flood prot. (Ha)	decision
	Flood management of Dikrong and river training works on both banks embankment	Lakhimpur/ Assam	New	Dikrong/ Brahmaputra	105.96	9998	Accepted
	Flood management of Ranganadi and river training works on both bank embankments	Lakhimpur/ Assam	New	Ranganadi/ Brahmaputra	361.42	21056	Accepted

119^th meeting (29.08.2013): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 601.67 crores

Sl No	Project	Dist/ State	Appr. year	River/ basin	original cost (Rs. Cr)	annual irrigation	decision
	Dhansiri Irrigation project	Assam	1975	Dhansiri/ B’putra	567.05		Accepted
	ERM of Singda multipurpose project	Manipur	New	Brahmaputra	34.62	3000	Accepted

120^th meeting (29.08.2013): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 42.96 crores

Project	Dist/State	River	original cost (Rs. Cr)	decision
Anti erosion work along river Haora from Champakpur to Baldakhal	W Tripura	Haora	42.96	Accepted

121^st meeting (08.10.2013): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 146.01 crores

Sl No	Project	Dist/ State	River	original cost (Rs. Cr)	Benefit flood prot. (Ha)	decision
	Anti erosion work along river Gumti from Dlak Samatal Para to Durgapur under Amarpur, Udaipur & Sonamura subdivision	S & West Tripura	Gumti	54.99	2209	Accepted
	Anti erosion work along river Khowaii from Netajinagar to Banglahour under Telimura subdivision and from south L. N. Pur to Paharmura bridge under Khowai subvision	West Tripura	Khowaii	91.02	4256	Accepted

122^nd meeting (20.12.2013): Accepted: TOTAL: Rs 25.56 crores

Sl No	Project	Dist/State	River	original cost (Rs. Cr)	decision
	Loktak Lift Irrigation Project	Manipur		25.56	Accepted

Parag Jyoti Saikia and Himanshu Thakkar

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[1]While this article only contains the details of the North East India Projects considered in TAC for the five years, we hope to soon provide details of the projects considered by TAC from all over India.

[2] Sicne Khuga Multipurpose, Thoubal Multipurpose and Dolaithabi barrage project, all from Manipur appears twice in this period, they have calculated only for once here.

[3] Feature image – Khuga Mutipurpose project. Image courtesy – http://manipuronline.com/