Avoidable flood disaster from unaccountable Sardar Sarovar operation: Why was River Bed Power House stopped since Sept 6?

The avoidable flood disaster brought in Gujarat and upstream Madhya Pradesh, starting from the night of Sept 16, 2023 by unaccountable operation of the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) Dam has created unimaginable impacts for lakhs of people in several districts, the full contours of the damage are still not fully available. But another intriguing aspect of this man-made disaster has come to light. Shockingly, there was no power generation at the 1200 MW River Bed Power House (RBPH) of the SSP from Sept 6 to Sept 16. This not only means loss of power generation of about 270 million units (MU), worth over Rs 80 Crores even at low price of Rs 3 per unit), but also it would have meant release of 1200 cumecs or, 42000 cusecs and over ten days, this would have meant reduction of about 12000 cumecs or 4.2 lakh cusecs from peak discharge for 24 hours, and this itself would have hugely reduced the flood disaster.

Involvement of large number of official agencies Since SSP is an interstate project with power shared by Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat in the ratio of 57:27:16, the decision about operation of SSP power houses is taken by the inter-state coordinating body Narmada Control Authority (NCA). So the decision about stopping the operation of all six units of RBPH from Sept 5 must have been taken and approved by NCA. It also means that this decision had the approval of BJP ruled state governments of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, since they are the 57 and 27% beneficiary of the power generated at RBPH. Since NCA is essentially under Union Jal Shakti Ministry, it implies that the ministry was also in the know and had approved this step. All this goes to show that this a pre-planned move with approval and knowledge of all number of agencies.

Missing daily reports on NCA website The NCA website daily provides the reservoir and plant report. The reservoir report provides the daily level, inflow and outflows from key reservoirs in the Narmada Valley including SSP. The Daily Plant report provides the daily generation at RBPH and CHPH (Canal Head Power House) of SSP. However, in a strange turn of events, currently, NCA website has no such reports since Sept 6, 2023 as we write this. [Subsequent to publication of this piece, NCA had uploaded the daily reports!]

To ascertain if the RBPH was indeed not operational for ten full days before Sept 16, 2023, we had to take recourse to alternative official sources of information, namely website of the Western Region Load Dispatch Centre[i] and the daily generation reports from National Power Portal[ii]. The date wise information on both websites corroborates that indeed none of the six 200 MW units of RBPH were operational for ten days from Sept 6 to Sept 15 (both included). During these dates four of the five 50 MW units of CHPH (the fifth one was under outage) were operational, but that too far below full capacity.  

Considering that during lower rainfall during August 2023, RBPH generated 842.67 MU, or about 27.18 MU per day, when the water level was also generally lower than that in Sept 2023, we can assume that RBPH could have generated at least 27 MU of power during these ten days. According to SSNNL 2023 Flood Memorandum[iii], a unit of RBHP releases 200 cumecs (7000 cusecs) water when runs at full capacity, so 6 units of RBPH would release 1200 cumecs (42000 Cusecs) water. When the total water release thus forgone due to stoppage of RBPH for ten days is counted and it would mean reduction of peak discharge from 18.61 lakh cusecs (0500 hrs on Sept 17) to no more than 13.42 lakh cusecs by this factor alone. This is assuming that the peak discharge reduction is spread over 28 hours of peak discharge from SSP from 1800 hrs on Sept 16 to 2200 hrs on Sept 17, reducing the peak discharge during this entire period to less than 38000 cumecs or 13.42 lakh cusecs. [Using here flow rates rather than volumes for illustrative purpose only.]

In fact, even from Aug 31 to Sept 5 (6 days) and also on Sept 16, average running hours of RBPH units were only 11 hours. If RBPH were to run for full hours during these seven days, that would have meant further reduction of peak outflows from SSP during peak floods, further reducing the flood disaster proportions.

Considering that the SSNNL authorities had about 72 additional hours to take advance action, the peak discharge from SSP could have been brought down further to around 6-7 lakh cusecs, which would have meant practically no flooding.

It is clear that due to the blundering of a number of agencies including SSNNL, Gujarat Govt, CWC, NCA and others, the Sardar Sarovar Dam ended up creating a man-made disaster that was completely avoidable. Whether their objective was to present a full SSP releasing water from the spillways on Sept 17, 2023, for PM’s birthday is secondary issue. The fact is they ended up creating the massive avoidable flood disaster for lakhs of people upstream and downstream of SSP. And since they have done this in the past, including in 2019 and 2020 and got away unpunished means they would continue to do that for the SSP upstream and downstream population, the threat of man-made disaster will keep looming on them every year.

Damage worse than in Sept 2020: The full scale of the damage created by this man-made disaster is not yet known, but from whatever information is available so far, it clear that this year, the damage is much more than in the similar man-made disaster in Sept 2020. This clearly indicated by the much larger peak releases from SSP this year, at 18.61 lakh cusecs compared to around 10.5 lakh cusecs in Sept 2020. According to one report[iv], the damage in Bharuch district alone as per available information is:

– Cities like Bharuch, Ankleshwar severely affected.
–  In 4 Talukas, in 216 villages, 59164 pucca houses and 44911 kutcha houses affected.
– Crops in 1.34 lakh Ha destroyed.
– 5.94 people have been affected one way or the other.
– There are huge impacts on business, industries, people’s houses, and lives in general.

SSP got 50 year flood this time If we go by the SSP Flood Memorandum 2023, the 50 year flood inflow at SSP is supposed to be 62345 cumecs or 22.07 lakh cusecs. Compared to that, the peak inflow into SSP this time was 63950 cumecs or 22.58 lakh cusecs, at 0100 hrs on Sept 17. This means that the inflow into SSP this year was higher than 50 year flood, so this was certainly a 50 years flood. As we noted earlier this was the result of the heavy upstream rainfall that started on Sept 14, which both CWC and SSNNL failed to take into account and forecast the inflows. This abject failure of both these institutes raises serious questions about our ability to forecast such floods and take advance action. If with all the available information, if we cannot forecast even peak inflows, how can be hope to prevent and reduce disasters or manage disasters?

Did SSP receive and release higher than CWC figures? The peak outflow from SSP, if we go by CWC figures, was 18.61 lakh cusecs at 0500 hrs on Sept 17. However, as per SSNNL Flood Memorandum 2023, with water level of 38.9 m (the peak water level at Garudeshwar this year as per Garudeshwar hydrograph above from CWC), the flow at Garudeshwar would be 60550 cumecs or 21.38 lakh cusecs, much higher than the CWC peak outflow from SSP of 18.61 L cusecs.

Similarly with actual peak water level of 12.34 m attained at Golden Bridge in Bharuch (see the hydrograph for Bharuch above), the flow would be 65000 cumecs or 22.95 lakh cusecs, much higher than the water release of 18.61 L cusecs as per CWC hydrograph. Part of the increase could be due to the catchment downstream from SSP, but there could also be some inaccuracy in CWC figures of peak discharge from SSP.

Did under construction Bhadbhut barrage worsen the floods in the upstream? The Bhadbhut barrage on Narmada river in Gujarat is under construction, downstream of Bharuch. About 400 m of river width from both northern and southern side of the river is blocked currently for the project, leaving just about 800 m of gap in between. This obstruction in the path of water is bound to create additional submergence in the upstream, on both sides of the river. It is feared by many in Gujarat that this may have been a factor in further increasing the flood disaster.

Lame Excuse of Gujarat Govt. The Gujarat govt so far has not been able to come out with any explanation for this man-made disaster created by them. The only rather lame excuse that both the Narmada minister and Chief Minister has come out is that there were heavy rains in the catchment, releases from upstream dams and inflow of over 22 lakh cusecs into SSP and they actually managed to reduce the outflow to 18.61 lakh cusecs. This does not explain anything and it actually insults the intelligence of the audience. These were facts known in advance, why did they not take action of advance releases based on this information? Why they could not forecast inflows? Why they did not operate any of the RBPH units for ten days prior to Sept 16, when they operated them throughout August and upto Sept 5? Why was there no disaster management in place? Why there is no accountability of the man-made disasters created in the past by SSP including in 2020? Why there is no inquiry into past disasters?

Clearly there is a lot that the concerned agencies like SSNNL, Gujarat Govt, NCA, CWC, NDMA and Union govt, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh govt, among others need to answer to the lakhs of people in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh who have suffered due to this avoidable disaster.

This report can also be seen in Hindi here. Please also click links to see English and Hindi versions of first part of this report.

SANDRP (ht.sandrp@gmail.com)

PS: 1. Video in Gujarati by a tribal boy about his feelings following the disaster: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?extid=WA-UNK-UNK-UNK-IOS_GK0T-GK1C&mibextid=j8LeHn&v=1363318847593031

2. As per this report, the estimated damage in two districts of Bharuch and Narmada is at least Rs 3000 crores due to the floods. Farmers of some 214 villages have seen destruction of their crops over some 3 lakh ha.
https://watchgujarat.com/bharuch-narmada-district-river-water-return-back-face-huge-lost

3. The officials of Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited (SSNNL) are in a spot amid dam “mismanagement” allegations even as they claim they were “only following instructions”. They say the Gujarat government had requested the Narmada Control Authority to shut the riverbed powerhouse between September 6 and 14 due to “lack of rain” in the catchment areas and the “declining water level in the Sardar Sarovar basin” to “ensure that Gujarat is awarded its share of nine million acre feet” of water for the current year.
– The SSNNL officials add that the onus of explaining the rationale behind the “special request” to bypass the dam filling safety protocol after it crosses the 130-m mark should not be on SSNNL. “The state government should respond to the accusations to make clear that SSNNL has not mismanaged the dam… It is true that the monsoon turned weak in August and the dam reservoir needed to be preserved. But there has been heavy rainfall in Madhya Pradesh that was released water to Sardar Sarovar, which upset the calculations,” a senior official said.
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/ahmedabad/gujarat-confidential-in-a-water-fix-8947571/

4. One Mr Nirnay Kapoor tries to defend the indefensible situation of SSNNL (which itself has passed the buck to GOG, see above) and GOG. But he uses selective facts and argument, does not really answer any of the questions as to why SSNNL operators could not have started release of water on Sept 14 and why like in case of August, the RBPH could not have been operated at full capacity in Sept.
https://twitter.com/nirnaykapoor/status/1704771987149856945

5. This BBC (Gujarati) video narrates the pathetic situation and anger of the people in Bharuch dist of Gujarat. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=172535975886279&extid=CL-UNK-UNK-UNK-AN_GK0T-GK1C&ref=sharing&mibextid=Nif5oz

6. This BBC (Gujarati) video narrates the story of 1500-2000 people who were dependent on cultivation over Dhanturiya island in Narmada river. Their crops were green and healthy, but have been totally washed away by the dam floods brought by SSP on Sept 16-18. Even the land is uncultivable with sand casting. Their 36 tractors have been submerged in the soil. Will they even get any compensation?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWdAhLep4mY

7. In the following report, NCA totally corroborates what SANDRP has been writing.
In this report NCA contradicts SSNNL and Gujarat Govt.
– A top official of the Narmada Control Authority told Scroll that the floods were “man-made” since even in conditions of the heavy rainfall, the water release “could have been comfortably managed”.
– Tejram Nayak, member (civil) of the Narmada Control Authority, said the abrupt release of water should have been avoided. “Gates should have been opened partially at least 48 hours before they were,” said Nayak, a senior scientist at the National Institute of Hydrology.
– However, Nayak pointed out that while there were “drought-like” conditions in the region since August, the weather forecast suggested a turn in the conditions in September. “I had instructed the dam authority to operate [the river bed] powerhouse with full capacity on September 7 itself,” he said. Scroll has seen his correspondence with one of the dam authorities. “Had they operated from 7th till 16th, around 2,500 mcm [million cubic metres] capacity could have been created and that would have absorbed the flood,” Nayak said. He added: “This disaster could have been avoided.”
– However, the Narmada Control Authority’s data contradicts these claims (SSNNL). Its daily reports, shared with all the dam authorities and available on its website, show that there was substantial rainfall in the Narmada basin starting September 14. The reports also reveal that the Indira Sagar project, along with other dams upstream, had started releasing significant amounts of water on September 15 itself.
– When asked if the Narmada Control Authority had instructed the Sardar Sarovar authorities to open the gates in view of the higher inflow from upstream, secretary D Ilanchezhiyan said, “We acted very correctly according to the mandate.” Nayak said the final decision on whether to open the spillway lay with the dam authorities. “We can give only directions to the chief engineer,” he said. “Why they did not open, you have to ask them.” The Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited did not respond to repeated requests for comment from Scroll.
https://scroll.in/article/1056412/ahead-of-modis-birthday-gujarat-dam-delayed-water-release-despite-heavy-rain-and-official-alerts

8. According to this report in Gujarati newspapers, at least 35 villages are affected in Bharuch dist: Bharuch Taluka: 6; Ankleshwar Taluka 15; Jhagadia Taluka: 12; Hansot: 1 and Vagra 1.

Cash relief of Rs 17.58 lakhs have been distributed to 9280 affected. Standing crop in about 5850 acres have been destroyed in two dists, amounting to loss of Rs 400-500 Cr.

9. According to this Rajasthan Patrika report from MP, when 13 gates of Bargi were opened on 15th Sept, the water level was above the FRL of 422.76 m, a clear violation of Rule Curve. Similarly both Tawa and Indira Sagar were full and only after that gates were opened. Sudden opening of 13 Bargi gates on Sept 15 affected areas in Narsimhapur, Narmada puram, Jabalpur and upto Khandwa.
https://epaper.patrika.com/article/BhopalCity?OrgId=24947e41d99&eid=64&imageview=1&standalone=1&device=desktop

10. BBC (Gujarati) report on the damages to farmers and rejection of paltry compensation offered.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9tutebZq1w

Other Parts of this analysis:
1. Part 1 of analysis in English: https://sandrp.in/2023/09/17/unaccountable-sardar-sarovar-operators-again-bring-avoidable-floods-in-downstream-gujarat/
2. Part 2 of analysis in English: https://sandrp.in/2023/09/20/avoidable-flood-disaster-from-unaccountable-sardar-sarovar-operation-why-was-river-bed-power-house-stopped-since-sept-6/
3. Part 1 of analysis in Hindi: https://shorturl.at/ctDM1
4. Part 2 of analysis in Hindi: https://shorturl.at/qxAOZ

REFERENCES:

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[i] https://reporting.wrldc.in/dailyreports/PSP/2023/September/

[ii] https://npp.gov.in/dgrReports

[iii] https://www.sardarsarovardam.org/document/pagecontent/Flood%20Memorandum%202023.-1.pdf

[iv] https://watchgujarat.com/bharuch-narmada-river-water-run-into-city-drone-video-historic-situation