A 75 feet wide breach on right bank of Yamuna Augmentation Canal (AC) has drowned vast agricultural land area belonging to three villages of Alahar, Palewala and Nachron falling under Radaur block of Yamuna Nagar district, Haryana.
The breach reportedly occurred about 14 km downstream Hamida Head on Western Jamuna Canal (WJC) in Yamuna Nagar district around 03:00 am on 12th of April 2015. From all accounts, it seems like an avoidable manmade disaster about which credible independet inquiry alone can help arrive at truth. Continue reading “Yamuna Augmentation Canal Breach – Man-made Disaster?”→
जलवायु परिवर्तन की मार से किस प्रकार भारतीय खेती और किसान प्रभावित हो रहे है, इसकी एक झलक हमको फरवरी अंत और मार्च 2015 के आंरभ में हुई। अप्रत्याशित हिमपात, बरसात एवं परिणामस्वरूप आई बाढ़ के रूप में देखने को मिली। 28 फरवरी से 03 मार्च 2015 चार दिन तक हुई इस बेमौसमी बरसात से लाखों भारतीय किसानों के प्रभावित होने की आशंका है। साथ-साथ जलवायु परिवर्तन जनित इन घटनाओं से भूमिहीन किसानों की बहुत अधिक दुर्दशा होती है और ऊपर उनकी सुध लेने वाला कोई नहीं है। Continue reading “जलवायु परिवर्तन की मार झेल रहे भारतीय किसान ; बेमौसमी बरसात का प्लेजियों को सबसे ज्यादा नुकसान”→
It was bit of a shock to get up to a VERY wet Sunday on March 1, 2015, having slept past midnight the previous night with a ‘dry’ weather. When I checked my inbox, the message from Manoj Misra of Yamuna Jiye Abhiyaan was waiting to provide a link to Accuweather.com site[1] and also satellite image from India Meteorology Department (IMD) site[2]. It looked ominous: “A potent storm will drop unusually far south as March begins, blasting India and Pakistan with heavy thunderstorms, flooding rain and burying mountain snow.” Northwestern India and Northern Pakistan were to face the maximum impact, but the impacts were to reach far down south right upto Karnataka. As the site said it was a rare event: “It is rare for widespread substantial rain such as this elsewhere across northern and central India”. Continue reading “Early Spring Rains bring Climate Disaster for farmers in India”→
NRSC latest (Feb 7 2015) image of the Phutkal landslide
Feb 13, 2015: The picturesque Zanskar Valley in Jammu and Kashmir State in Northern India continues to remain under threat as one of the tributaries of the Zanskar River has been blocked by a massive 200 ft high landslide dam (equal to height of a 20 storey building). The landslide dam between Shaday Sumdo and Mar Shun in the Zanskar subdivision of Kargil district has created about 14 km long lake, whose size is increasing with every passing day. Life and properties of around 4000 people are at risk due to the possible flashfloods when the landslide dam breaches. Continue reading “Landslide Dam blocks Phutkal River, threatens Zanskar Valley: Update”→
The picturesque Zanskar Valley in Jammu and Kashmir State in Northern India is under threat as one of the tributaries of the Zanskar River has been blocked by a massive 200 ft high landslide dam (equal to height of a 20 storey building). The landslide dam between Shaday Sumdo and MarShun in the Zanskar subdivision of Kargil district has created about 8 km long lake, whose size is increasing with every passing day. The landslide dam is made of mostly fine grained debris & blocks 97% of the flow of around 50 cusecs flow at this period as per records. While the lake is frozen right now, the threat of its breach looms as soon as the melting season starts. The landslide dam was reportedly created on Dec 31, 2014, when a whole side of mountain soil had landed on the Phuktal River. The landslide lake has been accumulating water for over a month now. Continue reading “Landslide Dam blocks Zanskar River tributary, threatens Valley”→
In the tragedy at a tiny village of Malin in Ambegaon, Maharashtra, as per reports till now, around 40 houses are under huge debris created by a landslide that occurred early in the morning on the 30th July 2014. The death toll till now is reported to be 44 with 150-300 missing as per different estimates. Unfortunately, the chances of survival of the missing are dim as per the Chief of Rescue operations.
Destruction at Malin Photo by Atul Kumar Kale Local activistPhoto by Atul Kumar Kale
Let us look at some key factors at play here:
VERY HEAVY RAINFALL: This region is nestled in the Northern Western Ghats which receives heavy rainfall in the monsoons. The region was receiving particularly very heavy rainfall in the week between 25th to 31st July. SANDRP had posted an alert on this on SANDRP Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/sandrp.in) on the night of 29th July.
Cumulative rainfall in the week as recorded by NASA’s (The National Aeronautics and Space Administration of US) TRMM (Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission, see: http://trmm.gsfc.nasa.gov/publications_dir/instant_2.html) was more than 600 mm, most of it between 29th-30th July. In fact on the 29th July, the region including Malin was shown purple in 24 hr rainfall map, which signifies the highest range of rainfall, exceeding 175 mm.
The region is still experiencing heavy to very heavy rainfall as we write this on Aug 1, 2014.
Malin receives very heavy rainfall on the 29th July, 9 pm by NASA TRMMMalin receiving high rainfall on the 30th July 2014, 9 pm IST NASA TRMM
It was surprising to read report from Down to Earth about “mere 4 mm rainfall in 24 hours” before the landslide, which is clearly not the case.
With changing climate, frequency of such high intensity rainfall events is predicted to increase, making these areas even more vulnerable to disasters like landslides.
Landslide Warning
Following the very heavy rainfall in the regions around Northern Western Ghats, extending till Gujarat, NASA’s TRMM had also highlighted this region to be strongly landslide prone on the 30thof July.
See NASA TRMM Landslide Prone Area Map on the 30th July 2014 below which highlights Bhimashankar and Malin region:
NASA Landslide potential Map, 6 pm IST on July 30, 2014
The dam connection:
The Malin village is approximately 1.5 kms from backwaters of the Dimbhe Dam, which is an irrigation project involving a big dam completed in 2000. On the 31st July, the dam held 44% of its live storage, that is about 156 MCM (Million Cubic Meters) of water. The link between water level fluctuations in dams and landslides in the rim of the reservoir and backwaters is well documented. Some geologists have also recorded increased landslides activity in areas surrounding Dimbhe Dam in the past. ( http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/City/Mumbai/More-landslides-likely-in-5km-radius-of-Dimbhe-dam/articleshow/39314716.cms) Even if the dam was not overflowing when the tragedy occurred, it is well known that the dams can induce such landslides around the rim in view of standing water with fluctuating levels, change in drainage pattern and underground water flow pattern.
Google map showing Dimbhe Dam and location of Malin village close to the backwaters
Key salient features of Dimbhe dam: Ht: 67.21 m; Lengh: 852 m; Live Storage Capacity: 354 MCM (www.mahawrd.org); Reservoir Area: 1754.7 ha.
The role played by the dam and its operations on the geology of the region and its possible connection with the landslide needs to be investigated in depth.
Landslides are not entirely new for the region
The region has seen some landslides in the past (e.g. in 2006-7) according to Saili Palande Datar, an ecologist and historian with Kalpavriksh. According to Anand Kapoor of NGO Shashwat active for decades in the region, a landslide had occurred earlier than that, where some cattle were buried and people had to be rescued. In a massive landslide on July 23, 1989, in village Bhaja in Mawal about 60 km from Pune, 39 people were killed.
In the Western Ghats of Pune as well as Maharashtra, a number of landslide-related tragedies have happened. According to a resident of village Tikona Peth in the catchment of Pavana Dam in Mawal tehsil of Pune, a landslide took place in in her village July, 1994 after heavy rains. There were no casualties, four houses were demolished by huge rocks. In August 2004, one person died due to landslide in Male, near Pune, in 2004 again, a worker died due to landslide in work related to a tunnel for a lift irrigation scheme, in June 2005, 4 workers died due to landslide at a tunnel of Ghatghar hydroelectric project.
Role of large scale land modifications in the region
Indeed according to a landslide map developed by Dr. David Petley, International Expert on Hazards and Risks in the Department of Geography at Durham University, the entire region of Western ghats has experienced landslides.
Dr. Petley has also written about the Malin Landslide here: http://blogs.agu.org/landslideblog/2014/07/31/malin-landslide-1/.
Dr. Petley told SANDRP, “Large scale land use modification and deforestation is the issue here”. He further said: “I would hypothesise here that the very heavy rainfall was the trigger, thick weathered soil, the shape of the slope and poor management of development and of water. A proper investigation should be able to ascertain whether this is right, but such large-scale modification of the landscape should be resisted.”
From Dr. David Petley: Landslide events where fatalities have occurred. We can see that Northern Western Ghats also features regularly in the map.
Landscape modifications around Bhimashankar
Bhimashankar region, the origin of river Bhima which is an important tributary of Krishna, is a high rainfall region with spectacular biodiversity. It is also home to Maharashtra’s state animal Malabar Giant Squirrel. The region is home to a vibrant tribal community which has seen several assaults on its way of life through the formation of the sanctuary, displacement caused by Dimbhe & other Dams, recent windmill projects, etc.,
In the recent years, some of the major landscape changes occurring in this region are through mechanised terracing of slopes for cultivation as well as developments related to windmill projects on mountain tops, which entail deforestation as well as road cutting on steep slopes. Although there are no windmill farms in Malin, such farms exist in the neighbouring Khed tehsil. Plans for such farms in Ambegaon are in the pipeline.
It needs to be understood that terracing for cultivation has been a traditional occupation of the tribals in this region, as in most of the Western Ghats. Not only is it an important livelihood support factor, but it has been limited by its scale, location and implementation due to its inherent manual nature. According to Anand Kapoor of Shashwat, tribals themselves do not prefer terraces made by JCBs and other machines as these are not entirely suitable for cultivation.
However, it is also a fact that now some government departments are using heavy machinery like JCBs in their bid to push terracing program. Unscientific mechanized terracing, which comes together with muck dumping, slope instability, affected drainage etc., can play a huge role in magnifying the impacts on a naturally vulnerable, high rainfall region.
In fact, a preliminary report by the Geological Survey of India (GSI) has singled out land flattening and terracing by heavy machinery as one of the primary causes for the tragedy. As per the preliminary report, a team of GSI experts noticed cracks where heavy soil erosion had occurred. The Deputy Director General of GSI has said that these cracks are a result of improper drainage system of rainwater. The flattening of land would have affected the water drainage resulting in the cracks. He says: “The slope of the hill was flattened almost halfway for agricultural purpose to such an extent that the hilltop had become unstable. The experts have also reported excessive deforestation disrupting the ecology of the hill. Added to this was the damage caused by use of heavy machinery over two years.” The Director General and Deputy Director General will be visiting the site on the 2nd and 3rd August for further analysis.
An independent credible review of the way the land levelling activities are going on under government policies and programs should be immediately instituted and till its report is available, use of heavy machines like JCB may be minimised.
Management of the region according to Western Ghats Expert Ecology Panel (WGEEP) Report and High Level Working Group Report (HLWG)
Both reports place Malin in Ecologically Sensitive Zone I and Ecologically Sensitive Area (ESA) respectively.
An ESZ I tag by the WGEEP report regulates a number of activities in the region, with participation of local communities. The report has specifically mentioned threat of landslides in this region.
While noting the impacts of windmills in the region surrounding Malin, WGEEP notes: “Apart from substantial forest destruction (including Forest Department estimates of about 28,000 trees being cut) via wide roads cutting huge swathes through Reserve Forest, the wind mill project has triggered large scale erosion and landslides through poor construction of roads with steep gradients, and all this rubble is ending up on fertile farmland and in reservoirs of tributaries of the Krishna.
The Forest Department is colluding with wind mill project operators in also illegally denying citizens access to these hills. Boards and check-posts have been put up by the company, falsely claiming to be authorized by the Forest Department. There are many traditional forest dwellers on these hills. Not only are their rights under the Forest Rights Act not being recognized, they are being illegally restrained in their movements on hills they have inhabited for centuries.”
If the WGEEP was accepted by the MoEF and state governments, this would have led to a more people-centred and ecologically-sound management of the Western Ghats region, but Maharashtra has been vehemently opposing WGEEP on the most unjustified grounds and the MoEF too has been busy downplaying the WGEEP.
While HLWG did include Malin village in its list of Ecologically sensitive Areas, however, this ESA tag did not mean much for the region it only regulates mining and red category industries. Most of the development activities that might threaten the region are not regulated by the HLWG. More importantly, HLWG has no role for the local communities in democratic decision making. There is also no mention of this region being landslide-prone in the HLWG, whereas the WGEEP specifically highlights this issue.
It is clear that HLWG is not much help for the region in avoiding tragedies like the Malin tragedy, but WGEEP report certainly would have helped.
Way forward
Northern Western Ghats which are characterized by heavy rainfall, rich biodiversity and predominant tribal population need more sensitive management approach than what it is subjected to right now. Although WGEEP had paved way for a more democratic, equitable and people-centred management of the region, the report was hidden, downplayed and finally rejected by the state as well as the central government. Episodes like Malin highlight the vulnerability and complex inter-linkages that affect the region which require a long term planning vision, integrating a number of components.
Despite this, several ill-conceived projects like townships, windmill farms, large dams and river linking projects like Damanganga-Pinjal and Paar Tapi Narmada are proposed in the region. Close to Bhimashankar region, Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) as well as the Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation are pushing more than 12 large dams. Some of these dams entail huge tunnels under the mountain ranges of Western Ghats. Despite the several risks and impacts, many of these massive dams may also escape scientific Impact Assessments or public hearings. These projects needs to be opposed and urgently dropped as there is little justification of the projects in view of huge number of options available in the cities for which these dams are proposed.
Similarly, Maharashtra Government has plans to build three huge hydropower dams in the Velhe and Mulshi region, which also falls in the Pune District. Velhe region has already seen slope instability and also falls in Seismic zone IV, making any such development highly risky there.
Let us hope that the heart-breaking tragedy at Malin is a wake-up call for all of us, paving way towards more sensitive,responsive, democratic and sustainable management of the Western Ghats. As a first step, the state and central government need to accept and implement the recommendations of the WGEEP immediately in Malin and for the entire Western Ghats.
In a classical Thumri rendition, Ustad Rashid Khan sings about how a river, which was once a friend, has turned into a foe…Nadiya Bairi Bhayi.. Something similar is happening at a number of places in India, where the river, a life giving friend, is turning into a deadly force.
~~
Drowning of 25 students following sudden water releases from the 126 MW Larji Dam in Mandi, Himachal Pradesh is one more saddening and shocking incidence in the long list of hydropower-release related disasters in India where rivers are turned into death traps.
On the 18th April 2014, 11 year old Radhika Gurung studying in standard fourth was accompanying her sisters Chandra and Maya along the river Teesta near Bardang, Sikkim. Suddenly, without having any time to respond, all three school girls were washed away by a forceful water released by upstream 510 MW Teesta V Hydropower project in Sikkim. While Maya and Chandra were lucky to be saved, Radhika was not so lucky. She lost her life. Residents here say that NHPC, the dam operator, does not sound any sirens or alarms while releasing water in the downstream for producing hydroelectricity and villagers live in constant fear of the river.[1] Residents demanded strict action against NHPC, but no action has been taken.
On the 28th March 2013, 5 people, including two small children aged 2 and 3 drowned in the Bhawani River near Mettupalayna when 100 MW Kundah IV HEP (Tamil Nadu) on the Pillur Dam suddenly released discharge of about 6000 cusecs water. The family was sitting on the rocks in the riverbed when water levels started rising, and they did not get enough time even to scramble out of the river with the two children, says the sole survivor. Tangedco officials stated that although alarm is sounded at the nearest hamlets, it does not reach the downstream regions.[2] Local villagers say no alarm is sounded. No action has been taken against Tangedco.[3]
On 8th January 2012, a family of seven people, including a child, drowned in the Cauvery River when water was released from the 30 MW Bhavani Kattalai Barrage-II (BKBII in Tamil Nadu). The same day, two youths were also swept off and drowned in the same river due to this release.[4] There are no reports of any responsibility fixed or any action taken against the Barrage authorities or Tangedco, although it was found that there was not even a siren installed to alert people in the downstream about water releases.[5]
Uttarakhand has a history of deaths due to sudden releases from its several hydropower dams. In April 2011, three pilgrims were washed away due to sudden release of water from Maneri Bhali-1 Dam on the Bhagirathi in Uttarakhand.[6] In 2006 too, three women were washed away by such releases by Maneri Bhali.[7] The district magistrate of Uttarkashi district ordered filing a case against the Executive Engineer of the dam after a number of organisations demanded action against the guilty. Again in November 2007, Uttarakhand Jal VIdyut Nigam Limited was testing the opening and closing of gates of Maneri Bhali Stage II, when two youths were washed away by these releases. [8] Following a protest by locals and Matu Jan Sangathan, the Executive Engineer and District Magistrate simply issued a notice which said that “Maneri Bhali Hydropower Projects exists in the upstream of Joshiyada Barrage and water can be released at any time, without prior notice from here”.
Similar notice is also given by NEEPCO, which operates the Ranganadi Dam and 405 MW Dikrong Power House in Arunachal Pradesh, on the Assam border. “The gates of Ranganadi diversion dam may be opened at any time. NEEPCO will not take any responsibility for any loss of life of humans, animals or damage to property”.
Similar notice sits on the banks of the Chalakudy River near the Athirappilly falls in Kerala and the Kadar tribes, which traditionally stay close to the river and are skilled fisher folk too, are fearful of entering the river.
Chamera HEP in Himachal Pradesh has been held responsible for sudden water releases and resultant deaths in the downstream. As per retired IAS Officer Avay Shukla who resides in Himachal, similar incidences which resulted in loss of lives have also happened due to Nathpa Jhakri and other dams in the state.
In December 2011,three youth were drowned in the Netravathi River when water was released by the fraudulently combined 48.50 MW AMR project (Karnataka) now owned by Greenko[9]. Villagers protested at the site, but this has not been the first instance of drowning because of this project. Villagers accuse the dam for the deaths of as many as 7 unsuspecting people in the downstream. This dam is now increasing its height and one more project is being added to it.
Protest against sudden water release by fraudulently combined 48.50 MW project in Bantwal, Dakshin Kannada by Greenko Photo: Daiji World
On October 1, 2006, at least 39 people were killed in Datia district in Madhya Pradesh when suddenly large amount of water was released from the upstream Manikheda dam on Sind River in Shivpuri district. There was no warning prior to these sudden releases and hence unsuspecting people crossing the river were washed away[10]. Chief Minister Shivraj Chauvan ordered a judicial probe into this incidence in 2006, however, and a report was submitted by retired High Court Judge in 2007. Since then, the report has been buried and several attempts of RTI activists to access the report have been in vain. The government has not released the report, forget acting upon it or fixing responsibility after 8 years[11].
In April 2005, at least 70 people were killed at Dharaji in Dewas district of Madhya Pradesh due to sudden release of huge quantity of water from the upstream Indira Sagar Dam on Narmada river. Principal Secretary Water Resources Madhya Pradesh inquired into the incident and found that “there was no coordination between agencies”[12]. No accountability was fixed and no one was held responsible. NHPC, who operated 1000 MW Indira Sagar Project, simply claimed that it was a case of miscommunication and that it was not aware of the religious mela in the downstream of the river. As SANDRP observed then, “ It just shows how far removed is the dam operator from the welfare of the people in Narmada as the fair annually gathers more than 100,000 people of the banks of the river. It is a scandal that no one was held responsible for the manmade flood which resulted in the mishap[13].”
Above incidents make it clear that incident at Larji is not the first and will not be the last, if we continue non transparency and non accountability in hydropower dam operations.
Some Questions that arise from these events:
Do sanctioning authorities and dam operators reaslise that each of these projects convert an entire river ( not limited to the hydropower project) in the downstream area into a potential death trap? Do they assess the impacts of the various possible operations of the projects in the downstream area and envisage, plan and implement measures to avoid death and destruction in the downstream areas?
Can cordoning off and alienating a river, indicating that it is dangerous, be a solution to this? Are measures like alarms, sirens, lights enough when a river experiences order of magnitude sudden change in its flow due to dam and hydropower releases?
Is it ok to have hundreds of dam-related deaths in the recent years due to irresponsible and non-transparent dam operations and not have any responsibility fixed?
The obvious answer to the above seems NO.
Some Recommendations: As we have seen above, many man made disasters have happened in India over the last decade and governments and dam operators have learnt no lessons. The avoidable tragedies are repeating without any change. India is possibly the only country in the world where such events have been happening in such large numbers. Here we are recommending some basic steps if we want to avoid or minimise occurrence of such tragedies in future.
MEASURES FOR TRANSPARENT, INCLUSIVE MANAGEMENT NORMS IN OPERATION OF ALL EXISTING DAMS AND HYDROPOWER PROJECTS:
For every operating Dam and Hydropower project in India there should be clearly defined operating procedure in public domain. This operating procedure will include the steps taken before release of water from dam or power house, how the releases will be increases (the increase should be in steps and not suddenly releasing huge quantity) or decreased, how these will be planned in advance, who all will need to be informed about such plans in what manner and what safety measures will be taken. This will also include who all will be responsible for designing, monitoring and implementing these measures. There should be boards at regular intervals in the downstream area in language and manner that local people and outsiders can understand and the boards should also indicate the danger zone and what kind of sirens and hooters may blow before the releases.
The operating procedure will take into account where there are upstream projects and how the upstream projects are going to influence the inflow into the project and how information will be shared with upstream and downstream projects and in public domain. The Power Load Dispatch Centres should also remember that when any hydropower project is asked to shut on or off, there are consequences in the river and they should be asked to keep such consequences in mind and time required to alert the regions in risk.
For every dam there should be a legally empowered official management committee for the project management, in which 50% people should be from govt and 50% should be non govt persons, including local community representatives and this committee should be in charge of providing oversight over management, including operation of the project and should have right to get all the information about the project.
Hourly water levels and release data of hydropower dams be made available in public domain on daily bases. Water levels corresponding to discharges (and possible timings where applicable) should be physically marked on the river banks, local communities should be involved in this, evacuation methods and mock drills should be organised by dam proponent from time to time in all places along the river where the impacts reach.
THE EXISTING DAMS AND HYDROPOWER PROJECTS SHOULD BE MANDATED TO PUT ALL THIS IN PLACE WITHIN A PERIOD OF NEXT THREE MONTHS THROUGH A LEGALLY EMPOWERED STEP IN ALL STATES.
SANCTIONING PROCESS FOR NEW PROJECTS, INCLUDING FOR UNDER CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS:
Safety measures related to, including water releases for all kind of eventualities and their downstream impacts and management plan should be an integral part of EIA and EMP. The aspect should be thoroughly discussed while appraising the project, and clear cut roles and responsibilities fixed. Mitigation measures should include proper siting of the project, gradual upramping & Downramping of releases in a clearly defined way and where planning is mandatory, safe operation of discharges through dams, etc.
Entire clearance mechanism for cascade hydropower projects in the Himalayas and elsewhere needs to be revisited to include the operational safety measures considering the cumulative operation of the projects. Projects where operational safety measures alone will not be sufficient due to massive fluctuations/location/upstream projects, etc., should be urgently dropped.
Peaking power projects should be restricted to certain locations like deep mountain gorges, after proper studies. Such projects should not be permitted as rivers enter into floodplains, due to their significant impact on the downstream and also in biodiversity rich river stretches.
SAFETY MEASURES BEFORE AND DURING WATER RELEASES:
Primary safety measures like informing the administration well in advance before release, sirens, hoots, alarms, lights, buoys should be strictly enforced and a clear responsibility of these measures should be adopted, for the entire zone in risk, sign boards at every 50 mts interval in such zones in languages and manner that local people and outsiders can understand, and which also show the specific risk zone. Where sudden unseasonal releases are likely, include police surveillance of the risk zone during danger period.
WHEN THERE IS DEATH AND DESTRUCTION IN THE DOWNSTREAM AREA:
Exemplary punishments should be fixed not only for dam operators,but also engineers and dam companies in case of negligence. Independent inquiry will be required since departmental or inquiries by District administration or government officials are not likely to be credible.
Since the designed safety measures in case of Larji were clearly inadequate, not just the operational staff but all those responsible for such shoddy safety plan should be held accountable.
It is unacceptable that a life giving and beautiful entity like a river should be converted into a dangerous and deadly force for our energy needs, without even the most basic precautions in place.
7 Students Get Justice 16 Yrs after Meeting Watery Grave
By Express News Service Published: 18th September 2014 06:03 AM
BHUBANESWAR: In a significant judgment, a civil court on Wednesday awarded a compensation of `25 lakh each to the families of seven students of University College of Engineering (UCE) of Burla __ now VSS University of Technology __ who were swept away by unannounced and untimely release of water from Hirakud dam 16 years ago.
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar, Sangram Keshari Patnaik, who pronounced the verdict in his 31-page judgement, ordered that the compensation be paid with 6 per cent interest effective from 2001, the year when the case was filed before the court.
The tragic incident had occurred on January 30, 1998 when eight students of the UCE of Burla were taking pictures on a sand bar of Mahanadi as part of the Spring Festival activity. The water flow of the river rose menacingly and barring Soubhagya Barik, the rest seven second-year engineering students were swept away and met their watery grave.
The Hirakud Dam authorities had allegedly opened nine gates during the non-monsoon season which led to the tragic incident as no caution was sounded before the release of the water.
The State Government ordered a Revenue Divisional Commissioner-level inquiry into the incident and the then RDC Hrushikesh Panda submitted the report to the Government on March 29, 1998. The Government accepted it on May 19.
The RDC, in his report, had examined 77 witnesses and 31 affidavits were filed. Panda, in his report, had highlighted the irresponsibility of the engineers and stated that even the Sambalpur Collector and the Superintendent of Police were not intimated about the release of water, let alone the public.
Basing on the report, the State Government had announced a compensation of `3 lakh each to the family of seven students. However, considering the compensation inadequate, a petition was filed before the Orissa High Court. In 2001, the HC directed that the case must be filed before a civil court since it pertained to compensation.
According to Madhumadhab Jena and Sidharth Das, counsels for the deceased’s families, the Civil Judge Court took into account various aspects, including the academic background of the students of UCE.
Drop 23 projects, do cumulative assessments & improve governance
In a significant development on role of hydropower projects in Uttarakhand flood disaster of June 2013, the Expert Body (EB) headed by Dr Ravi Chopra has recommended that at least 23 hydropower projects should be dropped, that hydropower projects played significant role in the Uttarakhand disaster and that there is urgent need to improve the environment governance of hydropower projects. The Report “Assessment of Environmental Degradation and Impact of Hydroelectric Projects During The June 2013 Disaster in Uttarakhand” dated April 2014 has been submitted to the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests on April 16, 2014 and was made public following hearing in the Supreme Court on April 28, 2014. The committee was appointed by a reluctant Union Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) in October 2013, following the Supreme Court’s suo motto order of August 13 2013.
Damaged Vishnuprayag Dam in Uttarakhand floods of June 2013: Source: MATU Jansangathan
Uttarakhand floods of June 2013[1],[2]: The committee report endorses the stand taken in a letter[3] that was written to MoEF on July 20, 2013, endorsed by over 20 individuals and groups including from Uttarakhand on the role of existing and under construction hydropower projects in the Uttarakhand floods of June 2013. MoEF did not take any action on this letter, but it was Supreme Court order next month that pushed MoEF to take necessary action.
SC order of Aug 13, 2013[4]: On Aug 13, 2013, while disposing off the petition on Srinagar HEP in Uttarakhand, the Supreme Court, suo motto, made an order that asked, MoEF and Uttarakhand governments not to provide any further clearances to any more hydropower projects anywhere in Uttarakhand till further orders. Both MoEF and Uttarakhand governments have been violating this order. However, one of the fall outs of this order was formulation of Expert Body appointed by MoEF more than two months latter, through an order on Oct 15, 2013, whose report now is available in public domain.
Limited TOR[5]: The Supreme Court order of Aug 13, 2013 pertained to whole of Uttarakhand, as was the disaster of June 2013. However, the MoEF order and subsequently CWC tried to restrict the field of work of the committee to Alaknanda and Bhagirathi sub basins rather than whole of Uttarakhand.
Problematic constitution: The constitution of the Expert body was also problematic from a number of aspects. There was clear conflict of interest with respect to some of the members like Dr BP Das, former member and Vice Chair of the MoEF’s Expert Appraisal Committee on River Valley Projects, as explained below. The committee also included chairman of Central Water Commission and Central Electricity Authority, which unfortunately act like lobbies for hydropower projects. These persons were in the committee to bring in respective expertise, but in stead used their presence in the committee to discredit evidence which suggested clear role of hydropower projects, some members also advocated for more hydropower projects, in stead of adhering to the mandate given by the Supreme Court, thus raising the issue of contempt of court.
In what follows we have given some useful recommendations and conclusions of the EB, followed by some weak recommendations and conclusions of the EB report, based on a quick reading of the report (we got the over 200 page report only on April 29, 2014), following by some remarks on role of vice chair, CWC, CEA, MoEF and our conclusion.
Map of Mandakini Valley, epicenter of Uttarakhand floods of June 2013 (Source: EB report)
On 24 projects recommended to be dropped by WII “After considerable discussions and analysis, the Expert Body concluded that of the 24 proposed Hydropower Projects (HEPs) that Wildlife Institute of India (WII) recommended for Review, 23 HEPs would have significant irreversible impacts on biodiversity values.”
“The EB recommends that for the 23 proposed HEPs out of the 24 identified by WII (other than the Kotli Bhel 1A project) that would have irreversible impacts on the biodiversity of Alaknanda and Bhagirathi Basins, the HEPs that fall in any of the following conditions should not be approved for construction.
(a) Proposed HEPs that fall inside wildlife Protected Areas such National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries
(b) Proposed HEPs that fall within the Gangotri Eco-sensitive Zone
(c) Proposed HEPs that fall above 2,500m that encompass critical wildlife habitats, high biological diversity, movement corridors, and fragile in nature due to unpredictable glacial and paraglacial activities.
(d) Proposed HEPs that fall within 10 km from the boundary of Protected Areas and have not obtained clearance from the National Board for Wildlife.”
It would have been in fitness of things if EB had exclusively asked for stoppage of work on all these 23 projects with immediate effect.
On Kotli Bhel 1A The EB has, we believe, erroneously concluded, over ruling the conclusion of WII and expert review initiated by EB, “that the Kotli Bhel 1A project might not significantly worsen the condition of the river Bhagirathi between Koteshwar and Devprayag – already part of a highly fragmented zone”. However, EB has asked for “due modifications to its design and operations so that an adequate stretch of the river downstream of the Koteshwar dam just above KB-IA can be maintained in a free flowing state”. This means the project work should stop and it should reapply for clearances after doing the suggested modifications in credible way.
Restoration: “The river bed profiles at Phata-Byung, Singoli-Bhatwari, Vishnuprayag and Srinagar HEPs have changed significantly. This requires a fresh analysis of the project hydrology and redesigning them if necessary.
All projects must undertake river restoration works after prior clearance from MoEF. It was noticed that project developers were engaged in projects’ restoration only. MoEF needs to conduct a formal review of the environmental damages at all the HEPs in Uttarakhand and prepare guidelines for restoration. Till then none of the projects should begin power production.”
HEPs above 2 MW need EC “All projects > 2 MW, shall require prior Environmental Clearances (EC) from MoEF”.
“A multidisciplinary expert body should be constituted with members of proven expertise and experience to review every year the progress/performance of each HEP and its compliance with the sanction conditions. This body will also review the technicalities of disaster preparedness before each monsoon season and examine the impact of monsoon storm and floods on the performance of all the project components. The environmental health of the river will be a critical area for comprehensive examination.”
No projects above winter snow line “Learning from the June 2013 event, the EB believes that the enhanced sediment availability from and in paraglacial zones could be a serious problem for the longevity of the existing, under construction and proposed HEPs in Uttarakhand. Therefore the EB recommends that the terrain above the MCT in general and above the winter snow line in particular (~2200-2500 m) should be kept free from hydropower interventions in Uttarakhand.”
SIA should be carried out for all river systems in Uttarakhand “The WII study has already identified 24 proposed HEPs in the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi basins as likely to cause irreversible impacts. But comprehensive research studies of other basins in Uttarakhand are lacking at this stage… Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) be carried out in other major river basins of Uttarakhand such as the Yamuna and Kali basins.”
Distance between projects in a cascade “Scientific studies by subject experts should be conducted for establishing baseline data on river parameters, diversity and populations of floral and faunal species in different rivers of Uttarakhand at different elevation zones. Such studies should be used for deciding upon the minimum distances between two consecutive HEPs. Until such scientific studies are completed, no new HEPs (in S&I stage) should be cleared on the rivers of Uttarakhand within a distance that may later be revoked. Minimum distances for projects in the clearance stage should be significantly revised upward from the current consideration of 1 km.”
SANDRP Map of Bumper to Bumper hydropower projects in Alaknanda basin in Uttarakhand
National Himalayan Policy “Since the Himalaya are our vital source of growth and abundance, a National Himalayan Policy needs to be urgently created and implemented.”
“Therefore, the EB strongly recommends that a detailed study of the impacts of hydropower projects in terms of deforestation/tunneling/ blasting/reservoir formation on the hydrogeology of the area should be carried out.”
A study on the role of large artificial reservoirs on local climate change and precipitation patterns with special reference to the Tehri dam reservoir.”
Sediment transportation studies “Recent studies have highlighted serious concern about the Indian deltas, which are shrinking due to changes in river courses. The Ganga-Brahmaputra delta is also noted in this category. This seems to be a major issue in near future therefore we recommend that the studies should be carried out regarding the impacts on sediment transportation due to projects existing on Himalayan rivers.”
Cultural impacts of HEPs “Therefore EB recommends that the Ministry of Culture along with the local representatives and spiritual leaders should undertake a comprehensive study of the cultural impacts of HEPs in the spiritually rich state of Uttarakhand.”
“The river bed profiles at Phata-Byung, Singoli-Bhatwari, Vishnuprayag and Srinagar HEPs have changed significantly. This requires a fresh analysis of the project hydrology and redesigning them if necessary.”
“River Regulation Zone (R.R.Z.) guidelines should be issued immediately by the Ministry of Environment & Forests and should be executed accordingly.”
Muck Management: “The existing practices of muck management are inadequate to protect the terrain and the people from an eventuality like the June 2013 flood. Therefore, a serious revisit is required towards evolving technically better and ecologically sustainable methods for muck disposal and rehabilitation in Uttarakhand.”
Environmental Flows: “Till such time as a decision is taken on the EFlows recommendations of the IITs-consortium, the EB recommends EFlows of 50% during the lean season and 30% during the remaining non-monsoon months. Sustaining the integrity of Uttarakhand’s rivers and their eco-systems is not negotiable.”
Eco-Sensitive Zones: “It is recommended that legislation be enacted to (i) protect small but significant rivers (as done in Himachal Pradesh and also recommended by the IMG for Uttarakhand) as pristine rivers and (ii) designate Eco-Sensitive Zones for all rivers of Uttarakhand.”
Community based CA and CAT “Community-based CA and CAT plan execution must be done by the State Forest Department within the construction period of the project.” This is to be monitored by a committee that includes two representatives from local communities, a renowned environmentalist, among others.
Forests and Biodiversity Conservation: “Community based CAT programmes have to be systemically implemented for ensuring sustenance of the plantations. This requires training of forest officials to work with the communities through their Van Panchayats.”
“It was brought to the notice of the EB that clearances to start work had been granted recently to the Lakhwar (300 MW) and Vyasi (120 MW) projects. This is in violation of the spirit of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s order of August 13, 2013. It is also noticed that these projects were approved more than 25 years ago. Consequently they do not have any EIA/EMP/DMP studies that are mandatory today. Without conducting cumulative impact assessments and disaster management studies of the Yamuna and Kali basins no such projects should be allowed at the risk of fragile ecology, biodiversity and lives of people living in and around the project sites.”[6]
SOME WEAK RECOMMENDATIONS OF EB
“The EB recommends that MoEF strengthens its personnel and procedures for post-sanction monitoring of environmental conditionalities. The MoEF should develop a programme for research studies by reputed organizations on the impacts of HEPs on river water quality (and flows). Pre-construction and post operation long term impacts monitoring studies are required.”
Geology & Social Issues: “Given the massive scale of construction of HEPs in Uttarakhand it may be worthwhile to set up a formal institution or mechanism for investigating and redressing complaints about damages to social infrastructure. The functioning of such an institution can be funded by a small cess imposed on the developers. It is also suggested that to minimize complaints of bias, investigations should be carried out by joint committees of subject experts and the community.”
Disaster Management: “Disaster preparedness is critical because all of Uttarakhand lies either in seismic Zone IV or V. These areas are most vulnerable to strong earthquakes. Disaster Management Plans (DMPs) are critical parts of EIA Reports. They need to be carefully reviewed and approved by local communities in the probable zone of influence.”
“It is necessary to establish an independent authority which may commission EIA Reports…”
CONCLUSIONS OF EB:
On Role of Dams in Uttarakhand disaster:
In Chapter 3 (p 10) chairman of EB notes, “Thus THDC’s inundation analysis results could
not be substantiated by the ground survey in Haridwar city.”
“In September 2010, to retain flood inflows in the face of water levels rising beyond the permitted FRL the (Tehri) dam authorities had to seek the permission of the Supreme Court. It led to inundation of the upstream town of Chinyalisaur and later after draw down fresh landslide zones were created around the reservoir rim.”
“Geo-chemical analysis of sediment samples taken from various locations along the river stretch in Srinagar, however, indicated a significant contribution — varying from 47% near the barrage to about 23% much further downstream (Fig. 3.19, pg 101, Main Report) — from muck eroded from muck disposal sites 6 and 9 located on the concave right bank and consequently experienced an intense current of the order of 7m/sec.
This raises a question that if there was heavy to very heavy rainfall from the glacial reaches of the Alaknanda valley, leading to numerous landslides along the banks, then why was massive damage observed only downstream of the Vishnuprayag and Srinagar HEPs? A detailed investigation is warranted in order to arrive at a scientifically viable explanation.”
“Otters appear to be nearing extinction in the Ganga, Alaknanda sub-basins.”
It is good to see that the EB has effectively rejected the critique of the WII report presented by Dr. Sabyasachi Dasgupta, HNB Garhwal University and consultant to UJVNL, following an independent review of the WII report by Prof. Brij Gopal, an eminent ecological scientist who had worked extensively on river ecosystems. Prof Brij Gopal, while finding some limitations in WII methodology, concluded: “he agreed with WII’s findings that the 24 proposed hydropower projects would impact the biodiversity of Alaknanda and Bhagirathi basins significantly. Based on his own analysis, Prof Gopal recommended that several more projects be dropped.”
SOME WEAK CONCLUSIONS:
“A ground survey of the inundation analysis carried out by THDC on the basis of which it claimed to have saved Haridwar from drowning raised doubts about the accuracy of the computer generated inundation maps. It is therefore not clear how much of Haridwar would have been affected if the Tehri dam had not been there. The problem at Haridwar, as at other towns and habitations along river banks, is that there has been wide spread encroachment and construction inside the river’s regime. Therefore it is imperative to set up river regulation zones where encroachments are forbidden. (Unscientific sand mining on river beds adds to the problem.)”
“There is some doubt about whether the Vishnuprayag project authorities were able to properly manage the opening and closing of the gates.”
Role of Dr B P Das: Dr B P Das has for close to a decade been member or vice chair or officiating chair of the Expert Appraisal Committee of MoEF on River Valley project and has in the process been involved in appraising and deciding on clearances for a no of projects and their impacts in Uttarakhand. Hence he was not likely to be in a position to take an independent view on Uttarakhand hydropower projects as there was a conflict of interest involved with respect to his earlier decisions. His biased views were also known through his article in The Hindu earlier. This got reflected in the alternate view on page 27 of chapter 3 and page 16-17 of Chapter 4 of the report authored by Dr Das. In Chapter 3 box, Dr Das’s abiding faith in the project developer could be seen. In Chapter 4 box Dr Das himself mentions that EAC has yet to take a view on WII report, but the he himself is a responsible party for EAC not having taken a view on WII report.
Role of CWC, CEA chairpersons: CWC (Central Water Commission, India’s premier technical body on water resources development under Union Ministry of Water Resources) and CEA (Central Electricity Authority, India’s premier technical body on power sector are largely known to act as lobbies for hydropower projects, in stead of the independent technical and regulatory body that they are expected to work as. In view of that, inclusion of chairperson of CWC and CEA in this committee was wrong step on the part of MoEF. We learn from a letter written by two eminent members of the committee, namely Dr Shekhar Pathak and Dr Hemant Dhyani on March 27, 2014, that indeed the chairpersons of CWC and CEA did not really participate in the way they were required to, and rather functioned in violation of the Supreme Court order.
Scanned version of last part of the letter of 27.03.2014 from Dr Shekhar Pathak and Dr Hemant Dhyani, members of EB
Role of MoEF: One had expected that the EB would take a critical view of the functioning of the MoEF around HEPs and contribution of MoEF’s failures in increasing the disaster proportions. Unfortunately we are disappointed in this. Possibly, with the committee having been appointed by MoEF and member secretary of the committee being MoEF official this was a difficult ask. However, not being able to take a critical stand on the role of MoEF (and other institutions like CWC, CEA, state environment department, state disaster management department etc) imposes a limitation on the EB report and provides a free reign to guilty party. The consequences of this became apparent when on April 28, 2014, during the Supreme Court hearing, we are told, the MoEF presented erroneous picture that there are two reports of the committee, one by 10 members(wrongly called activists) another by Vice Chair B P Das, with CWC and CEA chair persons, when at best the note from these three persons can be considered dissent note, that too in violation of SC orders. We hope the Supreme Court will take strong view of this misleading picture presented by MoEF and reprimand the responsible officials to ensure that this does not happen again.
View of the Committee working through its minutes
Minutes of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th meeting are available on the MoEF, Lucknow regional office website. Perusal of the minutes shed light of the functioning of the committee, and the biases of some specific members. Some highlights from the minutes:
THDC, Tehri and Muck Disposal Sites: Site visit reports of various members, including Dr. Amit Gupta, Dy Director of MoEF presented that THDC is managing active and non active muck disposal sites ‘poorly’. The sites do not have proper retaining wall, slop or plantations.
THDC hid drift tunnel of Koteshwar dam: Member Hemant Dhyani exposed that THDC officials did not accept the presence of a huge drift tunnel of Koteshwar Project near Payal Gaon, which was suffering from severe subsidence. Only when the local people, including the tunnel construction workers insisted that there is a tunnel that the THDC officials accept this fact!
In the 3rd meeting, the Chief Secretary of Uttarakhand told the committee that projects with EC or FC should not be closed or stopped. Note here that this suggestion is unacceptable when the SC itself has asked the committee to investigate the role of projects in the flood damages.
To top this, Additional Chief Secretary unilaterally asserted that HEP did not have any role in the mishap. He emphasised every Environmental CLearance needs an EIA. This indicates his poor knowledge about the quality of EIAs which has been accepted by most experts.
He further stressed that a umber of FC cases were peding before the MoEF. Moef official YK Singh Chauhan rebutted this claim.
In the 4th Meeting, Dr. B.P. Das, Co Chair of the committee categorized June event as a rare natural calamity and attributed the losses only to road construction ( Incidentally, many roads are being built for hydel projects, and do not even allow access to local communities.)
Dr. Ravi Chopra, Chairperson highlighted the poor data management of THDC. He highlighted that THDC could not provide HFL data, rainfall data, inlet level from Maneri Bhali II and outlet level sought by the committee members.
Conclusion: In spite of certain weaknesses, most of the recommendations of the committee need to be immediately implemented and till they are implemented in letter and spirit, the Supreme Court should order a status quo on any further hydropower projects. The EB headed by Dr Ravi Chopra should be congratulated for this report in spite of difficult circumstances under which the committee operated.
Þ We also hope the Supreme Court would ask MoEF to order stoppage of work on Lakhwar and Vyasi projects that has been started recently, violating the Supreme Court order in letter and spirit, and also as pointed out by the EB.
Þ The work on 24 hydropower projects that was part of explicit TOR of the committee should be ordered to stop immediately. The EB should have made this explicit recommendation, but even if they have not done that, it is implicit in its recommendation.
Þ The Supreme Court should ask MoEF to provide a time bound action plan on implementation of the various recommendations of the EB. The SC an also possibly appoint EB (minus Dr Das, CWC and CEA persons) to oversee the implementation of the action plan and continue to provide independent feedback on adequacy of such implementation.
Þ The Lessons from Uttarakhand are relevant for all Himalayan states of India from Kashmir to all the North East states and we hope Supreme Court to ask the follow up committee to ensure that these lessons are taken note of and necessary steps flowing there from are implemented in these Himalayan states. These will also provide guidance to our Himalayan neighbouring countries.
Þ The failure of environmental governance is one of the clearest stark message from this episode and we hope MoEF will put its house in order in this respect, revamping its entire environmental governance.
[7] Reuters report on this issue: http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/india-flood-idINL6N0NL0VC20140429
[8] The section “View of the Committee working through its minutes” has been put together by SANDRP colleague Parineeta Dandekar. I am also thankful to her for other useful suggestions from her.
As Uttarakhand faced unprecedented flood disaster and as the issue of contribution of hydropower projects in this disaster was debated, questions for which there have been no clear answers were, how many hydropower projects are there in various river basins of Uttarakhand? How many of them are operating hydropower projects, how many are under construction and how many more are planned? How many projects are large (over 25 MW installed capacity), small (1-25 MW) and mini-micro (less than 1 MW installed capacity) in various basins at various stages?
This document tries to give a picture of the status of various hydropower projects in various sub basins in Uttarakhand, giving a break up of projects at various stages.
River Basins in Uttarakhand Entire Uttarakhand is part of the larger Ganga basin. The Ganga River is a trans-boundary river, shared between India and Bangladesh. The 2,525 kms long river rises in the western Himalayas in the Indian state of Uttarakhand, and flows south and east through the Gangetic Plain of North India into Bangladesh, where it empties into the Bay of Bengal. The Ganga begins at the confluence of the Bhagirathi and Alaknanda rivers and forms what we have called Ganga sub basin till it exits Uttarakhand. Besides Bhagirathi, Alaknanda and Ganga sub basin, other river basins of Uttarakhand include: Yamuna, Ramganga (Western Ramganga is taken as Ramganga basin in this document, eastern Ramganga is considered part of Sharda basin) and Sharda. Sharda sub basin includes eastern Ramganga, Goriganga, Dhauliganga, Kaliganga and part of Mahakali basin.
Destroyed 400 MW Vishnuprayag HEP on Alaknanda. Photo: Matu Jan Sangathan
Existing hydropower projects in Uttarakhand In the table below we have given the sub basin-wise list of existing hydropower projects in Uttarakhand along with their capacities. The list has been prepared based on various sources including Central Electricity Authority, Uttarakhand Jal Vidhyut Nigam (UJVNL), Uttarakhand Renewable Energy Development Authority (UREDA) and Report of Inter Ministerial Group on Ganga basin.
Existing Hydropower projects in Uttarakhand
Projects
Installed Capacity (MW)
Projects in Alaknanda River Basin
1. Vishnu Prayag (P)
400
2. Tilwara
0.2
3. Soneprayag
0.5
4. Urgam
3
5. Badrinath II
1.25
6. Rajwakti (P)
3.6
7. Tapowan
1
8. Jummagad
1.2
9. Birahi Ganga (P)
7.2
10. Deval (P Chamoli Hydro P Ltd on Pinder)
5
11. Rishiganga (P)
13.5
12. Vanala (P Hima Urja P Ltd Banala stream)
15
13. Kaliganga I (ADB)
4
Alaknanda Total
455.45
Projects in Bhagirathi River Basin
14. Maneri Bhali-1 (Tiloth)
90
15. Maneri Bahli-2
304
16. Tehri St-I
1000
17. Koteshwar
400
18. Harsil
0.2
19. Pilangad
2.25
20. Agunda Thati (P Gunsola hydro Balganga river)
3
21. Bhilangana (P – Swasti)
22.5
22. Bhilangana III (P – Polyplex)
24
23. Hanuman Ganga (P – Regency Aqua)
4.95
Bhagirathi Total
1850.9
Projects in Ganga River sub basin downstream of confluence of Bhagirathi and Alaknanda
24. Chilla
144
25. Pathri
20.4
26. Mohamadpur
9.3
Ganga sub basin Total
173.7
Projects in Ramganga basin
27. Ramganga
198
28. Surag
7
29. Loharkhet (P Parvatiya Power P Ltd Bageshwar)
4.8
30. Kotabagh
0.2
31. Sapteshwar
0.3
32. Gauri
0.2
Ramganga Total
210.5
Projects in Sharda River Basin
33. Dhauliganga
280
34. Tanakpur
94.2
35. Khatima
41.4
36. Chirkilla
1.5
37. Taleshwar
0.6
38. Suringad
0.8
39. Relagad
3
40. Garaon
0.3
41 Charandev
0.4
42. Barar
0.75
43. Kulagad
1.2
44. Kanchauti
2
Sharda Total
426.15
Projects in Yamuna River Basin
45. Chibro
240
46. Dhakrani
33.75
47. Dhalipur
51
48. Kulhal
30
49. Khodri
120
50. Galogi
3
51. Tharali
0.4
Yamuna Total
478.15
Grand Total
3594.85
Note: (P) in the bracket suggests the project is in private sector, throughout this document. The eastern Ramganga river, which is part of Sharda basin, is included in Sharda basin. Where-ever Ramganga river is mentioned in this document, it refers to Western Ramganga, which is a tributary of Ganga.
Alaknanda flowing beyond the destroyed 400 MW Vishnuprayag Project Photo: Matu Jan Sangathan
In the next table we have given available list of existing mini and micro hydropower projects in Uttarakhand, based on UREDA information.
List of projects up to 1 MW under operation:
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Basin
1
Milkhet
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda
2
Bamiyal
*
Chamoli
Alaknanda
3
Bursol
0.2
Chamoli
Alaknanda
4
Choting
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda
5
Ghagaria
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda
6
Ghagaria Extension
*
Chamoli
Alaknanda
7
Ghes
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda
8
Gulari
0.2
Chamoli
Alaknanda
9
Niti
0.025
Chamoli
Alaknanda
10
Sarma
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda Nandakini/ Maini Gad
11
Wan
0.05
Chamoli
Alaknanda
12
Bank
0.10
Chamoli
Alaknanda Pinder
13
Gamsali Bampa
0.05
Chamoli
Alaknanda Dhauliganga/Ganesh Ganga
14
Kedarnath II
0.2
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
15
Badiyakot
0.1
Bageshwar
Alaknanda
16
Kunwari
0.05
Bageshwar
Alaknanda
17
Borbalada
0.025
Bageshwar
Alaknanda Pindar/ Chhiyaldi Gad
18
Dokti
0.02
Bageshwar
Alaknanda
19
Dior IInd Phase
*
Pauri
Alaknanda/ Ganga
20
Chandrabhaga Gad
*
Tehri
Bhagirathi
21
Jakhana
0.1
Tehri
Bhagirathi Bhilangana/Balganga
22
Gangotri-I
0.1
UttarKashi
Bhagirathi Kedar Ganga
23
Kanwashram
0.1
Pauri
Ganga
24
Bilkot
0.05
Pauri
Ramganga
25
Dior Ist Phase
0.1
Pauri
Ramganga
26
Gogina II
0.05
Bageshwar
Ramganga
27
Sattshwar
0.05
Bageshwar
Ramganga
28
Toli
*
Bageshwar
Ramganga
29
Ramgarh
0.1
Nainital
Ramganga
30
Lathi
0.1
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
31
Liti
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
32
Liti-II
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
33
Ratmoli
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
34
Baghar
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
35
Baicham
0.1
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
36
Jugthana
0.1
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
37
Kanol gad
0.1
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
38
Karmi
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
39
Karmi -III
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
40
Karmi-II
0.05
Bageshwar
E Ramganga/Sharda
41
Bhikuriya Gad
0.5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
42
Kanchauti
*
Pithoragarh
Sharda
43
Lamabager
0.20
Bageshwar
Sharda Saryu
44
Lamchula
0.05
Bageshwar
Sharda Saryu
45
Tarula
0.10
Almora
Sharda Saryu/Jataya Ganga
46
Taluka
0.025
Uttarkashi
Yamuna Tons/ Gattu Gad
47
Bhadri Gad
0.02
Tehri
Yamuna
From http://ahec.org.in/, capacity of some of the projects is as per the UJVNL website. The capacity comes to 3.815 MW for the 41 projects for which capacity is available.
5 MW Motigad Project in Pithorgarh District destroyed by the floods. Photo: Emmanuel Theophilus, Himal Prakriti
Based on above two tables, in the following table we have provided an overview of operating hydropower projects and their capacity, with basin wise and size wise break up.
Uttarakhand has total of 86 existing hydropower projects, with total installed capacity of close to 3600 MW. At least eleven of these projects are in private sector with total capacity of over 503 MW. An additional about 1800 MW capacity is in central sector. It means that majority of the power generation capacity in the state is not owned by the state and there is no guarantee how much of that power would be available to the state.
Basin wise number of operating hydro projects in Uttarakhand
Basin
Large Hydro projects (above 25 MW)
Small Hydro projects (1-25 MW)
Mini-micro Hydro projects (below 1 MW)
Total Hydro projects
No of projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
Alaknanda
1
400
10
54.75
21
2.22
32
456.97
Bhagirathi
4
1794
5
56.7
4
0.4
13
1851.1
Ganga Sub basin
1
144
2
29.7
1
0.1
4
173.8
Ramganga
1
198
2
11.8
9
1.05
12
210.85
Sharda
3
415.6
4
7.7
21
4.45
28
427.75
Yamuna
5
474.75
1
3
3
0.445
9
478.195
TOTAL
15
3426.35
24
163.65
59
8.665
98
3598.665
Here we should note that as per the Union Ministry of New and Renewable Energy sources, in Uttarakhand, by March 2013, 98 small hydro schemes has been installed with total capacity of 170.82 MW. If we add the small and mini-micro projects in above table, we have 83 operating schemes with installed capacity of 172.315 MW. This mis-match is not possible to resolve since MNRE does not provide full list of operating SHPs in Uttarakhand.
Under Construction Hydropower projects in Uttarakhand In the table below we have given available list of under construction hydropower projects in Uttarakhand. Actual list of under construction projects is likely to be larger than this, since clear and upto-date information is not available on official website. Please note that this does not include the list of mini and micro hydropower projects that are under construction. Even in case of small hydro projects (1-25 MW capacity), the list is not complete. According to this list, 25 projects with 2376.3 MW capacity are under construction in Uttarakhand. 6 of them are large hydropower projects and rest 19 are small hydro projects. Of the 6 large hydropower projects, three are in private sector and three are in central sector, none in state sector.
Mountains of Muck generated by under construction 330 MW Shrinagar Hydel Project
List of under construction projects:
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
1
Srinagar
330
Pauri
Alaknanda
2
Phata- Byung
76
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
3
Singoli-Bhatwari
99
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
4
Lata Tapovan
171
Chamoli
Alaknanda
5
Tapovan Vishnugad
520
Chamoli
Alaknanda
6
Madhmaheshwar (ADB)
10
Rudrprayag
Alaknanda
7
Kaliganga-II (ADB)
6
Rudrprayag
Alaknanda
8
Bgyunderganga (P)
24.3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
9
Birahi Ganga-I (P)
24
Chamoli
Alaknanda
10
Devali (P)
13
Chamoli
Alaknanda
11
Kail ganga
5
Chamoli Pinder
Alaknanda
12
Khiraoganga (P)
4
Uttarkashi
Alaknanda
13
Sobla I
8
Pithoragarh
Alaknanda
14
Hafla
0.2
Chamoli
Alaknanda Hafla Gad
15
Nigol Gad
0.1
Chamoli
Alaknanda Nigal Gad
16
Wachham
0.50
Bageshwar
Alaknanda Pindar/SunderDhunga Gad
17
Tehri stage-II
1000
Tehri
Bhagirathi
18
Asiganga-I
4.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
19
Asiganga-II
4.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
20
Suwarigad
2
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
21
Limchagad
3.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
22
Kaldigad (ADB)
9
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
23
Balganga-II
7
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
24
Jalandhari Gad (P)
24
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
25
Kakora Gad (P)
12.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
26
Kot-Buda Kedar (P)
6
Tehri
Bhagirathi
27
Siyangad (P)
11.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
28
KotiJhala
0.2
Tehri
Bhagirathi Bal Ganga
29
Pinsward
0.05
Tehri
Bhagirathi Bal Ganga
30
Dunao
1.5
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
31
Gaudi Chida
0.25
Pauri
Ganga sub basin E Nayar
32
Rotan
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda E Ramganga/Rotan
33
Duktu
0.025
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Nati Yanki
34
Nagling
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Nagling Yanki
35
Sela
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Dhauli Ganga/ Seal Gad
36
Kutty
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali
37
Napalchu
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Piear Yanki
38
Bundi
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Pulung Gad
39
Rongkong
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda Kali/ Dangiang Yanki
40
Chiludgad
0.10
Uttarakashi
Yamuna Supin/Chilude Gad
41
Khapu Gad
0.04
Uttarakashi
Yamuna Supin/Khapu Gad
Total Under Construction 2378.115 MW
Note: Projects like Loharinag Pala, Pala Maneri, Bhairoghati and other projects along Bhagirathi upstream of Uttarkashi along the Eco Sensitive zone have been dropped from this list. Rest of the list is from the IMG report or from UJVNL website. P in the bracket indicates the project is in the private sector. ADB in the bracket indicates that the project is funded by the Asian Development Bank.
Proposed hydropower projects in Uttarakhand In following tables we have provided available list of proposed hydropower projects in the Alaknanda, Bhagirathi, Yamuna, Sharda and Ramganga basins in Uttarakhand. The list is likely to be longer than the list in these tables since full and upto-date information is not available. Also there are different agencies involved in proposing, sanctioning and executing these projects and there is no single agency which can provide comprehensive picture of what is happening in the basin. However, even this available list is frightening.
List of proposed projects in Alaknanda Basin
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Vishnugad Pipalkoti (WB)
444
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Construction to be started
2
Kotli Bhel (IB)
320
Pauri
Alaknanda
EAC ok/FAC u/consideration
3
Alaknanda (P Badrinath)
300
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EC & FC ok IA not signed
4
Devsari Dam
252
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EC & FC ok CEA concrnce?
5
Kotli Bhel II
530
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
EAC ok/FAC u/consideration
6
Bowla Nandprayag
300
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EAC TOR Approved
7
Tamak Lata
280
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EC ok, DPR under revision
8
Nand Prayag
100
Alaknanda
DPR returned
9
Jelam Tamak
108
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EAC ok in June 2013
10
Maleri Jelam
55
Chamoli
Alaknanda
PFR prepared
11
Rishiganga I
70
Chamoli
Alaknanda
PFR prepared
12
Rishiganga II
35
Chamoli
Alaknanda
PFR prepared
13
Gohana Tal
60
Chamoli
Alaknanda
PFR prepared
14
Rambara
24
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
IMG report
15
Birahi Ganga-II (P)
24
Chamoli
Alaknanda
DPR under revision
16
Melkhet (P)
56
Chamoli
Alaknanda Pinder
Proposed
17
Urgam-II
3.8
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Under S&I
18
Bhyunder Ganga
243
Chamoli
Alaknanda
FC under consideration
19
Nand Pyayag Langasu
141
Chamoli
Alaknanda
EAC TOR Approved
20
Rambara
76
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
EAC TOR u/consideration
21
Bagoli
90
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
22
Bangri
44
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Pinder
23
Madhya Maheshwar
350
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
24
Ming Nalgaon
114
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Pinder
25
Padli
66
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
26
Thapli
44
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
27
Utyasu-I
70
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
28
Utyasu-II
205
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
29
Utyasu-III
195
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
30
Utyasu-IV
125
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
31
Utyasu-V
80
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
32
Utyasu-VI
70
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
33
Rampur Tilwari
25
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
34
Chunni semi
24
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed Mandakini
35
Kosa
24
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
36
Vijay nagar- Rampur
20
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
37
Nandakini-III
19.5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
38
Nayar
17
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
Nayar
39
Alaknanda I
15
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
40
Buara
14
Bageshwar
Alaknanda
Pindar
41
Duna Giri
10
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
42
Alaknanda II
10
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
43
Balkhila-II
10
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
44
Mandani Ganga
10
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Mandakini Mandani ganga
45
Rishiganga
8.25
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
46
Subhain
8
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
47
Son
7
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Mandakini son gad
48
Kalp ganga
6.25
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed kalpganga
49
Lustar
6
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Mandakini Lustar
50
Madhya maheshwar -II
6
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Mandakini madmaheshwar
51
Hom 6
6
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
52
Amrit ganga
6
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Amrit ganga balsuti gadera
53
Gaddi
5.25
Chamoli
Alaknanda
dhauliganga Gaddi Gadera
54
Deval
5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
55
Ghrit Ganga
5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
56
Jumma
5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
57
Ringi
5.5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga
58
Tamak
5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
59
Balkhila-I
5.5
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed Balkhila
60
Basti -I
4
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
61
Basti -II
4
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
62
Laxmanganga
4
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
63
Nil ganga
3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
64
Santodhar – I
2
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
W Nayar
65
Santodhar – II
2
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
W Nayar
66
Birahiganga
4.8
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
67
Byaligaon
2.25
Pauri
Ganga sub basin
E Nayar
68
Ghirit Ganga
1.3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
69
Jummagad
1.2
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
70
Kailganga
3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
71
Kakra
1
Rudraprayag
Alaknanda
Proposed
72
Kali Ganga
3
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
73
Garud Ganga
0.6
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Proposed
74
Gansali Bampa
0.05
Chamoli
Alaknanda
Dhauliganga/Ganesh Ganga
Alaknanda Total
5199.25
List of proposed projects in Bhagirathi Basin
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Kotli Bhel (IA)
195
Pauri
Bhagirathi
EC/FAC stage 1
2
Jhalakoti (P)
12.5
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed dharamganga
3
Bhilangana II A
24
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
4
Karmali
140
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
IMG, on Eco-sensitive zone?
5
Jadhganga
50
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
IMG: PFR prepared
6
Bhilangana IIB
24
Tehri
Bhagirathi
Under S&I
7
Bhilangana IIC
24
Tehri
Bhagirathi
Under S&I
8
Pilangad-II
4
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
9
Bhela Tipri
100
Uttarakashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
10
Nelong
190
Uttarakashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
11
Asiganga-III
9
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
12
Gangani (P)
8
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
13
Balganga-I
5
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed
14
Khirao ganga
4
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
15
Lagrasu (P)
3
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed
16
Songad
3
Uttarkashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
17
Jalandhari Gad
3
Uttarakashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
18
Jalkurgad I
2
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed jalkur gad
19
Rataldhara
0.4
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed Jalkur Gad
20
Lamb Gaon
0.4
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed Jalkur gad
21
Dhatirmouli
0.4
Tehri Garhwal
Bhagirathi
Proposed Jalkurgad
22
Gangi-Richa
0.2
Tehri Tehri
Bhagirathi
Bhilangana/ Re Gad
Bhagirathi Total
801.9
List of proposed projects in W Ramganga Basin
Golden Mahseer in Ramganga
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Babas Dam
88
Almora
Ramganga
Proposed
2
Khati
63
Bagehwar
Ramganga
Proposed
3
Lumi
54
Bagehwar
Ramganga
Proposed
4
Kuwargarh
45
Bagehwar
Ramganga
Proposed
5
Bawas Gaon
34
Nainital
Ramganga
Proposed
6
Jamrani Dam
30
Ramganga
Proposed
7
Khutani
18
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
8
Sarju Stage-II (P)
15
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
9
Sarju Stage-III (P)
10.5
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
10
Sheraghat
10
Almora
Ramganga
Kho
11
Baura
14
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
12
Sarju Stage-I (P)
7.5
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
13
Balighat
5.5
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed
14
MehalChaura-I
4
Pithoragarh
Ramganga
Proposed
15
MehalChaura-II
3
Pithoragarh
Ramganga
Proposed
16
Agarchatti
2
Pithoragarh
Ramganga
Proposed
17
Kho I
2
Pauri
Ramganga
Kho
18
Kho II
2
Pauri
Ramganga
Proposed
19
Harsila
0.7
Bageshwar
Ramganga
Proposed harsila gad
20
Kalsa
0.3
Nainital
Ramganga
Proposed
Ramganga Total
408.5
List of proposed projects in Sharda Basin
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Mapang Bogudhiyar (P)
200
Pithoragarh
Sharda
EAC TOR Approved
2
Bogudhiyar Sarkaribhyol (P)
170
Pithoragarh
Sharda
EAC TOR Approved
3
Sarkaribhyol Rupsiabagar
210
Pithoragarh
Sharda
EAC TOR Approved
4
Rupsiabagar Khasiabara
260
Pithoragarh
Sharda
EAC Ok / FAC Rejected
5
Bokang Baling
330
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed THDC
6
Chungar Chal
240
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed NHPC
7
East Ram Ganga Dam
30
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
8
Khartoli Lumti Talli
55
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
9
Budhi
192
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
10
Garba Tawaghat
610
Pithoragarh
Sharda-Mahakali
Proposed NHPC
11
Garbyang
131
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
12
Lakhanpur
160
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
13
Malipa
138
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
14
Pancheshwar
6000
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Indo Nepal Project
15
Purnagiri Dam
1000
Champawat
Sharda
Indo Nepal Project
16
Tawaghat – Tapovan
105
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
17
Taopvan Kalika
160
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
18
Tapovan Chunar
485
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
19
Sela Urthing
230
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
20
Urthing Sobla (P)
340
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
21
Sobla Jhimjingao
145
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
22
Kalika – Baluwakot
120
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Mahakali
23
Kalika Dantu
230
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
24
Dhauliganga Intermediate
200
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed NHPC
25
Gauriganga III A & B
140
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed NHPC
26
Madkini (P)
39
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
27
Burthing – Purdam
5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed Jakula
28
Jimbagad
7.7
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
29
Suringad-II
5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
30
Tanga (P)
5
Pithoraharh
Sharda
Proposed
31
Tankul
12
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
32
Motighat (P)
5
Pithoraharh
Sharda
Proposed
33
Painagad
9
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed
34
PhuliBagar- Kwiti
4
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Proposed Jakula
35
Kumeria- Garjia (Bawas)
12.5
Nainital
Sharda
Kosi
36
Balgad
8
Pithoragarh
Sharda
E Ramganga
37
Kuti SHP
6
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Maha Kali/ Kuti yangti
38
Palang SHP
6.5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Maha Kali/ Plang gad
39
Najyang SHP
5.5
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Maha Kali/ Najyang gad
40
Simkhola SHP
8.75
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Maha Kali/ Simkhola gad
41
Birthi
1
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Balchinn
42
Baram
1
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Dhauli Ganga/ Baram Gad
43
Unchiya
0.05
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Dhauli Ganga/ Khari Gad
44
Murtoli
0.02
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Goriganga/ Martoligad
45
Burphu
0.03
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Goriganga/ Martoligad
46
Ralam
0.03
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Goriganga/ Ralangad
47
Ram Gad-II
0.1
Nainital
Sharda
Kosi/ Ramgad
48
Watcm
0.1
Pithoragarh
Sharda
Ramgad E/ Watchraila
Total Sharda Basin
12022.28
List of proposed projects in Yamuna Basin
SN
Project
Ins Cap (MW)
Dist
Sub-Basin
Status
1
Lakhwar
300
Dehradun
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
2
Vyasi
120
Dehradun
Yamuna
EAC Recommended
3
Arakot Tuni
81
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
4
Tuni Plasu
66
Dehradun
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
5
Mori-Hanol (P)
63
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
6
Naitwar Mori (Dewari Mori)
60
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC Recommended
7
Hanol Tuni (P)
60
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC Recommended
8
Jakhol Sankri
45
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
EAC TOR Approved
9
Kishau
600
Dehradun
Yamuna
Proposed
10
Chammi Naingaon
540
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
11
Chatra Dam
300
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
12
Taluka Sankri
140
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
13
Taluka Dam
112
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
14
Sankri Mori
78
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
15
Barkot Kuwa
42
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
16
Hanuman Chatti Sianachatti
33
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
17
Barnigad Naingaon
30
Uttarakashi
Yamuna
Proposed
18
Rupin Stage V (P)
24
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
19
Damta – Naingaon
20
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
20
Tons
14.4
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
21
Supin
11.2
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
22
Rupin Stage IV (P)
10
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
23
Rupin Stage III (P)
8
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
24
Barnigad
6.5
Uttarakashi
Bhagirathi
Proposed
25
Pabar
5.2
Dehradun
Yamuna
Proposed
26
Badyar (P)
3
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed
27
Lagrasu
3
Tehri
Yamuna
Proposed
28
Rayat (P)
3
Tehri
Yamuna
Proposed
29
Ringali
1
Tehri Garhwal
Yamuna
Proposed Aglar Ringaligad
30
Purkul
1
Dehradun
Yamuna
Tons
31
Paligad
0.3
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Proposed Paligad
32
Rikhani Gad
0.05
Uttarkashi
Yamuna
Rikhanigad
33
Bijapur
0.2
Dehradun
Yamuna
Tons
Yamuna Total
2780.85 MW
Grand Total
21212.78 MW
Note: EAC: Expert Appraisal Committee of MoEF; FAC: Forest Advisory Committee of MoEF; EC: Environment Clearance: FC: Forest Clearance; TOR: Terms of Reference (of EIA); for Alaknanda, the first 17 projects are listed as given in IMG report and for Bhagirathi first 8 projects are as listed in IMG report. However, many of these projects have been recommended to be dropped by the WII (Wildlife Institute of India) report. Also, IMG and other have said that no further projects should be taken up in Bhagirathi and Alaknanda basins. The projects listed above in the Bhagirathi basin beyond serial number 8 and those in Alaknanda basin beyond 17 would, in any case, not be taken up.
In the table below we have provided and overview of proposed hydropower projects in Uttarakhand based on the information from above five tables.
Overview of Proposed Hydropower Projects in Uttarakhand
Basin
Large Hydro projects (above 25 MW)
Small Hydro projects (1-25 MW)
Mini-micro Hydro projects (below 1 MW)
Total Hydro projects
No of projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
Alaknanda
29
4823
43
375.6
2
0.65
74
5199.25
Bhagirathi
5
675
13
125.5
4
1.4
22
801.9
Ramganga
6
314
12
93.5
2
1
20
408.5
Sharda
26
11920
16
101.95
6
0.33
48
12022.28
Yamuna
17
2670
13
110.3
3
0.55
33
2780.85
TOTAL
83
20402
97
806.85
17
3.93
197
21212.78
Overview of hydropower projects in Uttarakhand In the table below we have put together the number and capacities of existing, under construction and proposed hydropower projects in various basins of Uttarakhand. Uttarakhand government has plans to have total of 337 hydropower projects with total capacity of 27191.89 MW. Largest number (124) of such projects are in Alaknanda basin, the largest capacity is proposed to be in Sharda basin at 12450.905 MW.
In the table below we have given basin wise figures of total large, small and mini-micro hydropower proejcts (including existing, under construction and proposed) projects in Uttarakhand. According to Union Ministry of New and Renewable energy, total potential of small hydro in Uttarakhand is 1707.87 MW from 448 small hydro projects. If we take that into account the figures in the following tabes would change (go up) accordingly.
Basin wise total capacities for large, small and mini HEPs in Uttarakhand
Basin
Large Hydro projects (above 25 MW)
Small Hydro projects (1-25 MW)
Mini-micro hydro projects (<1 MW)
Total Hydro projects
No of projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
Alaknanda
35
6419
61
524.65
26
3.67
122
6947.32
Bhagirathi
10
3469
28
266.7
10
2.05
48
3737.75
Ganga Sub basin
1
144
3
31.2
2
0.35
6
175.55
Ramganga
7
512
14
105.3
11
2.05
32
619.35
Sharda
29
12335.6
20
109.65
35
5.155
84
12450.405
Yamuna
22
3144.75
14
113.3
8
1.135
44
3259.185
TOTAL
104
26024.35
140
1150.8
92
14.41
336
27189.56
In the table below we have given basin wise figures of existing, under construction and proposed hydropower projects of all sizes in Uttarakhand.
Overview of all Hydropower projects in Uttarakhand
Basin
Existing Hydro projects
Under construction projects
Proposed hydropower projects
Total Hydro projects
No of projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
No of Projects
Capacity, MW
Alaknanda
32
456.97
16
1291.1
74
5199.25
122
6947.32
Bhagirathi
13
1851.5
13
1084.75
22
801.9
48
3737.75
Ganga Sub basin
4
173.8
2
1.75
–
–
6
175.55
Ramganga
12
210.8
–
–
20
408.5
32
619.35
Sharda
28
427.75
8
0.375
48
12022.28
84
12450.405
Yamuna
9
478.195
2
0.14
33
2780.85
44
3259.185
TOTAL
98
3598.665
41
2378.115
197
21212.78
336
27189.56
Basin Maps Maps of Hydroelectric Projects in various sub basins of Uttarakhand are available at the following links. Please note that the maps are based on information available when the maps were created in 2011:
How do the hydropower projects increase the scale of disaster?
This is a question that a lot of journalists and TV anchors have been asking me since the Uttarakhand disaster. Here is a quick response:
Þ Almost all hydropower projects of Uttarakhand involve deforestation. Deforestation directly increases the potential of erosion, landslides and floods since water now just runs off to the rivers. Moreover the compensatory afforestation and catchment area treatment, even when done, usually involves planting of commercially important variety of trees like pine and teak and not broad leaf tress like oaks which not only adds humus in the soil, but also allows rich under growth. Pine does not allow this to happen. This change in character of forests is something Gandhiji’s disciple Mira Behen has been warning since independence, but there is little impact of this on the forest department.
Þ In fact largest proportion of deforestation in Uttarakhand has happened basically for hydropower projects.
Þ All run of the river projects involve building of a dam, diversion structure, desilting mechanism, tunnels which could have length of 5 to 30 km and width sufficient to carry three trains side by side, as also roads, townships, mining, among other components. All of these components increase the disaster potential of the area in one or the other way. Cumulative impacts of all the components of any one project and all projects together in a given basin is likely to be larger than the addition of the impacts of individual projects in many cases.
Þ Massive blasting of massive proportions is involved in construction of all these components, which adds to landslide risks. In fact Uttarakhand’s Disaster Mitigation and Management Centre in their report of Oct 2012 after the Okhimath disaster of Sept 2012 recommended that no blasting should be allowed for any development activity anywhere in Uttarakhand, but Uttarakhand government did nothing about this recommendation.
Þ The massive tunneling by itself weakens the young and fragile Himalayan mountains, increasing the disaster potential.
Þ Each of the hydropower project generates immense amount of muck in tunneling, blasting and other activities. A large hydropower project could typically generate millions of cubic meters of muck. The large projects are supposed to have muck disposal plan, with land acquired for muck disposal, transportation of muck to the designated sites above the High Flood levels, creation of safety walls and stabilization process. But all this involves costs. The project developers and their contractors find it easier to dump this muck straight into the nearby rivers. In the current floods, this illegally dumped muck created massive disaster in downstream areas in case of 330 MW Srinagar HEP, the 76 MW Phata Byung HEP and the 99 MW Singoli Bhatwari HEP. When the flooded rivers carry this muck, boulders and other debris, has much greater erosion capacity and also leaves behind massive heaps of this muck in the flooded area. In Srinagar town about 100 houses are buried in 10-30 feet depth of muck. Such debris laden rivers also create massive landslides along the banks.
Muck Disposal directly into the Alaknanda river by Srinagar Project Photo: Matu janSangathan
Þ Wrong operation of hydropower projects can also create greater disasters in the downstream areas. For example the operators of 400 MW Vishnuprayag HEP on Alaknanda river did not open the gates when the river was flooded on June 16-17, possibly to maximize power generation. However, this lead to accumulation of massive quantities of boulders (for photos of dam filled with such boulders see: http://matuganga.blogspot.in/) behind the dam, so much so that that there was no space for water to flow. The river then bypassed the dam and started flowing by the side of the dam, creating a new path for its flow. This created a sudden flashflood in the downstream area, creating a new disaster there.
Boulders devouring the Vishnuprayag Project. 26th June 2013 Photo: Matu jan Sangathan
Þ The incomplete, broken and ill designed protection wall of the Maneri Bhali projects in Uttarkashi lead to erosion and landslides in the downstream areas.
DAMAGED HYDRO PROJECTSA large number of hydropower projects are likely to have suffered damage due to the flood disaster in Uttarakhand. Some of the projects that have suffered damage include:
According to the update from http://www.energylineindia.com/on June 27, 2013, the 520 MW under construction Tapovan Vishnugad HEP has suffered damaged by rains on June 16, 2013: “While construction of diversion tunnel was completed in April this year, the same was washed away due to heavy rains on June 16. Diversion dyke has washed away and damages have been observed in chormi adit approach road. In August last year, the flash floods had caused serious damages in the coffer dam of the project.”
76 MW Phata Byung HEP of Lanco in Mandakini Valley in Uttarakhand
99 MW Singoli Bhatwari HEP of L&T in Mandakini Valley in Uttarakhand NDTV India reported that the water level of the river has gone up due to the silt dumped by dams. This is likely to be due to the Phata Byung and Singholi Bhatwari HEPs.
Assiganga projects on Assiganga river in Bhagirathi basin in Uttarakhand
5 MW Motighat I HEP in Goriganga basin in Pithoragarh (Himalprakriti report)
280 Dhauliganga Project of NHPC in Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand (reports said the power house was submerged, but is now working, part of the township was submerged.)
The Himalaya Hydro (HH) Tanga Phase I for 5 MW, located along the Paina gad in Goriganga basin, is badly damaged. The dam has got smashed by a deluge of huge boulders. One sluice gate is torn through. The metal filter-gates are all choked with boulder debris, and the remnant concrete and gate pulleys of the dam are now stranded mid-river, with both banks eroded and the river now running along the true-left bank. (Himalprakriti report)
The UREDA 500 KW Motigad microhydel on Moti gadh (a tributary of Paina gadh) at Bindi (Dani Bagad) is also badly damaged. The water has broken through the wall, cut under the foundation, inundated the turbines with water and debris, and smashed the housing for the electrical distribution system. (Himalprakriti report)
The 5.5′ diameter head race waterpipes taking water to the HH Phase II, located on the Gori opposite Seraghat, has also been damaged. The generator and housing for the HH Ph II has collapsed into the river. All this damage is said to have happened on the evening of 17th June. People working as non-skilled labour have been sent home for a few months, but welding work on the new pipes feeding the powerhouse is still underway! (Himalprakriti report)
Down to Earth (http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/hydropower-projects-suffer-severe-damage) has given some details of damage to some of the hydropower projects, quoting UJVNL sources. It says: 19 small hydropower projects have been completely destroyed, while others have been damaged by the raging waters (see table below)
Project
Location
Capacity
Estimated Loss
Dhauli Ganga
Pithoragarh
280 MW
Rs 30 crore (project completely submerged)
Kaliganga I
Rudraprayag
4 MW
Rs 18-19 crore (power house and 4 houses washed away)
Kaliganga II
Rudraprayag
6 MW
Rs 16 crore (power house and 4 houses washed away)
In addition, a large number of projects had to stop generation temporarily due to high silt content, including Maneri Bhali I and II, Tanakpur, Dhauli Ganga, Kali Ganga I, some of the Yamuna basin projects among others.
Conclusion This article was intended to give an overview of hydropower projects in Uttarakhand. However, we should add that there are many glaring issues related to these hydropower projects, some of the key issues include:
Most of these projects are out of the environmental governance. Projects below 25 MW do not require EIA, Social Impact Assessment, public consultation, environmental clearance, environmental management plan or monitoring. This is clearly wrong as all projects have environmental impacts, and they are particularly serious in Himalayan region with multiple vulnerabilities. We have for years demanding that all projects above 1 MW should need environment clearance, EIA and so on.
Even for projects above 25 MW we do not have any credible environmental or social impact assessment. Former Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh is on record having accepted that most EIAs are dishonest cut and paste jobs. We do not have any credible process in place to ensure that EIAs are proper and those that are not are rejected and consultants are black listed. Jairam Ramesh did put in place a process of registration of EIA consultants under the Quality Council of India, but that is completely non transparent, unaccountable and ineffective process. It is amazing that reputed NGOs like the Centre for Science and Environment are on board of this process, but they have completely failed to achieve any change and have chosen to remain quiet.
The Environment clearances of the River Valley Projects (which includes hydro projects and dams) is considered by the Expert Appraisal Committee on River Valley Projects appointed by Union Ministry of Environment and Forests. However, the ministry chooses members of the EAC such that they rarely object to any project. As per SANDRP analysis in six years ending in Dec 2012, the EAC had not said NO to any project for environment clearance. Its appraisal of projects, EIAs, public consultation process and its own minutes were found to be inconsistent, unscientific and loaded in favour of the project developers.
Our environment compliance system is non-existing. The projects are supposed to implement the environment management plan pari passu with the project work, they are supposed to follow the conditions of environment clearance, follow the environmental norms, but who is there to ensure this actually happens? The Union Ministry of Environment and Forests which is supposed to ensure this compliance has no capacity the officials tell us. The officials do not have time to even check if six monthly compliance reports are being submitted or make any surprise visits. However they do not even seem to have will, since we have seen no change in this situation for decades. Nor do they seem to have willingness, since even when NGOs present photographic and video and other evidence of violations they refuse to take action.
One way to achieve compliance is to have a project monitoring committee for each project where over 50% of the members are from local communities and other independent persons and such committees ok must be required each stage for the project to go ahead. We have been suggesting this for long, but the MoEF has shown no willingness to follow this.
More pertinently, none of the assessment reports look at the impact on the disaster potential of the area. Each of these projects have significant impact on the disaster potential of the area, particularly in the context of a vulnerable state like Uttarakhand. This should be a must for all such projects.
Similarly the projects must also be assessed in the context of climate change, again in vulnerable area like the Himalayas. How the project will impact the local climate, how it will have impact on adoption capacity of the local communities and also how the project itself will be impacted in changing climate. This again we have been writing to the MoEF numerous times, but without any success so far.
Most significantly, the only impact assessments that we have is for specific projects of over 25 MW capacity. However, we have no credible cumulative impact assessment for any of the river basins of Uttarakhand, which also takes into account carrying capacity of the river basins and all the interventions that are happening in the basins. As our critique of so called cumulative impact assessment of Bhagirathi-Alaknanda basins done by AHEC of IIT Roorkee shows (see: http://www.sandrp.in/hydropower/Pathetic_Cumulative_Impact_Assessment_of_Ganga_Hydro_projects.pdf), it was not much of a cumulative impact assessment. WII (Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun) report was somewhat better within the mandate given to it (assessment of hydro projects on aquatic and terrestrial biodiversity), but the most important recommendation of the WII report that at least 24 projects should be dropped has not been accepted by the MoEF, so what is the use of the cumulative impact assessment in such a situation?
Unless we address all of the above issues in a credible way, there is little wisdom in going ahead with more hydropower projects in Uttarakhand.They will invite greater disasters. Uttarakhand has many other options for development.
Firstly people of Uttarakhand should get first right over all the power that is getting generated within Uttarakhand.
Secondly, this is not a plea for no projects, but to address the crucial issues without addressing which we are in no situation to even know the impacts or address the issues.
Thirdly, Uttarakhand needs to take up power generation options that do not accentuate the disaster potential of the area. Such options include micro hydro, hydro kinetics, and solar and biomass based power in addition to better utilization of existing infrastructure.
Going ahead with more hydropower projects in current situation would be invitation to greater disasters. In fact, the Uttarakhand government should not allow even the damaged and under construction hydropower projects until al the conditions mentioned above are satisfied.
Some of the hydropower projects that have surely seem to have added to the disaster proportions of current Uttarakhand flood disaster include the 400 MW Vishnuprayag HEP, the 280 MW Dhauliganga HEP, the 330 MW Shrinagar HEP, the 304 and 90 MW Maneribhali II and I HEPs, the 99 MW Singoli Bhatwari HEP and the 76 MW Phata Byung HEP, the last two on Mandakini river.
In response to my question on a programme on Headlinestoday channel anchored by Rahul Kanwal on July 8, 2013 (in presence of panel that also included Dr Vandana Shiva and Vimlendu Jha), the Uttarakhand Chief Minister Shri Vijay Bahuguna agreed that he will institute an enquiry into the damage due to these hydropower projects and hold them accountable for such damage.
Let us see how soon and how independent and credible enquiry he institutes.
– Himanshu Thakkar
South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (www.sandrp.in) July 2013
Central Water Commission, India’s premier technical body under Union Ministry of Water Resources, has once again failed in the Uttarakhand flood disaster. Even as the Uttarakhand state faced the worst floods in its history, CWC, which has been given the task of forecasting floods across flood prone areas all over India, completely failed in making any forecasts that could have helped the people and administration in Uttarakhand.
First principle of disaster management is prior warning. With prior warning, significant proportion of possible damages and destruction can be avoided. In that respect, one expected that CWC would play a key role in forecasting the floods. SANDRP has been monitoring CWC flood forecasts throughout the monsoon for some years. During June 15-17, when Uttarakhand was receiving the most intense rains, CWC did not make any forecasts regarding Uttarakhand. As far as the most severely disaster affected areas of Ganga basin upstream of Devprayag are concerned (these include the worst affected Kedarnath and Mandakini valley, the Gangotri and Bhagirathi valley and Badrinath in Alaknanda valley), CWC has made no flood forecasts at all this year. Same is the case regarding other affected regions of Uttarakhand including Yamuna basin including Yamunotri and Pithoragarh including Goriganga basin. What is than the role of this premier technical body tasked with flood forecasting?
The only forecast that CWC made for Uttarakhand this June 2013 were for Rishikesh and Haridwar on June 18, 2013. Even in these instances, CWC’s callousness is reflected. For example, by the fact that normally when flood forecasts are made for any site in the first place, the forecasts would be low flood forecast (where water level is between warning and danger level for the site), and only in next stage, would medium flood forecast would be made (water level above danger level). However, in case of both Rishikesh and Haridwar, CWC straightaway made medium flood forecasts, clearly missing the low flood forecasts.
In fact looking at the CWC flood forecasting site (http://www.india-water.com/ffs/index.htm), we notice that in entire Uttarakhand state, CWC has only three flood forecasting sites: Srinagar, Rishikesh and Hridwar, which means CWC would not be doing any forecasts for the most vulnerable regions of Uttarakhand in any case! Even in case of Srinagar (which actually suffered the worst floods with hundreds of damaged houses), CWC site says the Highest flood level is 536.85 m, amazingly, below the warning level of 539 m! This means that CWC has never forecast flood at that site and even if water level goes above HFL, it won’t forecast any floods since level could still be well below the warning level? Can one imagine a more callous technical body?
The callous performance of CWC does not end there. During June 2-7 this year, CWC flood forecasting site as also the flood forecasting site of NDMA which also depends on CWC, stopped functioning. After numerous emails and phone calls from SANDRP, the website started functioning on June 7, 2013 and Shri V D Roy, Director (Flood Forecasting Management) of CWC wrote to us, “Due to technical reasons, the CWC FF site was not working since 2nd June. With consistent effort, the website was made functional w e f 7th June”.
Pointing out a major blunder of CWC, we had written to CWC on June 12, 2013, “CWC forecast site reported that water level of Brahmaputra river at Neamatighat site in Jorhat district in Assam had reached 94.21 m at 0900 hrs (on June 11, 2013), which was 6.84 m above the highest flood level of the site at 87.37 m. The FF site also forecast that the level will be 94.15 m at 0900 am on June 12, 2013, that is today. Both the recording and forecast were clearly wrong, rather way off the mark. The site or the area in question or upstream and down stream levels do not match with what the CWC site said y’day.” Needless to add there was no floods in Brahmaputra in spite of such forecast by India’s highest technical body! CWC is yet to respond to our emails on this issue.
It is strange that CWC, in stead of putting its house in order, is acting as a lobby for big dams by making baseless claims about Tehri dam having saved downstream area of floods, as reported by Indian Express[i] on June 25, 2013. This is like adding salt to the wounds of the people of Uttarakhand who are suffering from the ill effects of lopsided developments including dams and hydropower projects. It would be better if CWC tries to improve its flood forecasts rather than indulging in such lobbying efforts at such times of crisis.
CWC needs to seriously consider including key sites of Uttarakhand into its flood forecasting sites, even if the the duration available for such forecasting is smaller. In times of crisis even a few hours notice can save many lives and also help save other losses.
8th April 2014, 11 year old Radhika Gurung studying in standard fourth was accompanying her sisters Chandra and Maya along the river Teesta near Bardang, Sikkim. Suddenly, without having any time to respond, all three school girls were washed away by a forceful water released by upstream 510 MW Teesta V Hydropower project in Sikkim. While Maya and Chandra were lucky to be saved, Radhika was not so lucky. She lost her life. Residents here say that NHPC, the dam operator, does not sound any sirens or alarms while releasing water in the downstream for producing hydroelectricity and villagers live in constant fear of the river.
nuary 2012, a family of seven people, including a child, drowned in the Cauvery River when water was released from the 30 MW Bhavani Kattalai Barrage-II (BKBII in Tamil Nadu). The same day, two youths were also swept off and drowned in the same river due to this release.
s of the Chalakudy River near the Athirappilly falls in Kerala and the Kadar tribes, which traditionally stay close to the river and are skilled fisher folk too, are fearful of entering the river.
east 70 people were killed at Dharaji in Dewas district of Madhya Pradesh due to sudden release of huge quantity of water from the upstream Indira Sagar Dam on Narmada river. Principal Secretary Water Resources Madhya Pradesh inquired into the incident and found that “there was no coordination between agencies”
