(Feature Image: Waterlogged Red Fort after heavy rainfall and rising Yamuna river water level in New Delhi on Friday (July 14, 2023). Image Credit: ANI/Gulf News)
In absence of any official report so far, the causes behind unusual flood spell in Delhi in July 2023 remains to be fully explained, understood and addressed. Amid this, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Water Resources in its 27th report which was presented in Lok Sabha on February 06, 2024 has in a welcome step, deliberated on the issue under Chapter X titled “Role of Barrages on River Yamuna and Flood Management in Delhi” (60 to 66 pages) and has recommended some measures (page 86-88) to avoid its reoccurrence.
A careful reading of the chapter has only compounded the flood mystery and thrown some questions on the operation and management of Wazirabad and ITO barrages. The report has also revealed some contradictory and confusing statements by Central Water Commission (CWC), Upper Yamuna River Board (UYRB) and Haryana Government.
1. CWC, Haryana Govt Find No Role of ITO Barrage in Delhi Floods?
The Parliamentary Committee has inquired into the role of ITO barrage in Delhi floods, reasons behind non-functioning of barrage gates and issues related with its ownership and management. The barrage was in the center of controversy when 5 of its 32 gates (gate no. 28 to 32) could not be opened during peak flood spell in July 2023.
As per the report the parliamentary committee had visited ITO barrage on 23 August 2023 and later on documented replies provided by the Govt of India’s Department of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation (DoWR, RD & GR) on the issue.
The ITO barrage (also named as Yamuna barrage) was built in 1966-67 by the Haryana Irrigation Department to meet cooling water requirement of Indraprastha Power Station and Rajghat Power House of Delhi govt. The operation and maintenance of the barrage was assigned to Haryana Irrigation Department. In course of time, both the power stations have been non-operational since December 2009 and May 2015 respectively.
As per the DoWR, RD & GR, the function of ITO barrage is not for regulation of flood water and it has no role in flood management in Delhi. It further states that all the gates of the barrage should be kept open for passing of flood water in the river.
CWC: On the question of non-functioning of ITO barrage gates and flooding in Delhi the DoWR, RD & GR in writing informed the committee that an expert team from CWC visited the ITO Barrage on 27 July 2023 and observed that the main cause of non-functioning of these gates is heavy silting up downstream of gates & poor maintenance of hydromechanical equipment. The CWC also found the rope connection to the gate or counter in some bays were detached.
Haryana Government: The Haryana government had then informed the CWC that there was no direct flow of flood water from gates number 28 to 32 due to growth of a heavy jungle and sandy bela (shoal) in front these gates. As per Haryana government the vegetation growth is part of DDA nursery and since 2015 Haryana government has been requesting DDA to remove the same. It further informed the CWC that since it was not land-owning agency; the DDA & Delhi government are responsible to keep the riverbed free from encroachment and carry desilting in its territory.
According to the Haryana government the riverbed in upstream and downstream of the 5 closed gates is silted upto 2.4 ft above crest level of gates and only 2 ft passage would be available for flood waters if these gates were in fully opened position. Strangely, it seems the Haryana government has even claimed that the more discharge passed through gate no. 28 to 32 when in closed position.
Regarding non-maintenance of ITO barrage gates, the Haryana government informed the CWC that the Indraprastha Power Generation Company Ltd (IPGCL) has refused to pay it operation and maintenance charges (O&M) since 2018 hampering the O&M of the barrage and functioning of gates.
The Haryana government blamed siltation of river and back flow in Sen Nursing Home drain (No. 11) and Delhi Gate Drain (No. 10) for flooding at Rajghat and Ring Road areas. Similarly, it held damages to Head Regulator of Drain No. 12 responsible for flooding at ITO chowk and adjoining areas including WHO and Supreme Court buildings.
Concluding its reply to CWC, the Haryana government again claimed that the non-opening of 5 gates (No.28 to 32) has no impact or role in flooding in Delhi.
Interestingly, neither the CWC nor the Parliamentary committee scrutinized these confusing and contradictory claims of Haryana government. Further, there is no official information on since when exactly the gates were in closed position.
It is proven fact that the dams and barrages have design discharge capacity. These structures cover a significant flowing portion of rivers’ floodplain and require to keep all the gates open during peak flood events, otherwise the structures can face damages or worsen flood situation in up and downstream areas.
CWC: Without any thorough investigation, the CWC too suggests that the 5 closed gates of ITO barrage caused no back flows during floods stating that there was no incident of embankment breach or spill over at ITO. It said the Tibetan market near ISBT to Red Fort, which areas faced inundation, are about 8-10 km upstream ITO barrage. Further, the CWC mentions that the 5 gates of ITO barrage were closed due to growth of vegetation and siltation and water remained in stagnant condition even after opening of gate number 32.
2. ITO Barrage: Ownership, Management, Utility Issues Unresolved
CWC: On the question of steps taken to prevent reoccurrence of such flood situation in Delhi, the DoWR, RD & GR in written submission states that Haryana government is responsible for maintaining the ITO barrage. The CWC renders technical advice on the request of state government and it got no such request for upkeep of ITO barrage in recent years.
The CWC replies also present the divergent views of Haryana and Delhi government regarding ownership and maintenance of ITO barrage.
Haryana Government: The Haryana government has shifted the blame on Delhi government for violating interstate agreement and for stopping O&M funds for the barrage.
Delhi Government: There is just one line on the view of Delhi as per which Delhi government states that it has better technical capacity to maintain and operate the ITO barrage and has asked the Haryana government response to hand over the barrage to it. Presently there is no progress in the matter.
UYRB: On the question of lack of intervention by UYRB in resolving the ownership and O&M issues of ITO barrage, the UYRB has informed Parliamentary committee that UYRB intervention is required only when there is any dispute in regulation of flow from the structure but at present, no water is diverted from ITO barrage for use by any State.
Future Plan for ITO barrage: The UYRB has also revealed that the governments of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh during 02 April 2015 meeting decided to plan utilization of available water at ITO barrage for further distribution amongst Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Rajasthan states at Okhla. Hence, it is not feasible for Haryana to transfer the control of Barrage to Delhi.
Delhi Government not invited in ITO barrage meeting: Referring to Haryana government replies, the MoWR, RD & GR stated that the Delhi government was not invited in the meeting because it was conducted to resolve bilateral disagreements between Haryana and Uttar Pradesh regarding delivery of allocated share of water at Okhla barrage as decided in 42nd meeting of UYRB in 2012.
Joint Study on Flood Management and ITO barrage utility: Regarding MoWR, RD & GR stand on ITO barrage ownership issue, the department informed the Parliamentary committee that it has formed a CWC committee on 06 August 2023 for joint flood management study of river Yamuna stretch between Hathni Kund and Okhla Barrage and one of the scopes of this study is to review the utility of ITO barrage in present context.
3. Blame on Wazirabad Barrage; Discharge Figure Questionable
Deliberating on the unprecedented flood situation in Delhi, the MoWR, RD & GR referring to CWC information has revealed some astounding figures on water discharges though Hathni Kund, Wazirabad and Okhla barrages in second week of July 2023. As per the CWC the peak flood water discharges from these barrages were recorded as:
Hathni Kund Barrage (HKB): 3,59,760 cusecs for 1 hour at 11:00 & 12:00 11 July 2023.
Wazirabad barrage: 11,37,020 cusecs for 2 hours from 13:00 to 15:00 13 July 2023.
Okhla barrage: 3,72,225 cusecs for 20 hours from 17:00 13 July 2023 to 13:00 14 July 2023.
ITO Barrage: Based on the peak flood level attained downstream of ITO barrage (676.90 ft which is 0.1 ft higher than of 1978 peak level) and water releases from Okhla barrage, the CWC infers 3,36,200 cusecs as peak flood discharges from the ITO barrage attained on 13 July 2023 but has no mention of time of peak level reached.
The Parliamentary Committee report at Annexure-V carries a week-long hourly water discharges data for HKB, Wazirabad and Okhla barrages from 10:00 hour 09 July 2023 to 12:00 hour 16 July 2023. The report has no such data for ITO barrage.
Failure of CWC: As per this data, cumulatively the HKB released 2,38,57,516 cusecs while Wazirabad barrage released 6,91,23,310 cusecs and Okhla barrage 3,44,23,639 cusecs between 09 to 16 July 2023. The figures show that around three times more water was released from Wazirabad barrage in comparison with HKB. Okhla barrage discharges fell nearly to half of the releases made by Wazirabad barrage. The CWC has provided no explanation for the confusing figures.
Further, as per the CWC water availability at Wazirabad barrage was already 7,72,260 cusecs even before receipt of peak discharge of 3,99,760 from HKB (3,59,760 cusecs) plus Somb river releases which merges into Yamuna downstream HKB.
The CWC suggests that once peak HKB discharges reached Wazirabad barrage, the releases further increased to 11,37,020 cusecs for 2 hours from 13:00 hour to 15:00 hour 13 July 2023. That as per the CWC is main reason behind historic floods in Delhi.
This is the quite counter intuitive and raises many questions on CWC’s role as a flood monitoring agency:
(A) The CWC has completely failed to figure out amount of water reaching Wazirabad barrage from the Yamuna catchment lying downstream HKB.
(B) Generally, the peak HKB discharges get reduced by the time it reaches Delhi due to seepages, evaporation losses along about 200 km long river stretch between HKB and Delhi. In case of saturation of floodplain due to prior flood spells in the season or constant rainfall spells, it could be equal or slightly higher than peak releases of HKB, depending on the rainfall in the catchment downstream of HKB.
(C) In July 2023 case, CWC – without providing any credible analysis of rainfall figures and water discharges data – tries to suggest Wazirabad barrage received two times more flood water from local catchment downstream HKB excluding peak HKB discharges.
(D) CWC has 5 flood monitoring station on Yamuna between HKB and Delhi Railway bridge namely Kalanaur in Saharanpur, Shergarh Tapu in Karnal, Mawi in Shamli, Baghpat and Palla in Delhi. The flood spell between 11-13 July 2023 could breach the Highest Flood Level (HFL) at none of these upstream flood monitoring stations but crossed the 1978 HFL at Delhi Railway bridge by an unbelievable margin of 1.17 meter setting 208.66 m as new HFL at 18:00 hour on 13 July 2023.
(E) There are 5 other flood monitoring stations on tributaries of Yamuna downstream HKB including 2 stations WJC MLL and Fatehgarh on Somb river in Yamuna Nagar; 2 stations Panchkaun on Burhi Yamuna and Ghodopipli on Maskara river in Saharanpur and 1 station Dhansa on Najafgarh drain. The WJC MLL station on Dadupur head at confluence of Somb and Western Yamuna canal is non-functioning while the downstream station Fatehgarh on Somb did not register significant rise during 09-13 July 2023.
The Ghodopipli and Panchkaun stations attained HFL on 11 July 2023 but water level at Dhansa station remained constant during that time. In addition to Palla station, CWC has installed computerized gauge at Jagatpuri downstream Palla and upstream Wazirabad. However, CWC has failed to reveal the sources and amount of flood water entering river Yamuna downstream HKB during the flood spell.
(F) It must be remembered that the peak discharge from HKB in Yamuna Nagar, Haryana on 03 September 1978 was 7,09,000 cusecs resulting in 207.49 m HFL at Delhi Railway bridge on 06 September 1978. However, the peak discharge from the HKB on 11 July 2023 were merely 3,59,760 cusecs for two hours which is less than half of 1978 peak discharge amount and still the 1978 HFL at Delhi Railway bridge is crossed by an unexpected margin of 1.17 m. CWC does not provide any explanation for this anomaly.
(G) Moreover, the HKB has discharged 7 lac plus peak discharges thrice since 1978 including 7,44,507 cusecs on 20 September 2010; then 8,06,464 cusecs on 17 June 2013 and 8,28,000 cusecs 18 August 2019 despite this the 1978 HFL records at Delhi Railway Bridge and downstream ITO barrage remained unbroken.
(G) Surprisingly, the CWC claims that the “Flood Level achieved at Wazirabad Barrage, Old Delhi Railway Bridge, ITO Barrage & Okhla Barrage of the year 2023 are in sync with previous flood discharge data from 1978 to 2022.” But fails to explain why the HFL 207.49 m of 06 September 1978 was breached by 1.17 m and why the 1978 flood level was crossed by just 0.1 ft downstream ITO barrage.
(H) In very next para, while holding Wazirabad barrage main reason of floods in Delhi by releasing 11,37,020 cusecs water downstream, the CWC contradicts its claim (of July 2023 flood levels being in sync with previous flood discharge data from 1978 to 2022) and says that the Wazirabad discharge of 11,37,020 cusecs figure does not sync with releases made its upstream at HKB and its downstream at Okhla.
(I) Clearly, CWC’s blaming Wazirabad barrage and giving clean chit to ITO barrage sound unconvincing. CWC has no credible information on amount of water reaching and discharged through Wazirabad barrage and wrongly justifying that closed gates of ITO barrage has no role in Delhi’s flood. The Parliamentary Committee report too has not taken note of these glaring facts.
(J) Even CWC officials privately have questioned the authenticity of water discharge figures from HKB and Wazirabad barrages during July 2023 and recorded in previous high flood events including of August 2018. This indeed raises a big question mark on the credibility of these barrage managers, CWC and entire purpose of flood monitoring.
4. No Suggestions on Preventive Steps by CWC
The MoWR, RD & GR has referred to 6 suggestions made by Haryana government (none by CWC) which includes (1) recalibration of gauge discharge curves at all 3 barrages (Wazirabad, ITO and Okhla) in NCT of Delhi, (2) re-ascertaining of present danger level at old Railway bridge, (3) preparation and implementation of flood zoning policy by Delhi government for removal of floodplain encroachment, (4) earliest removal of vegetation growth in front of gate 28 to 32 to allow smooth passage of flood water, (5) carrying out of Bathymetric survey of river Yamuna once in 5 years to address siltation problem and carry out clinical dredging accordingly, (6) mandatory annual flood preparation meeting (in May end) by Delhi government to identify vulnerable areas, ensure timely action and coordination between various agencies.
5. Recommendations of Parliamentary Committee
Broadly, the Parliamentary Committee has made four following recommendations to MoWR, RD & GR regarding ITO Barrage and Flood Management in Delhi.
1. ITO Barrage: Feeling the need of earliest sorting out of ITO barrage ownership and maintenance issues to avoid July 2023 like flood situation in Delhi, the Parliamentary Committee has asked MoWR, RD & GR to mediate in the matter and play the role of an honest broker in resolving this contentious issue between the concerned state governments by pro-actively engaging all stakeholders.
2. CWC Study Findings: The Committee asked the MoWR, RD & GR to apprise it on the findings of the CWC committee constituted for joint flood management study of river Yamuna stretch between Hathnikund and Okhla Barrage. One of the scopes of this study is to review the utility of ITO barrage in present context. There is no update on progress of this study.
3. Gauge Discharge Curves Recalibration: The committee has further asked MoWR, RD & GR to take necessary steps in coordination with the Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi state governments to recalibrate the Gause Discharge Curves of all the three Barrages in NCT of Delhi to ensure the discharges from these barrages downstream are in sync with each other. The committee should also have included the HKB for the same exercise.
4. Bathymetric Survey: The committee also suggested that Bathymetric survey of River Yamuna should be carried out once in 5 years or within a specified time period so that concern of silting of river bed could be addressed and clinical dredging could be done to accommodate the probable flood coming in River Yamuna.
Summing Up:
Overall, the Parliamentary Committee report has raised more questions than revealing the causes responsible behind unusual flood spell in Delhi in July 2023. Without providing convincing reasons, the Haryana government and CWC have ruled out role of ITO barrage closed gates in Delhi’s flood situation. Both have made confusing and contradictory statements which has also escaped the scrutiny of Parliamentary Committee. The issue requires urgent credible scientific assessment including of Wazirabad and Okhla barrages.
The dispute between Haryana and Delhi governments regarding ownership and operations of ITO barrage seems reaching no conclusion. The CWC, UYRB have also appeared non-serious on the issue. Yamuna is already starved of flows during lean season and plan of utilization of ITO barrage to divert available water in future is unviable and unjustified.
In larger context of revival of river Yamuna and flood management all concerned stakeholders must initiate plan to decommission the barrage which is standing on the river without any purpose for the past 9 years in unmaintained condition, creating a lot of safety issues, among others.
Moreover, the fact that 3 barrages, namely, Wazirabad, ITO and Okhla in just 22 km river stretch being managed by three different governments of Delhi, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh in apparently opaque manner and CWC, UYRB just running away of their responsibilities does not auger well for holistic flood management. The Parliamentary Committee should have taken note of this serious issue.
The information on water discharges through HKB, Wazirabad and Okhla barrages in the report has again raised serious questions on CWC’s role as prime flood monitoring agency. CWC has no answer on sources and amount of water reaching Wazirabad barrage from catchment downstream HKB.
Further, CWC itself does not agree with water discharge figures of Wazirabad and HKB barrages. In this context, the recalibration of gauge discharge curves as recommended by the Parliamentary Committee must be initiated on urgent basis and this exercise must include HKB.
The committee has fixed no time limit for its recommendations. It has also not adequately dealt with growing encroachment of floodplains in Delhi and corresponding impact on aggravating the flood situation.
Actually, the Committee has in limited manner dealt with the serious issue as it has neither summoned nor sought replies from DDA, PWD Delhi, NHAI, NMCG etc. which have been regularly allowing projects which are ending up further restricting the Yamuna river flowing space, encroaching on and fragmenting the floodplains. All this is ultimately proving detrimental to hydrological function of river in Delhi stretch during monsoon.
The July 2023 flood event in Delhi requires a thorough assessment to understand and address the exact reasons including the discrepancies in water discharge figures, encroachment of floodplains and siltation of riverbed. If the CWC, UYRB and barrage operators continue to be in denial and indifferent mode, a repeat of such and possibly worse flood episode is inevitable.
Bhim Singh Rawat (bhim.sandrp@gmail.com)
SANDRP 